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I Introduction 
1 Game theoretic models and concepts 
1.1 Conflict situations 
This monograph deals with several subjects in game theory. Game theory is a mathe-
matical theory to model and analyze conflict situations. A conflict situation can be a 
classical game, like chess, but also an economy with many people (called players) in-
volved, each with their own capacities, knowledge, behavior, likes and dislikes. The first 
task of game theory is the modeling of such a conflict: selecting the relevant issues and 
putting them into a mathematical framework. 
Each player acts according to his capacity, restrained by e.g. rules of the game or 
physical constraints. The acts of all players together determine an outcome. Each 
player valuates this outcome in his own way. Actually, one can hardly speak of a conflict 
if all players valúate the outcomes in the same (or a similar) way. Yet, this situation will 
not be excluded beforehand, so the notion 'conflict' should be taken in a broad sense. 
In general (but not always), the outcome itself is not interesting for game theorists, but 
• only the way the players evaluate it. Often these evaluations will be considered to be 
the outcome of the game. 
By two examples we try to give an impression which issues can be important. The 
examples show that different assumptions on the possibilities of negotiation among the 
players lead to different outcomes. Different aspects of the game become important. 
Example 1.1 : Two friends are shopping in a large store. They lose each other. From 
earlier occassions they .know, that if this happens, they wait for each other at the exit. 
Unfortunately, this store has two exits, one at the east side and one at the west side. 
What should the players do? 
If a game theorist wants to model this situation, the first thing to do is telling what 
the possibilities of the players are. Optional actions are 'going east' and 'going west'. 
Furthermore, flipping a coin and letting chance decide which way to go might be included 
as well. Other actions seem to be irrelevant. Secondly, he has to model the evaluations 
of the players of all possible outcomes. In this example, it seems sufficient to qualify 
each outcome where both players go to the same exit as 'positive' (for both players) and 
each other outcome as 'negative'. 
If this is the only information available, it is hard to tell what to do. It changes if we 
assume that there is a pre-play communication round: before the actual play a meeting 
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takes place, where the players can discuss and negotiate what to do. In the example, a 
player could say in the pre-play: "In case we lose each other, let us meet at the west 
exit." 
Besides that, we have to make another assumption on the behavior of the players, since 
if the players just act in a chaotic way, nothing can be predicted. We assume that 
the players are rational. That is, whenever for a player a specific strategy yields a 
higher utility level than another one, whatever the other players do, he will certainly 
not choose the one with the lower utility level. We also assume that everybody knows 
that everybody acts rationally, everybody knows that everybody knows this, and so on. 
With these assumptions, a reasonable outcome is that the players choose one of the exits 
in the pre-play and go there in the game. 
Example 1.2: Two players, called 1 and 2, both have two strategies. Those of player 
1 are called top and bottom, the strategies of player 2 are called left and right. The 
utilities are reñected in the following bimatrix: 
left right 
top /(10,20) (70,0) \ 
bottom \ (0,20) (20,30) / 
If, for instance, player 1 plays top and player 2 plays left, the outcome will be the top-left 
entry of the matrix; 10 for player 1 and 20 for player 2. 
The outcome of this game will depend on the possibilities of the players in the pre-play. 
If they cannot make binding agreements, we speak of a non-cooperative game. In this 
case, player 1 can (and will, because he is rational) make the following line of thought, 
whatever might have been said in the pre-play: "If player 2 chooses Jeft, my best strategy 
is top. If he chooses right, my best strategy is top as well. Therefore I will play top." 
Player 2, being rational and deducing that player 1 will play top, plays left. The payoff 
will be (10,20). 
In the case the players can make binding agreements, we deal with a cooperative game. 
The players may agree to play a certain outcome. The nature of the game changes 
completely. The strategic aspects become less important, while the negotiations in the 
pre-play become crucial. Let us consider what each coalition can achieve in the example 
(a coalition is a non-empty subset of the player set). Player 1 alone can guarantee himself 
10 by playing top. Player 2 gets at least 20 if he plays left. The coalition {1,2} can 
achieve all outcomes in the set {(10,20), (0,20), (70,0), (20,30)}. The following figure 
illustrates the situation: 
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(0,20)' (10,20) 
_(70,0) 
Figure 1.3 
Player 1 will not agree with a point left of the vertical line through the point (10,20). 
Player 2 will not agree with a point below the horizontal line through (10,20). Hence, 
only outcomes in the striped area are taken into consideration. The options are (10,20) 
and (20,30). Since (20,30) is for both better than (10,20), they will agree to play 
(bottom, right). 
This type of games are called non-transferabie utility games or NTU-games. In such 
games, for each coalition its set of attainable outcomes is the only important issue. 
Let us return to the example. If we assume that the utility functions express money, 
say dollars, the players can make an agreement in which side payments are used. For 
instance, the players can agree to play (top,right), under the condition that player 1 
gives $40,- to player 2, yielding the payoff (30,40). It turns out that the payoff vector 
of an outcome is not relevant, but only the sum of its coordinates. 
This type of games are called transferable utility games or TU-games . For each coalition 
the only important issue is the value of its most valuable attainable outcome. 
In the example, the value of player 1 is 10, the one of player 2 is 20 and the value of 
their union is 70. 
In the following section we will formalize the types of games discussed in this section. 
1.2 Games and solution concepts 
This section gives the general models of games and briefly discusses well known solution 
concepts. A solution concept on a family Q of games assigns to each game in Q an 
outcome or a set of outcomes of the game. Solution concepts can be considered as 
recommendations to the involved players for certain possible outcomes. Sometimes they 
even predict the actual outcome of the game. 
We introduce a basic model in Game Theory: 
Definition 1.4: A strategic game or game in strategic form is described by a triple 
(N, {X,}l€N, Mies), in which 
N = {1,2, . . . , n} is the set of players (also called the grand coalition), 
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for each player i 6 Ν, Xt denotes his strategy space or action space, 
for each г G Ν, player г's payoff function or utility function ut is given by 
u, : Π
 х
з —•
 R 
An element of YI}ÇN XJ is called a strategy profíle or outcome. The model is used 
to describe non-cooperative games. We will use it in part IV. The most fundamental 
solution concept for non-cooperative games is the concept of Nasi equilibria, introduced 
by Nasi (1951). An outcome is called a Nash equilibrium, when no player can gain by 
deviating from his strategy, given that all other players do not change their strategies. 
If binding agreements can be made, it is only relevant which outcomes coalitions (subsets 
of N) can achieve. This is reflected in the following model: 
Definition 1.5 : A non-transferable utility game or NTU-game is described by a tuple 
(N, {V(S)}Se2N^) or (N, V), in which 
N = { 1 , . . . , n) is the set of players, 
V(S) Ç IR' for each coalition S. 
Here, 2^ denotes the collection of subsets of N. V(S) denotes the set of attainable 
payoff vectors if the coalition S is formed. In the case of cooperative games, outcomes 
are also called allocations. Mostly the sets V(S) are assumed to have some convenient 
properties, like closedness, comprehensiveness, convexity and boundedness from above. 
Since we will not make use of the NTU-model, we will not discuss the details of this 
model. 
In the parts I, II and III, we will discuss transferable utility games. These games have 
a very basic model. It is assumed that there exists some good (like money) such that 
if a player gives one unit of this good to another player, his utility will decrease with 
one and the utility of the other will increase with one. Hence, it makes sense to speak 
of the utility of a coalition for each outcome. Therefore the very essence of the conflict 
situation is kept in the model: for each coalition the maximum of the sum of the values 
of the outcomes this coalition can achieve. 
Definition 1.6 : A transferable utility game or TU-game is described by a tuple (TV, υ), 
in which 
N = { 1 , . . . , n} is the set of players, 
ν : 2N —• IR is the characteristic function of the game which obeys υ(φ) = 0. 
Often the function ν is referred to as 'the game ν '. 
The class of TU-games can be considered as a subclass of the NTU-games. Namely, the 
Tl/-game (TV, v) corresponds with the NTU-g&me (N, V) with: 
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V(S) = {x € IRS | x(S) < v(S)}, {S С Ν) 
in which χ (S) is another way to denote 52,
eSa:t In case the model contains too little 
information, one can extend it in many ways This will be done in chapter 6, in which 
a graph is given that expresses communication restrictions, and in chapters 7 and 8, in 
which the underlying economic situation that generates the TU-game plays a role in the 
selection of reasonable allocations 
There are several well known solution concepts for TU-games We will start with the 
formal definition of a solution concept 
Definition 1.7 A solution or solution concept φ on a family of Q of TU-games is a 
rule tbat assigns to each game (N,v) e Q a subset of IR 
It is allowed that a concept assigns the empty set to some or all games If φ assigns to 
each game a singleton, we call φ a one point solution In this case, we consider <p(N, v) 
to be an element of R (instead of a subset of IR with one element) 
Most of the current concepts obey the property of efficiency, ι e for all (N, v) € Q 
x(N) = v{N) for all χ e φ(Ν, υ) 
This property is based on the assumption that all players will cooperate, ι e the grand 
coalition will form Another common property is individuai rationality A solution on 
Q is individual rational if for all (N, v) € Q and all г £ N 
Χι > «(г) for all χ € φ(Ν,υ) 
Not only concepts, but also allocations can have the efficiency and individua/ rational­
ity properties For each TÍZ-game (Ν, υ), the set of efficient and individual rational 
allocations is called the imputation set or Ι(υ) 
1{υ) = {x € R* I x(N) = v{N), x, > v(i) for all г € Ν} 
If υ(Ν) < Σι ν{ι)} the imputation set is empty The set of allocations that obey solely 
efficiency is called the preimputation set or Γ(ν) 
I'(ν) = { i e l " | x{N) = v{N)} 
The notion excess plays a role in many solution concepts Let (N, v) be a TU-game 
For each vector ι 6 R and every coalition S Ç N the excess of S with respect to x, or 
exc(S, i ) , is defined by exc(S,x) = v(S) - x(S) 
The excess of S at χ represents the total gain (which can be negative) to the members of 
S if they reject χ and actually form S For any preimputation, the excess of the grand 
coalition and the empty set are equal to zero The imputation set is the set of efficient 
allocations where all one person coalitions have a non-positive excess 
The соте, defined by Gillies (1953), is the set of (pre) imputations in which all coalitions 
have a non-positive excess For any TU-game (N,v), we define 
core{v) = {xe I{v) | exc{S,x) < 0 for all S Ç Ν} 
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The core is a very natural concept, but it has the disadvantage that it can be empty. 
The bargaining set, introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964), is an extension of the 
core. It is defined on the class of games with a non-empty imputation set. Let (N, v) be 
an element of this class. Let χ be an imputation. An objection of player г against player 
j (with respect to the imputation x) is a coalition S Ç N with i e S Ç N\j and a vector 
С 
у e R such that у* > ík for all players к € S and y (S) = v(S). И χ e Ι (ν) and the 
objection (5, y) of player i against player j are given, a counter objection is a coalition 
Τ with j € Τ С N\i and a vector ζ € IRT with ζ (Τ) = υ {Τ), ζ, > y, for all i € S Γ) Τ 
and Zi > xt for all г € T\S. If every objection with respect to the imputation χ can be 
countered, then χ is, by definition, an element of the bargaining set. The bargaining set 
of (Ν, v) is denoted by M{v). It is always non-empty. As core elements do not allow 
any objection, M(v) contains the core. 
The Jeast core (Maschler et al. (1979)) is also non-empty. It is a subset of the core, 
whenever the latter is non-empty. It is the set of imputations where the maximal excess 
of the proper subsets of N is minimal and is denoted by C(v): 
£(v) = {x € Ι (υ) | max exc(S,x) < max exc(S,y) for all у e Ι (υ)}, 
in which Μ = 2Ν\{φ,Ν}. If we maximize over the preimputation set, we speak of the 
preleast core: 
£*(«) = { i 6 I*(v) | max exc(S,x) < max exc{S,y) for all y € I'(ν)}. 
The definition of the least core is not the same as in Maschler et al. (1979), in which 
the least core has been defined to be what we call the preleast core, but it is analogous 
to the definitions of the (pre)imputation set and the (pre)kernel. 
The JcerneJ has been introduced by Davis and Mascbler (1965). Before we can define it 
we give the notion surplus. Let (JV, V) be a TC-game. The surplus of player i against 
player j (with respect to allocation i ) , called s,j(i), is defined by: 
st](x) = max{ea;c(5,a;) | г 6 S Ç N\j}. 
The allocation χ is an element of the kernel )C(v) if χ € I(v) and for all pairs (г, j), i^j: 
StJ(x) < S„{x) ОГ Xj = v{j). 
The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (see Davis and Maschler (1965) for more 
details). The prekernel of υ or fc*(v) is the set of preimputations χ with st](x) = s3i(x) 
for all pairs (i,j), іфз-
The prekernel has the disadvantage that it does not obey individual rationality. The 
advantages are that it can be defined for games with an empty imputation set and that 
it has a simpler definition than the kernel. This can be convenient when the kernel and 
prekernel coincide, which is the case under mild conditions (Theorem 2.1). 
We continue with the nucJeoJus, introduced by Schmeidler (1969). The excess map 
E:H —> IR is given by E(x) = [exc(S,x)}sç\i- Furthermore, we need the map 
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θ : R —> R that orders the coordinates of a vector (in R ) in a weakly decreasing 
way. The nucJeo^s of(N, v) or Nu(v) is defined to be the set of vectors in I(v) in which 
the function θ ο E attains its lexicographical minimum. 
Schmeidler (1969) proved that the nucleolus of a game (with a non-empty imputation 
set) contains precisely one element. This element is called the nucleolus as well. It will 
be denoted by nu(v) or nu. The nucleolus is an element of the kernel, and therefore of 
the bargaining set as well. 
The prenucleolus Nu*(v) is the set of vectors in I*(v) where θ ο E attains its lexico­
graphical minimum. Once more this is a singleton. The element will be denoted by 
nu*(v). 
The (pre)nucleolus is an element of the (pre)kernel and also of the core in the case 
the core is non-empty. The intersection of the core and the kernel is also denoted by 
core-kernel or CK,. 
Finally we recall the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). There are several definitions of 
this concept. We will give the one that corresponds to the following interpretation. Let 
(N, v) be a TÎZ-game. Suppose the players enter a room one by one in a randomly chosen 
order. Each player gets the amount that he contributes to the present coalition, i.e. if 
coalition S is already present when player г enters the room, player г gets v(SUi) — v(S). 
The Shapley value of υ or Φ(ν) allocates to each player in N the expected amount he 
gets by this procedure. In formula, for all г € Ν: 
Φ.(«) = ^ Σ>(01 °b) < "(ОН - "ib I σ{]) < а(г)}), 
in which σ runs through the set of rankings of N. 
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2 General preliminaries about TU-games and graphs 
This section contains definitions, notations and known results that are used in more 
than one chapter. For notions not mentioned, we refer to the Index of notations and the 
Subject index. 
2.1 TU-games 
Let (N, v) be a TCZ-game. A subset of N is called proper if it is non-empty and not 
N itself. The collection of proper subsets of N is denoted by M. If we give a coalition 
explicitly, we do not use angle brackets but parentheses and often omit the commas, e.g. 
(ij) instead of {i,j}. To reduce the number of parentheses, we denote e.g. v(S U (j)) 
byv(Suj). 
Several subclasses, often cones, of the set of TU-games deserve special attention. A 
game (N, v) is called monotonie if v(S) < v(T) for all S Ç T. A game is called zero-
normalized if v(i) = 0 for all players г 6 N. The zero-normaiization of (Ν,υ) is the 
game (N,v0), defined by: 
w„(S) = t>(S) - 5 > ( i ) . (SCN) 
•es 
Two games (N, v) and (N, w) are equivalent if v0 = Ли/о for some positive number A > 0. 
A property is invariant if there is no equivalent pair of games such that one of them 
has the property and the other one has not. A game (N, v) is zero-monotonic if щ is 
monotonie. Zero-monotonicity is an invariant notion, where monotonicity is not. In 
fact, every equivalence class contains both monotonie games and non-monotonic games. 
The following theorem gives a convenient property of zero-monotonic games. 
Theorem 2.1 : (Maschler et al. (1979)) If (Ν, ν) is a zero-monotonic TU-game, then the 
prcleast core equals the least core, the prekernel equals the kernel and the prenucleolus 
equals the nucleolus. 
A game (N, v) is called superadditive if for every pair of disjoint coalitions (S, T) we 
have: 
v{S)+v(T) <v(Sl)T). 
The cone of superadditive games with player set TV is denoted by SAN. Superadditive 
games are zero-monotonic. A game is called convex if for every S,T Ç N: 
v(S) + v{T) < v{S U T) + v{S Π Γ). 
Convex games are superadditive. A game is called concave if for every S,T Ç Ν: 
v{S) + v(T) > v(S U T) + v(S Π Τ). 
The game υ is called additive if it is convex and concave, i.e. VQ — 0. 
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These properties are all invariant. 
A solution concept φ on a class of games Q is called covariant if for all pairs of equivalent 
games (N,v), {N,w) in Q we have: 
ψ{υ) = (o(l),. . ., α(η)) + λφ{ιν), 
in which (N, a) is an additive game, λ > 0 and υ = a + Aw. The (pre)imputation set, 
core, bargaining set, (pre)least core, (pre)kernel, (pre)nucleolus and Shapley value are 
all covariant concepts. 
N 
Let S Ç N. The indicator vector es is the 0,1-vector in IR with e$, = 1 if and only if 
г € S. We denote e^y by e, for each г G N. Such vectors are also called unit vectors. 
Let ß be a collection of coalitions. Then В is called balanced on S if В = ф or if there 
are XT € IR++ (T e В) and μ, > 0 (г £ S) such that: 
ΤζΒ igS 
U S = Ν, then ß is called balanced. The numbers Ar (Τ e ß) are called balancing 
weights. Note that we call the empty collection balanced. A game (N,v) is called 
balanced if for each non-empty balanced collection В with balancing weights {Хт}тев: 
£ Χ
τ
υ(Τ) < υ(Ν). 
тев 
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) independently proved that a game is balanced if 
and only if it has a non-empty core. The class of balanced games with player set N 
is denoted by BAN. Let 5 Ç N. The subgame of ν to S, denoted by i;s, is the game 
(S,vs) with vs(T) — v{T) for all Τ Ç S. We denote the subgame of υ with player set 
N\S by v~s. The game ν is called totally balanced if vs is balanced for every S Ç N. 
Let χ e Γ{ν) and t 6 R. Then ß ((i) is the set: 
Bt{x) = {SeM\exc{S,x)>t}. 
These sets are called Kohlberg's collections. 
The carrier c(x) of a vector χ 6 IR is defined by: 
c(x) = {teN\x,¿0}. 
The non-carrier is the complement of the carrier and is denoted by nc(x). 
The following well known theorem characterizes the nucleolus by balancedness of the 
collections Bt'. 
Theorem 2.2 : (Kohlberg (1971)) Let (JV, v) be a zero-normalized TU-game and let 
χ € Ι (υ). Then χ = nu(v) if and only if for each t € R the collection Bt{x) is balanced 
on c(x). 
A similar characterization has been found for the prenucleolus: 
Theorem 2.3: (Sobolev (1975)) Let (N,v) be a TV-game and let χ € Г (ν). Then 
x = пи* (υ) if and only if for each t G IR the collection Bt(x) is balanced. 
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A T[/-game (N, v) is called simple if v{S) e {0,1} for all S С N. We denote the set 
of all monotonie simple games with player set N by SN. A monotonie simple game ν 
is determined by its minimal winning coalitions, i.e. coalitions with value 1 while all 
proper subcoalitons have value 0. We denote the collection of minimal winning coalitions 
by W„. On the other hand, let W be a collection of coalitions of N such that S % Τ for 
all coalitions S,T e W, S φ T. The game (N,u
w
) defined by 
u
w
(S) = 1 if there is a coalition Τ e W with Τ С S, 
u
w
 {S) = 0 else, 
is a monotonie simple game. This gives a 1-1 correspondence between monotonie simple 
games and collections W € 2M with 5 % Τ if S, Τ e W and S φ Τ. If W„ = {Τ} for 
some coalition T, we call ν a unanimity game and denote the game by UT instead of 
U{T}· Similarly, we denote e.g. ЩТ,(І)} by ит,і-
A player is called a veto player if v(S) = 0 for all S С N with i £ S. Games with veto 
players are veto games. We denote the set of veto players by veto(v). If player г is a 
veto player of game υ, then υ is called an i-veto game. 
2.2 Graphs and networks 
Many ways to define graphs, networks and all kinds of notions exist in this field. In this 
section we give formal, but robust and general definitions. 
A graph Γ is a triple (V,E,ct), in which V and E are finite sets. Here, V is the set of 
nodes, also called vertices, and E is the set of edges or arcs. Let V2(V) be the collection 
of subsets of V with one or two elements. 
The function a: E —У (V χ V) U г( ) assigns to each edge an ordered pair of nodes 
or a 1-set or 2-set of nodes. If a(e) G V χ V, then e is called directed, otherwise it is 
called undirected. Hence, we allow a graph to have both directed and undirected edges. 
Moreover, it is possible that there are several edges between two nodes. If all edges are 
(un)directed, then Γ is called (un)directed as well. If a(e) = (v, v) or a(e) = {v} for 
some node v, then e is called a bop. If a(e) — {v,w), we say that e comes from ν and 
points at w. The node ν is called the taiJ of e, or tail(e) and the node w is called the head 
of e, or head(e). A subgraph {V, E', a') of Γ is a graph with V' Ç V, E' С E in which 
a' is the restriction of a to E'. The range of a' must be a subset of (V χ V) U гі ). 
Usually, it is not necessary to be so formal and we will not mention the function a. 
Instead we speak of an undirected edge between nodes υ and w and a directed edge from 
ν to w. 
A (simple) path from node ν to node ω is a sequence of different nodes VQ,V\,. .. ,vp 
with υ = VQ and w = vp such that for each fceN, к < p—1 there is an undirected edge 
between Vk and Vk+i or a directed edge from vi¡ to υ*+ι· Sometimes the set of involved 
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arcs is also called a path from υ to w. 
A cycie is a sequence of (at least two) different nodes vQ,vi,... ,vp such that for each 
к 6 IN, к < ρ there is a (directed or undirected) edge between vk and Vk+\- Here, vp+i 
equals VQ by convention. The set of involved arcs is called a cycle as well. 
A circuit is a sequence of (at least two) different nodes υ0,υχ,...,υρ such that for each 
к g Ν, к < ρ there is an undirected edge between U/t and гі^ +і or there is a directed edge 
from Vk to Vk+i (again, vp+i = vo). The set of involved arcs is called a circuit as well. In 
the case of an udirected graph, the notions circuit and cycle coincide. 
The following notions are mainly used in the case of an undirected graph. A subset V' 
of V is called connected if for every v, w e V' there is a path from υ to w using only 
nodes in V'. A connected set of nodes is a component if none of its strict supersets are 
connected. A graph is a forest if it contains no cycles. A forest is called a tree if it has 
just one component. 
In case a graph is decorated with certain extras (like capacities, prices or lengths of the 
edges) we speak of a network. In this monograph the notion now network is used many 
times. In a flow network each edge e has a non-negative (possibly infinite) capacity, 
called cap(e). We denote Deec c a P( e ) by cap(C) for each С Ç E. To define a flow 
properly we have to be able to distinguish the endpoints of an undirected edge that is 
not a loop. We choose arbitrarily one of them and call it head(e). The other one will 
be tail{e). 
A now is a function ƒ : E —» IR such that: 
0 < f(e) < cap(e) for all directed edges e, 
| ƒ (e) | < cap(e) for all undirected edges e. 
For each node ν we define: 
in(v) = {e 6 E | head(e) = v} and' out(v) = {e e E \ tail(e) — v}. 
The inflow of a node υ (given a flow ƒ) is by definition Σ£6»η(υ)/(e)- Similarly, the 
Outflow ÍS Eeeout(v) / ( e ) -
Often there are two specific nodes: the source (So) and the sink (Si). A now from source 
to sink is a flow such that the outflow of the source is at least its inflow, the inflow of 
the sink is at least its outflow and Eeem(«) f (e) = Deeout(u) ƒ (e) f°r aU other nodes v. 
The va/ue of a flow from source to sink is defined to be the difference of the outflow of 
the source and the inflow of source. 
A cut is a set of arcs C, such that each positive flow from So to Si uses at least one of 
the arcs of C. A minimum cut is a cut with minimal capacity. Now we are able to give 
a result of Ford and Fulkerson which is applied several times in this dissertation: 
Theorem 2.4 : (Ford and Fulkerson (1956)) Let (V, Ε, a, cap, So, Si) be a fow network. 
Then the maximum of the values of all flows from source to sink equals the capacity of 
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a minimum cut. 
This theorem is also called the 'max flow min cut' Theorem. A byproduct of this theorem 
is that every maximal flow from source to sink uses the complete capacity of each edge 
in a minimum cut. 

21 
3 Outline of t h e monograph 
Let us give a summary of the subjects in this Thesis. Chapter 4 gives an implementable 
algorithm to compute the nucleolus of any TU-game with a non-empty imputation set. 
It can be considered to be a prolonged simplex algorithm. It uses at most η — 1 linear 
programs, in which η is the number of players. The algorithm can be made faster if be­
forehand a (small) collection of coalitions can be selected that determines the nucleolus. 
This idea will be elaborated in chapter 5. We prove that always a collection exists of at 
most 2n —2 coalitions that determines the nucleolus. However, determining this collec­
tion is in general just as hard as finding the nucleolus. For some classes of combinatorial 
games a relatively small collection of coalitions that determines the nucleolus can be 
given beforehand. We will do this for the classes of assignment games, Г-component ad­
ditive tree games, standard tree games and zero-monotonic simple games. The general 
algorithm of chapter 4 is adapted for games in the latter class. Furthermore, chapter 5 
deals with the nucleolus of restricted games. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to Г-component additive tree games. The main results of this chap­
ter are that for such games the bargaining set equals the core and that the (pre) kernel 
equals the nucleolus. 
Chapter 7 regards simple flow networks and the games they generate. We introduce 
the minimum cut solution and characterize it by the axioms one person efficiency, con­
sistency, and converse consistency. Furthermore we give results concerning classical 
solutions. We will show that if the core is non-empty and the grand coalition is not min­
imal winning, then the (pre)least core equals the core. We characterize the simple flow 
games for which the core-kernel and the core coincide and we show that for superadditive 
simple flow games the bargaining set and the core coincide. 
In chapter 8 we deal with fair division games: TU-games that arise from for instance a 
division of an inheritance or from trade-economies with land as the unique commodity. 
With the help of the max flow-min cut Theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1956) we show 
how to determine whether a game is a fair division game or not. 
If we replace in the model the owners of the land by committees with veto control, we 
obtain the class of games with population monotonie allocation schemes. This class of 
games is the subject of chapter 9. A population monotonie allocation scheme (pmas 
for short) of a game ν gives a core allocation to each subgame of υ in such a way that 
every player gets a weakly higher payoff in larger coalitions. We give some new proofs of 
the results of Sprumont (1990) concerning this subject. We discuss the (open) question 
whether there is a relatively fast algorithm to determine if a game has a pmas. We find 
some necessary conditions for games to have a pmas. The chapter ends with the (again 
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open) question whether all integer-valued games with a pmas have an integer pmas as 
well 
Chapter 10 provides an algorithm that finds an envy free and efficient allocation in 
the case of a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods and linear utility 
functions Actually, we define for each allocation problem a trade-market of which 
the algorithm finds an equilibrium This equilibrium corresponds to (a set of) envy 
free and Pareto optimal allocations The algorithm is used to find an allocation in the 
classical cake division problem that is almost Pareto optimal and envy free This chapter 
ends with open questions too If we extend the model with goods that are not wanted 
(negative utility) and/or with initial endowments, is it possible to adapt the algorithm7 
The dissertation is concluded by two subjects m non-cooperative game theory Chapter 
11 gives an axiomatization of the set of Nash equilibria in terms of non-emptiness, one 
person rationality and consistency for two classes of strategic games Firstly for the 
class of mixed extensions of finite games (η-matrix games) Secondly for the family of 
strategic games with compact convex strategy spaces and continuous utility functions 
with the property that the utility function of each player is concave in his own strategy 
Finally, chapter 12 provides an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium in the two person 
(zero sum) search game with an immobile hider, in which the search space is4he real­
ization of a so-called weakly Eulenan graph It means that we can give the value of this 
type of games it equals the length of the shortest closed tour that visits all points of 
the realization at least once, divided by two 
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I The nucleolus 
4 Computing the nucleolus by solving a prolonged 
simplex algorithm 
This chapter is based on a paper of Potters, Reijnierse and Ansing (1995). 
4.1 Introduction 
Briefly after the introduction by Schmeidler (1969), many attempts have been made to 
find an algorithm to compute the nucleolus. Prom the beginning it was clear that the 
algorithm should consist of the solution of a series of linear programs and all solution 
methods known to us are doing so. 
In a (as far as we know unpublished) manuscript of Kopelowitz (1967) we find the 
first algorithm of this type. The number of linear programs to be solved can increase 
to 2n _ 1 (n denotes the number of involved players), but in general it is much smaller. 
Kohlberg (1972) gives one linear program with 0(n) variables, (2n)! constraints and huge 
coefficients. Owen (1974) also uses only one linear program; he needs 0(2") variables and 
0(4") constraints. In Mascbler et al. (1979) we find an algorithmic scheme that requires 
the solution of 0(4n) linear programs with ö(2n) rows and columns. In this scheme the 
coefficients of the linear programs have only the values —1,0 or 1. Dragan (1981) uses 
linear programs with only 0(n) rows and 0(2") columns. Although he claims to use 
only η — 1 programs, we have the opinion that his procedure may use more. In his paper 
the nucleolus is the allocation that nowadays is called the prenucleolus. More recently, 
Sankaran (1991) proposed an algorithm based on Maschler et al. (1979) that uses 0(2n) 
iterations. Finally, Solymosi (1993) gives in his dissertation an algorithm that uses at 
most η — 1 linear programs with only 0(n) rows and 0(2") columns. 
The algorithm we discuss in this chapter is based on an algorithmic scheme of Maschier 
et al. (1992) for the generalized nucleolus. It finds the nucleolus after solving at most 
η — 1 linear programs with ö(2n) rows and columns. The initial values of the coefficients 
are -1 ,0 or 1. The matrices used in the programs are very sparse: at most η columns 
have more than one non-zero entry. This makes the number of coefficients to be stored 
of the same order as in the algorithms of Dragan (1981) and Solymosi (1993). 
The programs we solve have such a great similarity that we can speak of one prolonged 
simplex algorithm. The term 'prolonged simplex algorithm' means that the usual series 
of pivot operations (Gauss eliminations) and deletion of elementary rows or columns is 
interrupted by the introduction of a new variable (that is, a new column). This happens 
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exactly once in each of the linear programs. This answers a question, raised in Dragan 
(1981), affirmatively. 
To give an idea about the performance of the algorithm: the computation of the nucleo­
lus in Sankaran's 5-person example requires only 11 pivot operations and approximately 
2100 elementary calculations. On a SPARC/SUN/10/41 station it takes only 0.07 sec­
onds user time. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First we repeat the necessary definitions, 
in particular we recall the definition of the generalized nucleolus. We also give the 
algorithmic scheme of Maschler et al. (1992), that will be the basis of our algorithm. In 
section 4.3 we transform this algorithmic scheme into an (implementable) algorithm. In 
section 4.4 we investigate the performance of the algorithm and prove that the algorithm 
requires only η — 1 loops (linear programs). Section 4.5 gives an explicit calculation in 
a 3-person example. Finally we show some empirical results. 
4.2 Preliminaries 
Let {N,v) be a zero-normalized TU-game with v(N) > 0. Furthermore, we assume that 
v(S) > 0 for all coalitions1. The imputation set, I(v) is defined by: 
I{v) = {xeH+ \x{N)=v{N)}. 
Let M be the set of proper subsets of N, i.e. M = 2Ν\{φ,Ν}, let 5 G M and let χ 
be an imputation. The excess of S with respect to χ equals v(S) — x(S) and is denoted 
by exc(S, x). The excess map E:I{v) —> ÏÏI is given by E(x) = {exc(S,x)}s£M-
Furthermore, we need the map θ : IR —> M that orders the coordinates of a 
vector (in IR ) in a weakly decreasing order. The nucleolus is defined to be the set of 
vectors in I(v) where the function θ ο E attains its lexicographical minimum. 
In Schmeidler (1969) it has been proved that the nucleolus of a game (with a non-empty 
imputation set) contains precisely one element. This element will be denoted by nu(v) 
or nu. 
In Maschler et al. (1992) the general nucleolus is defined along the same lines. Let 
<S Ç 2Ν\{φ, Ν} be a collection of coalitions and let Π be a polytope in the imputation 
set of (JV, v). Then we introduce the excess map Es = {exclS, -)}ses and the coordinate 
iS ΙΟΙ ICI 
ordering map 9S : IR —• К . Let <icx denote the lexicographical ordering on R . . The 
general nucleolus Nu(Tl, S) is defined by 
Nu(n,S) = {x e Π| θ
ε
 о E
s
(x) <iex θε ° E
s
{x') for all χ' £ Π}. 
For the special case S = φ, we define Nu(Tl, φ) = П. It is easy to see that, if Π = I(v) 
and S = 2Ν\{φ,Ν}, then Nu{U,S) equals the nucleolus of {Ν,υ). 
'This assumption is harmless as changing negative coalition values into zero does not change the 
nucleolus of a zero-normalized game (see Lemma 5.4). 
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Up to minor changes, the following algorithmic scheme can be found in Maschler et al. 
(1992). The algorithm we describe will be an elaboration of this procedure. 
Initialization: Π := Ι (υ), S := 2"\{φ, Ν}. 
Step 1: Replace Π by {τ € Π| Vse5 exc(S, χ) is minimal}. 
Step 2: Delete from S a number (at least one) of coalitions with constant 
excess on (the new) Π. 
If S Φ φ, return to step 1. 
Compared with algorithm 2.4 in Maschler et al. (1992) we replaced "Remove aJJ 
functions which are constant on Π", by "Remove at ieast one coalition with constant 
excess on Π". We made this change because it is easy to find at least one constant excess 
function (cf. section 4.3), but it may require much effort to find all of them. This minor 
change does not affect the proof of the fact that this algorithm stops and generates the 
nucleolus. 
4.3 The transformation into an algorithm 
The algorithmic scheme at the end of the previous section contains commands like 
"replace a polytope Π by an other one". A computer can only handle polytopes if they 
are given in an implementable form. Therefore, we define a description of a pair (Π, S), 
in which II Ç I[v) is a polytope and S Ç 2Ν\{φ, Ν}. 
Definition 4.1 : A description of (Tl,S) is a system of inequalities and equations 
χ € K+, y e 1R+, Αχ + By = d > 0, 
in such a way that: 
(1) χ e IR is a point of Π if and only if there exists a solution (x, y) of the system, 
(2) there are q basic variables (q is the number of rows of). In other words, there are 
q variables that occur in exactly one equation, each in a different one. 
(3) for every point Ι Ε Π , there is exactly one solution (x, y) of the system. 
In practice, the variables y$, (S € S) measure the difference between the last found 
maximal excess с and the excess of the current point ι € Π: 
ys = c-(v(S)-x(S)). 
In the initialization step the constant с will be max
 V(S) = max max exc(S.x). We 
r
 ses
 v
 ' хеЦ ) Se5 v ' ' 
start the translation of the algorithmic scheme with the initialization step. 
The initialization 
Let S = 2Ν\{φ, Ν} and let Π = I(v). Let с = max
 V(S) and let i' e N be an arbitrary 
player. We use the following description of (П,5): 
26 
χ 6 IR+, y e ÏÏI+ 
χ(Ν) = υ(Ν) 
y
s
 - x(S) = с - v(S) {S e S, ζ' 0 S) 
y
s
 + x{N\S) = c + v(N) - v(S) (S eS, i' e S) 
Notice that the variables {ys}ses and the variable x,< occur in exactly one equation. 
Also the other conditions for a description of (П, S) have been satisfied. 
Step 1 
In this step we replace the description of the current pair (П, S) into a description of the 
new pair (П', 5) in which II': = {x e П| Vses exc(S, x) is minimal} = {x 6 П| Ases ys(x) 
is maximal}2. 
Let x, у > 0, Ax + By = d be the current description of (П, S). To find the subset of Π 
where Ases Vs is maximal, we solve the linear program: 
maximize t under the conditions 
χ > 0, í > 0 
Ax + By = d 
t<ys (SeS) 
At this point we introduce a new variable í > 0 (and thus a new column). To save a 
large number of slack variables and equations, we substitute Zs + t := ys and get the 
following problem: 
maximize t under the conditions 
χ > 0, ζ > 0, ί > 0 
Ax + Bz+ (Be
s
)t = d, 
С 
in which es e R is the indicator vector of S. 
We solve the linear program with a slight variation of the simplex method (see e.g. 
Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988)30-41). First we bring the i-variable into the basis (by 
one pivot operation). One row, say the j-tb row, contains the variable t. Then we 
perform some well-chosen pivot operations that remove negative coefficients from the 
j-th row. This is, in fact, a simplex algorithm that maximizes t. Suppose that after the 
maximization of t the j-th equation is 
Σ Л„Хг + Σ Bjszs + t = dj. 
As we still have a basis (corresponding with a feasible point (x,z,t) with t = d3), we 
have another description of the pair (Π,5). Since the j-th equation has only non-
negative coefficients, d} is the highest value t can attain under the condition that χ eU. 
Furthermore, all variables with a positive coefficient in the j-th equation (except for t) 
are bound to vanish in order that t attains its maximal value. So, we replace the j-th 
equation by the set of equations (splitting the j-th equation) 
2Notice that ys can be considered as an affine function of χ by condition (3) of a description. 
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x, = 0 for all г with AJt > 0, 
z
s
 = 0 for all S with B]S > 0, 
ί = d, =: ¿. 
If we replace the coefficients of these variables in the other equations by 0 (this can be 
understood as a pivot operation), we have a basis again. After these actions we obtained 
a system of linear equations with the property: 
the point (x, z, t) is a solution of the system if and only if x G Π, t = t is maximal 
and zs = (c — t) — exc(S, x) for all S e S. 
If we delete the equation t = t and rename the variables zs by y s (S € S), we have a 
description of the pair (I1',<S). Note that y s now measures the difference between the 
(new) current highest excess c — t and exc(S, x). Hence, we have finished step 1. 
Step 2 
In this step we delete coalitions that are found to have constant excess functions on the 
newly constructed set Π. As we only have the present description at our disposal, the 
current system of equations must show that one or more excess functions are constant. 
Wc do not want to spend much time on detecting constant variables. Therefore we only 
look for rows that show independently of the rest of the description that some variable 
is constant. Therefore, we introduce 
Definition 4.2 : The k-th equation (row) is called elementary if there is a unique coali­
tion S e S such that Bks Φ 0 and Akt = Bks· = 0 for all S' φ S and ι e N. We call 
this coalition S the index of row k. Hence, an elementary equation looks ¡ike ys = dk. 
Lemma 4.3 : After step 1, the tableau contains at ¡east one elementary row. 
Proof: Immediately after the substitution zs + ί := ys we have the set of equations 
Ax + Bz + {Be
s
)t = d. For each row in this set the sum of the coefficients of the z-
variables equals the coefficient of t and this property is not affected by pivot operations. 
Therefore, after the optimization, the j-th row still obeys the property. Hence, £
s
 B3s = 
1 and there is at least one S € S with B3s > 0. Each of these variables occurs in an 
elementary row after the splitting of the equation J] AJtxt + Σ B3szs + t = d3 in the 
previous step. D 
If row к is elementary with index S, then zs is constant over П. We delete S from S and 
remove row к and the column corresponding to ys- Note that after this action there is 
still a basis; we remove each time one basis column (variable) and one row containing 
this variable. This is all we do in step 2. 
Summarizing we have the following algorithm: 
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Algorithm 4.4: 
Initialization 
Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized TU-game with v(N) > 0 and v(S) > 0 for all S С N. 
Let Π = Ι(υ) and S = 2Ν\{φ,Ν}. Furthermore, let с = max
 V(S) and take г' e Ν. 
Let (Π, <S) be described by: 
χ e R+, у e R+ 
x(./V) = г;(Л0 
y j+i(yV\S)=ti(W)+c-i>(S) ( i ' e 5 e 5 ) 
ys - x{S) = с - v(S) (i' 0 5 e 5) 
as long as <S ƒ φ : run through the procedure. 
We end up with the table I χ = nu(v), in which I is the identity matrix. 
Procedure: 
Let Ax + By = d be the present description of (11,5). 
(o) Maximize t under the conditions 
t > 0, χ > 0, у > 0 
Ax + By + (Be
s
)t = d; 
Start with a pivot operation in the ¿-column. 
(b) If (e3 A)x + (е}В)у + t = d3 is the equation containing t 
(г) For all S € 5 with BjS > 0: 5 <— 5\{5}; remove column 5; 
(»'t') For all г € TV with AJt > 0: replace column i , by the 0-column and add the equa-
tion x, = 0; 
(ггг) Delete row j (which has become "t = d}") and the i-column (which has become a 
zero-column); 
(¿υ) For all elementary rows к with index S: 5 <— 5\{5}; remove column S and 
row k; 
(c) The resulting tableau is Ax + By = d\ 
4.4 Performance of the algorithm 
In this section we investigate the complexity of the algorithm of section 4.3. We discuss 
the following characteristics of the algorithm: 
(o) the number of linear programs to be solved, 
(6) the sizes of these programs, 
(c) the values of the coefficients of the programs, 
(d) the total number of pivot steps and the number of elementary calculations in one 
pivot step. 
(a) In this section we will prove that our algorithm terminates after solving at 
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most η — 1 linear programs, in which η equals the number of players. This is, in 
fact, the main result of this section. The other algorithm we know of that uses at 
most η - 1 linear programs ,the algorithm of Solymosi (1993), obtains this feature by a 
(not explicitly given) subroutine between each program that 'settles' coalitions that are 
linearly dependent of coalitions with a constant excess. This happens automatically in 
our algorithm. 
(6) The sizes of the linear programs are large; the first program has 2n — 1 rows 
and 2" + η columns. Each program has a strictly smaller size than its predecessor. 
Because we have a basis all the time, most of the columns are unit vectors and only the 
(n +1) (2" — 1) coefficients in the non-basic columns must be stored individually. Hence, 
the number of coefficients that has to be stored is of the same order as in the algorithms 
of Dragan (1981) and Solymosi (1993). 
(c) In the beginning all coefficients (outside the constraint column) are —1, 0 or 1. 
(d) In general, the number of elementary calculations in one pivot step is of the order 
of the size of the tableau, that is about 4" in our case. However, from the scarcity of 
non-trivial columns we infer that one pivot step requires only ~ (n + 2) · 2" elementary 
calculations. Furthermore, we only have to store at most n+1 non-trivial columns and 
the places where the basic columns have their one. This means that the process has a 
length of η • 2" • ρ, in which ρ equals the number of pivot operations. In general, simplex 
algorithms have a bad worst case performance but a rather good average complexity. 
We did not investigate if this special class of linear programs behaves better. In the next 
section we gather some empirical evidence showing that the number of pivot steps does 
not increase too dramatically with the number of players. 
The rest of this section is used to prove that the solution of at most η — 1 linear programs 
is required for finding the nucleolus. 
Theorem 4.5 : The algorithm terminates after solving at most η — 1 linear programs. 
The subtlety of the proof derives from the distinction we make between variables that 
are constant on the current set Π and the variables that are detected to be constant. 
In fact, we prove that all variables that are constant on the linear variety defined by 
Ax + By = d (without the constraints χ > 0 and y > 0) are also found by the algorithm. 
Let В be the collection of coalitions S that the algorithm has detected to have constant 
excess on П. In the beginning В consists of the coalitions N and φ only. During the 
algorithm the collection В increases with at least one coalition in each loop but we have 
to do better. 
Suppose that we start a new loop of the algorithm. The present description is Ax + By = 
d, χ > 0 and у > 0. Let В be the present collection of coalitions with detected constant 
excess and с the last found maximal excess. The collection S is the set of coalitions 
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of which the ^-variables are still present. Using these data we can introduce two linear 
varieties Λ and Λβ. 
The linear variety Λ is the solution of the linear equations Ax + By = d (without the 
inequalities χ > 0 and y > 0). At the beginning of the algorithm the linear variety Λ is 
the set 
{(x,y) G H " Χ IR5 I X(N) = v(N),ys = c-exc(S,x),Se S}. 
It has dimension n—l. The linear variety Лв is defined by the following linear equations: 
1 б Е Л , у € Е 5 
x{S) = nu(S) (S e В) 
ys = c-(v(S)-x(S)) (SeS) 
At the start of the algorithm the varieties Л and Лв coincide. 
Claim 1: Each time we start a new Joop the linear varieties Л and Ag are the same. 
Proof: We must prove that, if we start a loop with equality of Л and Ag, we end the 
loop with equality but the linear varieties have changed. The first action in the loop is 
the substitution y s = zs + t, (S e S). If we perform this substitution in both systems 
of equations we obtain 
Ax + Bz + {Be
s
)t = d (1) 
and 
χ e1RN,y e ï ï t 5 
x{S) = nu(S) (S e В) (2) 
zs = (с - t) - {v(S) - x(S)). (S e S) 
These systems of equations have also the same solution space. 
The next actions are pivot operations to maximize t. Pivot operations change the 
appearance of the equations but not the solution space. 
When we have found the maximal value t and the j-th equation (the one containing the 
variable i) equals Σ А]гхг + £ B}sZs + t = t, 
we add the equations x, = 0 if AJt > 0 and the equations zs = 0 if B3s > 0 to the 
system of linear equations. We do the same in system (2). Both systems continue to 
have the same solution spaces. Now we add to В the coalitions (г) if A,, > 0 and the 
coalitions S with B3s > 0. So, in system (2) we find x, = 0 = nut in the first case and 
the equations z$ = 0 and (the old equation) z$ = (c — t) — eic(5, x) in the second case. 
After that we find by elimination: x(S) — v(S) — (c — t) and Zs = 0 in (2). 
When we substitute t — t, the solution spaces remain the same and the equation(s) 
x(S) — v(S) — (c — t) become(s) x(S) = v(S) — (c — i) — nu(S), as the nucleolus is a 
point of the solution space of the present system (2). Prom the system (1) the by now 
trivial j-th equation is deleted and we are at the end of step 1. 
In step 2 we delete the elementary equations of the form zs = d*. Among these equations 
are the equations zs = 0 we added to the system before. In system (2) we skip these 
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variables too and change therewith the collection S. If we find other elementary equa­
tions zs = d/c, we know that the variable zs is constant in the solution space of (2). As 
we also have the equality Zs = (c - i) — exc(S, x), we find that x(S) = «4 — (c — t) + v(S) 
holds on the solution space. This constant value must be nu(S). Therefore, at the end 
of the loop we have new collections В and S but still we have the equality Л = Лв- Note 
that also с obtains a new value: (c — i). D 
The proof of Theorem 4.5 is based on the fact that, in each loop, all coalitions S with 
constant excess on Λβ (not on П!) are detected by an elementary equation. The excess 
function ET is certainly constant on Лд if the characteristic vector of Τ is a linear 
combination of the characteristic vectors of coalitions in B. Therefore we define: 
If ß is a non-empty collection of coalitions, cl(ß) consists of the coalitions Γ for which 
there is a linear expression e^ = Y,SÇB ^S^S-
Claim 2: At the end of every loop В = c\(B). 
Proof: Suppose that, at the start of a loop, we have В = c\(B). The present linear 
variety Лв is the solution of the system of linear equations 
Ax + Bz + (Be
s
)t = d (1) 
and also of the system of linear equations 
χ e UN,y e R s 
x(S) = nu{S) (S e В) (2) 
z
s
 = {c-t)-(v(S)-x{S)). {S e S) 
The first change of В occurs at the moment we split up the j-th equation. If x, has 
a positive coefficient in this equation we add the coalition г to B; if ys has a positive 
coefficient, we add S to B. Let B' be the extended collection. We have to prove that, 
for coalitions Τ e c\(B')\B, there is an elementary equation of the form ζτ = d in the 
present set of equations Ax + Bz = d. 
If Τ e B'\B, we made an equation z? = 0 (already of the right type) or an equation 
Χι = 0. If we have x, = 0, we find in system (2) also the equation Z(,) = (c — t) + x, and 
therefore, that Z(,j is constant on Лв». If Τ € cì(B')\B', we have x(T) = Σ 5 ε Β ' Asx(5) = 
Sses' ^snu(S) and this linear function is constant on Лв'. Prom the equation z-r = 
(c — t) — {v(T) — x{T)) of (2) we infer that zT is constant on the linear variety ЛВ'. Then 
the equations Z(t) = constant and the equations ζχ = constant are linear combinations 
of the equations in Ax + Bz = d. As this system has a basis, every non-trivial linear 
combination of the equations contains as many basic variables as there are non-zero 
coefficients in the linear combination. Hence, to obtain the equation Z(,) = d or z? = d, 
there must be an equation of this form among the equations in Ax + Bz = d. The 
variables Z(,) and z$ occur in an elementary equation and are detected to be constant. 
D 
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Proof of the theorem: The variable zs that is detected to be constant when splitting 
the equation containing t, was not constant on the previous linear variety. If so, the 
equation ys = к would have been a linear combination of the equations in the previous 
system (2). This would have been detected in the previous loop. 
Therefore, the dimension of Λβ decreases within each loop of the algorithm. This means 
that Лв is zero-dimensional after at most η — 1 loops. Because П С А , also the set Π 
consists of one point after at most η — 1 loops. D 
4.5 An example of the working of algorithm 
Let N = (123), v(N) = 9, u(12) = υ(13) = 5, u(23) = 1 and v(i) = 0 for all i 6 N. 
Then с = max y(S) = 5. We took i' — 3. After introducing the t-column, the tableau 
is: 
t 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2/12 Ϊ/13 2/23 2/1 
0 0 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Vi 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2/3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Xl 
1 
- 1 
0 
1 
- 1 
0 
1 
X2 
1 
- 1 
1 
0 
0 
- 1 
1 
хз 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
d 
9 
0 
9 
13 
5 
5 
14 
The first pivot is in the i-column. According to the pivoting rules of the simplex method, 
this must be in the second row: 
t 2/12 2/13 2/23 V\ 2/2 2/3 i l x2 x3 d 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
- 1 
- 1 
- 1 
- 1 
- 1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
- 1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
1 
- 1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
0 
9 
13 
5 
5 
14 
For the second pivot we choose a column with negative second coordinate, for instance 
the column corresponding to X\. We pivot with the sixth row: 
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t 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Уі2 3/13 3/23 
1 
0 
0 
1 
- 1 
- 1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Уі 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
3/2 
- 1 
1 
- 1 
- 2 
0 
1 
- 2 
Уз 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Χι 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Xl 
1 
- 1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
2 
za 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
d 
4 ' 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
4 
The third pivot must be in the column corresponding to X2, for instance with the last 
row: 
Xl 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
%2 Х3 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
d 
2 
7 
0 
1 
3 
5 
2 
t 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0-
0 
0 
Уі2 2/13 
1 
2 
- 1 
1 
2 
-li 
- 1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3/23 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
3/1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Now there are no negative coefficients anymore in the second row. We reached the first 
optimum. The collection S becomes {(13), (23), (1), (2)}. We delete the second row. 
There are no elementary rows. The tableau has become: 
3/13 3/23 2/1 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3/2 
0 
1 
- 1 
1 
1 
- 1 
Χι 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
X2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Хз 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
d 
2 
0 
1 
3 
5 
2 
At this stage it occurs that the algorithm has not detected yet that e.g. y2 is constant 
over П. Hence, the dimension of Л is strictly larger than the dimension of П. 
We get the new i-column by summing up in each row the sum of the coefficients of the 
y- variables: 
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0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 " 
0 
1 
3 
5 
2 
* 2/13 2/23 Уі Уг ^і *2 *з d 
О О О О 
2 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
- 1 0 0 0 - 1
Pivot with the second row: 
t Уіз У23 2/1 2/2 l i X2 Хз d 
О 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
О 
1 
3 
5 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
- 1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Because there are no negative numbers in the second row, we are on an optimal point. 
After deleting the colums corresponding to у 13 and 2/2, all rows become elementary. The 
algorithm terminates. We derive from the tableau that nu(v) = (5,2,2). The total 
number of pivot steps is 4. 
4.6 Empirical results 
To give an idea of the performance of the algorithm in practice, we give some empirical 
results. 
The set of test-games has to be chosen carefully. It seems not to be appropriate to 
choose the coalitional values just at random. In practice, there is often a positive cor­
relation between the size and the value of a coalition. The assumption that the grand 
coalition forms is only acceptable if its value is large in comparison with the other values. 
Therefore we have defined the test games in the following way: 
(г) = 0 for all ι e Ν, 
for all S Ç N with | 5 | > 2, v(S) is an arbitrary natural number between 1 and 
100|5|, 
v(N) is an arbitrary natural number between 100(n — 2) and 100η. 
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This list shows the results: 
Table 4.6 
number of players: 
number of tested games: 
average number of pivots: 
maximal number of pivots: 
average number of programs: 
maximal number of programs: 
average user time in seconds: 
maximal user time in seconds: 
3 
10 
4 
4 
1.4 
2 
0.04 
0.06 
4 
10 
6.8 
9 
2.3 
3 
0.05 
0.08 
5 
10 
9.0 
10 
2.3 
4 
0.06 
0.09 
6 
10 
11.7 
14 
2.2 
4 
0.10 
0.12 
7 
10 
16.6 
20 
2.8 
4 
0.21 
0.26 
8 
10 
20.9 
27 
1.9 
3 
0.56 
0.62 
9 
10 
25.8 
30 
1.9 
3 
1.67 
1.89 
10 
10 
32.9 
38 
1.9 
4 
5.27 
6.04 
If we choose the coalition values uniformly, i.e: 
v(i) = 0 for all i e Ν, 
for all S С N with \S\ > 2, v(S) is an arbitrary natural number between 1 and 50n, 
the following numbers arise: 
Table 4.7 
number of players: 
number of tested games: 
average number of pivots: 
maximal number of pivots: 
average number of programs: 
maximal number of programs: 
average user time in seconds: 
maximal user time in seconds: 
3 
10 
3.7 
5 
1.6 
2 
0.05 
0.07 
4 
10 
4.5 
6 
2.2 
3 
0.06 
0.09 
5 
10 
5.5 
9 
2.5 
4 
0.08 
0.11 
6 
10 
7.7 
11 
2.6 
3 
0.10 
0.16 
7 
10 
11.4 
17 
3.5 
5 
0.24 
0.28 
8 
10 
10.9 
17 
2.6 
4 
0.52 
0.64 
9 
10 
18.6 
24 
2.5 
4 
1.62 
2.20 
10 
10 
22.9 
27 
2.7 
4 
5.54 
8.24 
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5 The Б-nucleolus and the nucleolus of restricted 
games 
This chapter is closely related to the previous one. Several definitions of section 4.2 are 
used. 
5.1 Introduction 
The nucleolus (and the core) of a TU-game is not necessarily dependent on all coalition 
values: in all games the value of a large number of coalitions can be diminished without 
changing the nucleolus. If the nucleolus of a game is known, it is easy to find a quite 
small collection of coalitions such that their values determine the nucleolus already. We 
investigate if for certain classes of games a relatively small collection of coalitions can 
be found in advance that determines the nucleolus of the game. 
Definition 5.1 : Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized game with υ(Ν) > 0 and iet В be a 
collection of proper coalitions. The restricted nucleolus, or B-nucleolus, is by definition 
equai to Nu(I(v), B) (see section 4.2 for an explicit deñnition). 
The B-nucleolus is a generalized nucleolus in the sense of Maschler et al. (1992). The 
concept has been studied by Kuipers (1994). The ß-nucleolus can consist of more than 
one point. 
We are interested in collections В for which the ß-nucleolus and the regular nucleolus 
coincide. If this is the case, algorithm 4.4 in the previous chapter can be adapted easily 
to calculate the ß-nucleolus, simply by starting with S = В, instead of S = M. Then 
the number of rows and variables of the initial description will be \B\ + 1 and |ß| + η 
respectively. Obviously, if |ß| is much smaller than 2", it saves a lot of time calculating 
the ß-nucleolus instead of the nucleolus. 
Let (N, v) be a TU-game and let ß be a collection of coalitions of N. We say that ß 
determines the nucleolus of υ if the nucleolus and the ß-nucleolus of υ are equal. 
Section 5.2 shows that always a collection exists with at most 2n — 2 elements that 
determines the nucleolus. However, determining this collection is in general just as 
hard as finding the nucleolus. For several classes of games relatively small collections of 
coalitions that determine the nucleolus can be found in advance, which can make the 
calculation of the nucleolus faster. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 give examples of such classes of 
games. For three of these classes an algorithm especially designed for this class can be 
found in the literature. For the other one, i.e. the class of zero-monotonic simple games, 
we adapt algorithm 4.4. 
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For situations in which certain coalitions cannot be formed, e.g. by lack of communi­
cation, it can be appropriate to give such coalitions no value. The last section of this 
chapter discusses these games with restricted communication or restricted games. The 
characteristic function is only defined for B, a subset of M, and the coalition N. There 
is a natural way to define the nucleolus of such a game. In section 5.5 we characterize 
for a fixed player set N the collections В for which the nucleolus is a singleton for every 
characteristic function v. This section is strongly related to Deris and Reijniersc (1992). 
5.2 Small collections determining the nucleolus 
This section shows that for any game (Ν, υ) there exists a relative small collection В 
such that the nucleolus and the ß-nucleolus of ν coincide. To prove this, we need a 
generalization of Theorem 2.2 of Kohlberg (1971): 
Theorem 5.2 : Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized game with a non-empty imputation set. 
Let В Ç M and let χ e I(v). Then χ € Nu(I(v),B) if and only if for every t € TR the 
collection {S e В \ exc(S,x) > i) is balanced on c(x). 
The proof is a straightforward generalization of Kohlberg's Theorem 2.2. Apart from 
that, it follows out of Theorem 7.2 of Maschler et al. (1992). Therefore the proof is 
omitted in this monograph. 
The following proposition is very useful to find collections that determine the nucleolus: 
Proposition 5.3 : Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized game with a non-empty imputation 
set. Let χ — nu(v). Let В С M such that the B-nucleolus equals the nucleolus. Let 
Τ e В and let S = {S £ B\{T} \ exc(S,x) > ехс{Т,х)}. If there are 7, 7s (S e <S), v% 
(i e nc(x)) 6 K+ with: 
eT = -jeN + J ] 7 5 e s + Σ г/,е„ (г) 
ses lenc(i) 
then Nu(v) = Nu(I(v),B\{T}). 
Proof: Theorem 5.2 gives that for every t € R the collection {S e В | exc(S, x) > t} is 
balanced on c(x). To prove that 1 e Nu(I(v),B\{T}), we have to prove that {5 € В | 
exc(S,x) > t}\{T} is balanced on c(x) for every t. 
Let t e IR. For abbreviation we denote {S e В \ exc(S, x) > t} by 7". If Τ φ Τ, nothing 
is to be proven. Hence, we assume that Τ eT- Because Τ is balanced on c(x) , there 
are \s > 0 (S € T) and μ» > 0 (г e nc(x)) such that: 
\TeT + Σ ^ses + Σ Л
е
·
 = eN- (") 
ser\{T} ignc(i) 
Since Τ e Τ, we have S Ç T. Substituting equation (г) into equation (гг) gives: 
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Σ
 a
s
e
s + Σ (A*· + лг^.)е, = (1 + AT7)ejv, 
S€T\{T) tenc(i) 
in which as = Xs + Ar7s if 5 € 5 and as — As otherwise. 
This equation shows that T\{T} is balanced on c(x). Hence, χ e JVu(/(i;),ß\{T}). It 
is the only element because of the following observation. As the S-nucleolus equals the 
nucleolus, it is a singleton. Therefore the vectors {es}seB together with {е,},
е
„ф;) and 
ejv span IR . The vector e-p is, by equation (г), linearly dependent of the other vectors 
in this collection. Hence, {es}see\{T} together with {et},ene(x) and ejv span R and 
Nu(I{v), B\{T}) is a singleton as well. D 
A coalition S is called essential if v(S) > Στ^ν V(T) for each partition V of S, V φ {S}. 
The following Corollary will be useful in the next section: 
Corollary 5.3: (Huberman (1980)) If (N,v) has a non-empty соте, then the essential 
coalitions determine the nucleolus. 
Proof: If S is not essential, and V is a partition of S with υ (S) = Στεν иСПі then for 
every χ £ core(v) and in particular for χ = nu(v) we have es = Σ er and exc(S, χ) < 
Στεν exc{T, χ) < ехс(Т', χ) for all Γ' € P . D 
Let us give an application of the theorem: 
Lemma 5.4 Let (N,v) be α zero-normalized TU-game with v(N) > 0. Then the collec­
tion В = {S G M I v(S) > 0 or \S\ = 1} détermines the nucleolus. 
Proof: If v(S) < 0, then for every χ 6 I(v) we have es = S ies e · a n d exc(S,i) < 
ехс((г),х) for all г e 5. D 
We use Proposition 5.3 to find an appropriate collection with at most 2n — 2 coalitions. 
Theorem 5.5 : Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized TU-game with a non-empty imputation 
set. There exists a. collection В with at most 2n — 2 elements that determines the 
nucleolus. 
Proof: Let χ = nu(v). We start with В = M. We remove elements from В by the 
following procedure: 
Procedure: as long as there is a collection {Τ,Τι,... ,Т*} С В with the properties 
(ι) and (гг) of the previous theorem, we remove Τ from B. 
By applying Proposition 5.3 we conclude that В determines the nucleolus. We have to 
prove that \B\ < 2n - 2 after the procedure. Let В — B\j{{t) | г e nc(x)}. 
Let φ = B0 φ B\ £ . . . £ Bk = В such that: 
(α) Bi is balanced (£ < к) 
(b) if Τ Ç Βι+ι\Βι and Bt U Τ is balanced, then Τ = φ (ί < к) 
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(с) if S e Bt and Τ e B\Be, then exc{S, χ) > exc(T, χ). 
We denote Be\Be-i by Vt. Define for each Τ £ 2
м
 the linear subspace П(Т) of the 
preimputation set: 
ЩТ) = {y e ƒ » | y{S) = x{S) for all S € Г}. 
Then dim(n(#o)) = η — 1 and dim(ri(ßt)) = 0. The dimensions of the subspaces give 
an upper bound for the size of T>¿ (£ < к): 
Claim 1: dim(II(B/_i)) - dim(II(B/)) > \V
e
\ - 1 for all £ € { 1 , . . . , Jfc}. 
Proof: There is an Τ Ç Vt such that dim(n(ß,)) - аіт{ЩВі.
л
)) = \T\ and Π(β£) = 
Π(7~υ Βι-ι). We will prove the claim by showing that the opposite leads to a contra­
diction. Suppose there are coalitions S, S' € T>i\T, S φ S'. The coalition S is in the 
span of Βι-ι U T U {Ν}, i.e. there are a, aT € HI (T e Τ) such that: 
aes = es + Σ атет- {iti) 
Since Βι-ι is balanced, there are βτ > 0 such that: 
and because Be is balanced, there are JT > 0 such that: 
ZN = Σ Trer- (v) 
тев
е 
Subtract a multiple of equation (iii) from equation (v) such that in the resulting equation 
all Τ e Ve still have non-negative weights and at least one of them, say 5", has weight 
zero. The weight of S' is unaffected. If some of the coalitions in Be-i U {N} have got a 
non-positive weight, add a multiple of equation (iv) such that this is no longer the case. 
The resulting equation shows that there is a balanced set V Ç Be with Be-\ U {S1} Ç V 
and S" $. V. This contradicts property (b). Hence, we conclude that \T\ > \T>i\ — 1 and 
Claim 1 has been proved. D 
Claim 1 gives us an upper bound of the size of B: 
к к 
η - 1 = dim(n(ßo)) = ¿ с М В Д - О ) - dim(n(ßi)) > ¿(|ВДВ/-і| - 1) = |B| - к. 
< = 1 1=1 _ 
Finally, we have to give an upper bound for к (the number of steps in the ^-sequence) : 
Claim 2: к < η - 1 + \nc(x)\. 
Proof: If \Vt\ > 1, then Claim 1 gives that dim(n(ß/)) - dim(n(ß/_i)) > 0. Hence, this 
can occur at most η — 1 times. 
Suppose that Ve = {S} for some S 6 В. Be is balanced, so S is in the span of ({N} U 
ßt)\{S} (i.e. {N}L)Be-i). Hence, t h e r e а г е а
т
€ І ( Г е {N}uBt-i) with es = ΣатеТ-
Since Be-\ is balanced, we can assume that Qj· > 0 for all Τ e Be-\- Now we can apply 
Proposition 5.3 and conclude that Τ should have been removed from В during the 
procedure. Hence, if \Vt\ = 1, its element is in {(г) | i è nc(x)}. This can occur at most 
|nc(i)| times. This proves Claim 2. • 
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The fact that \B\ <2n-2 follows easily from Claim 2: 
\B\ = \B\ - \nc(x)\ <n-l + k- \nc(x)\ <2n-2. D 
5.3 Assignment games and two types of tree games 
This section shows three classes of TU-games for which we can give relatively small 
collections of coalitions that determine the nucleolus. We start with: 
Assignment games and matching games 
Consider the following situation. We have two types of players; sellers and buyers. 
The set of sellers is denoted by S, the set of buyers by B. The grand coalition N is 
the disjoint union of S and B. A seller г and a buyer j can arrive at an agreement, 
which yields a given benefit ufy > 0. It is assumed that each seller can only make one 
agreement (he has just one object to sell) and the same holds for buyers (each of them 
needs one object). We can model this situation as follows: Let Г = (S U Β,Ε) be the 
bipartite directed network with node set S U В = Ν, arc set E = {(ι, j) \ ι e S, j G В} 
and weight on the arcs: the (non-negative) weight of arc (i,j) equals wiy A matching 
is a subset μ of E such that if (i\,ji), (¿21J2) 6 μ, then i\ = ¿2 if and only if j \ = j 2 . 
Hence, in general not all players are matched. If a matching μ is formed, the resulting 
benefit is Z)(,j)eM№y We denote the set of possible matchings by M. 
In such a situation, the relevant questions are: "Which matching will be formed?" and 
"In what way will the benefits be divided?". The following TU-gaxne (N, v) corresponds 
to this model: 
The game is called an assignment game. Assignment games are introduced in Shapley 
and Shubik (1972). They showed that the core of such a game is non-empty. Let 
В = {(1),..., (η)} U {(ij) I г e 5, j € В}. By the definition of an essential coalition, the 
set of essential coalitions is a subset of B. Therefore Corollary 5.3 gives immediately: 
Lemma 5.6 : Let (N, v) be the assignment game corresponding to network (N, E). Let 
В = {(1),..., (η)} U {(ij) I г £ S, j € В}. Then В determines the nucleolus of v. 
Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) give an algorithm of order ö( |5 |3 |ß |) to find the nucleolus 
of assignment games (here \S\ is assumed to be the minimum of |5 | and |B|). 
A natural extension of the class of assignment games is the class of matching games. 
Let Г = (Ν, E) be a undirected network with node set N, a complete edge set, i.e. 
E = {{i,j} I i, j G ЛГ,г / j} and non-negative weights wtJ ({i,j} e E) or we (e e E). 
In this case a matching is subset μ oì E such that no different edges in μ have a common 
node. If a matching μ is formed, the resulting benefit is, as before, Хф^едИ ;· Again, 
we denote the set of possible matchings by M. 
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The corresponding game (N, v) is defined by 
v(T) - max {Σ w
e
 \ e € μ, both nodes of e are in T} (T С Ν) 
and is called a matching game. A matching game is an assignment game if ./V is the 
disjoint union of two coalitions S and В such that uiy = 0 if i, j S S or г, j 6 S. 
Let ß = {Τ e M I |T| < 2}. In general, the collection В does not determine the nucle­
olus. It contains the collection of essential coalitions, but the core of a matching game 
can be empty, and therefore Corollary 5.3 cannot be applied. The following matching 
game is probably the most elementary example of a matching game for which В does 
not determine the nucleolus: 
Example 5.7: Let N = (12345) Let wu — W34 = w35 = W45 = 1. Other weights are 
zero. The following figure expresses the situation: 
1* 
Figure 5.8 
The nucleolus of this game is g(3,3,2,2,2). The coalitions with maximal excess | 
are (1234), (1235), (1245), (34), (35) and (45). The ß-nucleolus is 1(2,2,2,2,2). The 
coalitions with maximal excess ì are (12), (34), (35) and (45). 
However, if a matching game has a non-empty core, the collection of one and two person 
coalitions does determine the nucleolus. 
Г-component additive tree games 
Г-component additive tree games are the subject of chapter 6. Therefore we discuss 
this type of games only briefly here. Let (N, v) be a superadditive Tt/-game and let 
Г = {Ν, E) be an undirected graph with node set N and edge set E. There are no 
loops and edges are denoted by the two person coalition they connect. For all S Ç N, 
define S/T to be the set of components of S, i.e. the set of subcoalitions of S that are 
connected within the subgraph (5, {(ij) \ i,j € S}) and maximal with respect to this 
property. The game υ is called Г-component additive if 
v(S) = Σ «(П (s я Ν) 
res/r 
If Γ is a tree, we call it a Г-component additive tree game. Г-component additive tree 
games have a non-empty core (Proposition 6.2). Let В be the set of coalitions connected 
in Г. Again Corollary 5.3 can be applied. Hence, В determines the nucleolus. Kuipers 
(1994) gives an algorithm of order ö(n|ß|2) to find the nucleolus of a Г-component 
additive tree game. 
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The game described in example 5.7 is a Г-component additive game if Γ is chosen to 
be (N, {e 6 E \ w
e
 = 1}). If В is the collection of connected coalitions, again the 
B-nucleolus is ì(2,2,2,2,2). Hence, the example shows that if Г is not a tree, В may 
not determine the nucleolus of v. 
Standard tree games 
A number of villages is connected to a root (think e.g. of a power plant), directly or 
via one or more other villages with a (cable-)network without cycles. This situation 
can be modeled by a so-called standard tree enterprise. We refer to Bird (1976) and 
Granot and MascnJer (1991) for more details. A standard tree enterprise is a quadruple 
£ = (TV, V, A,w,r), in which N is the player set, (V, A) is a directed graph with vertex 
set V and arc set A. There is one special vertex г (the root). The graph is a tree with 
root r, i.e. there are no cycles and each vertex d s V\{r} has exactly one outgoing 
arc a¿ (arcs are directed to the root). The weights wa (a e A) are non-negative and 
represent the costs that have been made to construct arc (cable) a. To each i£ jV, the 
vertex (village) d, G ^ \{г} has been assigned of which г is an inhabitant. It is assumed 
that each village has at least one inhabitant. For every coalition S Ç N, let c(S) be the 
sum of the weigths of the arcs that are part of the path of the village of some member 
of S to the root. Then с is the characteristic function of a so-called standard tree game. 
It is a cost game; players want to minimize their expenses. In order to be in accordance 
with the rest of the thesis, we will regard the costs as negative savings and define the 
game (Ν,υ) by v{S) = -c(S) for all S Ç N. 
Granot et al. (1994) show that standard tree games are convex and they give an al-
gorithm to find the nucleolus of such a game. We will give a collection with at most 
2n — 2 elements that determines the nucleolus of a standard tree (savings) game (Ν, v). 
Therefore we need some further terminology. For every α ζ A, the set of players whose 
villages are still connected to the root if arc о is deleted is denoted by T„ (the trunk 
of a). The complement of T
a
, i.e. N\T
a
, is called B
a
 (the branch of a). A player г is 
called extreme if T„ = N\(i) for some о € A. Hence, an extreme player lives alone in 
a terminal point (also called leaf) of the tree. Let С (the center) be the set of players 
that are not extreme. 
Proposition 5.9: Let (N,V, A,w,r) be a tree enterprise and let (Ν,υ) be the corre­
sponding standard tree game. Let В = {N\(i) | i G С} U {Т
а
 \ а 6 А}\{ф]. Then В 
determines the nucleolus of v. 
Proof: The proof consists of two steps. For every S С Ν, let S be the coalition of 
players whose villages are connected to the root by the set of arcs needed to connect S. 
We call S the saturation of S and we call S saturated if S = 5. Let S be the collection 
of saturated coalitions. Firstly, we will prove that SU В determines the nucleolus. 
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Claim: S\J В determines the nucleolus of v. 
Proof: Let Τ 2 SUВ be a collection that determines the nucleolus. Let S G T\(SUB). 
It is sufficient to prove that 7Д{5} determines the nucleolus as well. We use Proposition 
5.3 to do this. Let χ = nu(v). Since ν is convex, χ G core(v). This gives for all i G Ν: 
x(N\i) > v(N\i) > v(N), so χ < 0. 
Since S\S is a subset of С, we have that N\j = N. Hence, v(N\j) = υ(Ν) for all j G 
S\S. This and the fact that v(S) = v(S) give: 
exc(S, x) = exc(S, x) + Σ хз ~ e%c(S, x) + ^ exc(N\j,x). 
}€S\s jes\s 
Hence, exc(S, x) < exc(S, x) and exc(S, x) < exc(N\j, x) for all j S S\S. Furthermore: 
es = es+ Σ (ejvv,-ejv). 
,es\s 
We can apply Proposition 5.3 and conclude that 7Д{5} determines the nucleolus. D 
We proceed by assuming that Τ is a collection of coalitions that determines the nucleolus 
with Β ς Τ С В U S. Let 5 G Т\В (so S is saturated). We will finish the proof by 
showing that T\{5} determines the nucleolus. 
Let As be the set of arcs that point from outside S to S, i.e. for each α ζ As there is a 
player i 6 S such that о points to d, and a player j € N\S such that a comes from d}. 
Since S φ В, for each a G As we have S фТ
а
. Furthermore: 
es = eN + Σ (ет» - e ^ ) · 
aeAs 
Because x G core(v), x(B
a
) < v(N) — (Т
а
) for all a G A, i.e. a branch pays at least its 
arcs. Hence, a coalition that is the union of S and one or more of the branches B
a
 with 
a G As, has a larger excess than S. In formula, for each К Ç As: 
exc{ [j BaÚS,x)=Y^ (v{N) - v(Ta)) + v{S) - £ x(Ba) - x(S) > exc(S, x). 
aCK afcK' aeK 
In particular, exc(Ta, x) > exc(S, x) for all a G As. Again, we apply Proposition 5.3 
and conclude that T \ { S } determines the nucleolus. D 
5.4 The nucleolus of a zero-monotonic simple game 
This section gives a modification of algorithm 4.4, designed for zero-monotonic simple 
games. A TU-game (N,v) is called simple if v(S) G {0,1} for all S С N. We denote 
the set of all monotonie simple games with player set N by SN. Let υ G SN. In the case 
of two or more winning one person coalitions, the imputation set of ν is empty and the 
nucleolus is not defined. In the case of one winning one person coalition, there is just 
one imputation, which is the nucleolus. If v(N) = 0, there is also just one imputation. 
Therefore we assume that the game is zero-normalized and that TV is winning. We denote 
the set of all zero-monotonic simple games (JV, v) with υ(Ν) = 1 by SQ. 
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A player is called a veto player if v(S) — 0 for all S 6 M with г ^ S. We denote the set 
of veto players by veto(v). Let ν e SQ. The following statements can be easily verified: 
- i e veto(v) if and only if v(N\i) = 0, 
- veto(v) is the intersection of all elements of W„, 
- core(v) = {x € I(v), x, = 0 for all i € N\veto(v)}. 
The nucleolus of a simple game with veto players can also be found easily: 
Lemma 5.10: Let υ € SQ with veto(v) φ φ. Then nu(v) = \veto(v)\~le
veto(y)· 
Proof: Denote nu(v) by x. Since core(v) φ φ, we have χ e core(v). Therefore x
x
 = 
0 for all i 6 N\veto(v). Since veto players are interchangeable, all of them get the same 
in the nucleolus. D 
If there are no veto players, it requires more effort to find the nucleolus. Therefore it 
is worthwhile to find a (relatively small) collection В that determines the nucleolus of 
zero-monotonic simple games without veto players. The collection of minimal winning 
coalitions seems to be a good candidate, but it turns out that a larger collection is 
required. In fact, for every player, one extra coalition is needed: 
Proposition 5.11 : Let υ £ SQ with veto(v) = φ. Denote W„ by W. Let 
#1 = {S 6 W | exc{S, nu(v)) > exc(T, nu(v)) for all Τ e M}. 
For every i e Ν, there is a coalition T~ e ßi sucii that i £T~. Let Tt+ be the (disjoint) 
union of(i) and T~. Then В :—WU {T,+ | i e Ν) determines the nucleolus of v. 
Proof: Denote nu(ti) by x. We will show that B\ is balanced on c(x): 
Claim: B\ is balanced on c(x). 
Proof: Denote {T € M \ exc(T,x) is maximal} by T. Theorem 2.2 gives that Τ is 
balanced on c(x); there are λ^ > 0 (T 6 Τ), μ, > 0 (г € nc(x)) such that 
Σ XTeT + J2fMe, = eN. (г) 
Since there are no veto players, the core is empty and the maximal excess with respect 
to χ is strictly positive. Therefore only winning coalitions are elements of T. In fact, if 
Γ e Τ, then Τ is the disjoint union of a minimal winning coalition T
w
 and a subset of 
тгс(х), say T
nc
. Substitute for every Τ ξ. Τ the equation ет = е ^ + Z)ter„c e, in (г) and 
the result is an equation that shows that B\ is balanced on c(x). D 
The proof is continued as follows. We infer that for every i € N the collection B\ 
contains a coalition of which player г is not a member. Let i Ç. N. Since the maximal 
excess is positive and B\ is a subset of Τ balanced on c(x), for each imputation у there 
is a coalition Τ e Bi with exc(T,y) > 0. This is in particular true for у = e,. Therefore, 
there is a coalition in Βχ not containing player i. Choose such a coalition and call it T~. 
Let T+ be T~ U (») and В = W U {T+ | i e Ν}. 
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The same technique as in the proof of Proposition 5.9 is used. Let <S D В be a collection 
that determines the nucleolus. Let S e S\B. We prove that ¿>\{S} determines the 
nucleolus as well. 
Since S $. В, S is neither minimal winning nor T ; + for any j ζ N. The coalition S is 
either winning or losing. If S is losing, we have: 
exc(S,x) < -χ, < ехс(Т+,х) < exc(T,x) for all j G S and all Τ 6 Β
λ
. 
Furthermore, we have the equation: 
β 5 = Σ ( ε τ + _ e T - ) · («) 
íes 
If S is winning, let S' be a minimal winning subset of S. We have exc(S, x) < exc(S', x) 
and exc(S,x) < exc(S',x)-x3 < exc{T+,x) < exc{T,x) for all j € S\S' and all Τ e Bi. 
Furthermore: 
e
s
 = eS'+ Σ (eT+-eT-). {Hi) 
ies\s' 
Since B\ is balanced on c( i) , there are Χχ > 0 (Τ e Βι), μ3 > 0 (j g nc(i)) such that 
53 Aper + Σβ]β] = e N· For any г E S, another way to denote this is: 
— Л
т
- е
т
- = — eff + Σγφ
Τ
- λτ^τ + Σμ^-
We can substitute these equations in (it), (Hi) respectivily and infer that es is in the 
cone of —елг, es> (if defined, i.e. if S is winning), е^ (г ξ S), βχ (Τ £ Β\) and e3 
(j 6 nc(x)). We can apply Proposition 5.3 and conclude that <S\{£} determines the 
nucleolus. D 
The proposition enables us to modify algorithm 4.4 for games in SQ. TO understand the 
modification, we refer to section 4.3. 
We would like to start the algorithm with the collection W U {Tt+ \ i € Ν}. The 
problem is that we cannot give the collection {Tt+ | i € Ν} in advance. Therefore, we 
run algorithm 4.4 with S = У . The following claim shows that the first optimization 
implicitly gives a subcollection of {T e W | exc(T, x) is maximal} that is balanced on 
c(nu(v)): 
Claim: The first time the process reaches line (b) of the procedure of algorithm 4.4, the 
collection of coalitions S with B}s > 0 is balanced on c(nu(v)), in which j is the row 
with a positive t-coefficient. 
Proof: Consider the initial description of (Π, S): 
χ € R + , y 6 R+ 
x{N) = v(N) 
ys + x{N\S) = c + v{N)-v{S) {teSeS) 
ys-x(S) = c-v(S) (¿¿Ses) 
For each row I we have: £ At,e, + Σ Βπ·ε
τ
 = XteN, (iv) 
іелг Tes 
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in which X( is some real number. We show this for a row of the second type. Let 
row £' correspond with coalition S' with г' e S'. Then Ae, = 1 for all г € N\S' and 
Agx = 0 for all г e S'. Furthermore, BeS' = 1 and Вет = 0 for all Τ φ S'. The equation 
corresponding to row I' is: ^
 e
, + e5« = XeeN. 
t€N\S' 
Hence, for Xp = 1 the equation holds. 
Property (iv) is unaffected by pivoting or adding the t-coiumn. Hence, it still holds for 
row j when the process reaches line (6) for the first time. At that moment all coefficients 
of that row are non-negative. The proof of Lemma 4.3 reveals that Στ BjT = 1, and 
therefore X3 > 0. Hence, the equation gives the balancedness the collection of coalitions 
S with Bjs > 0 on the coalition consisting of players г with A}1 = 0. This coalition 
contains c(nu(v)). D 
We denote the collection that is found by В'. B' does not have to be equal to the 
collection B\ in the proof of Proposition 5.11; it can be a proper subset of B\. However, 
in the proof of Proposition 5.11 only the balancedness of Βχ on c(nu(v)) is used. A 
subcollection of B\ balanced on c(nu(v)) will do equally well. 
When we have found B', we can take for each i € N a coalition in B' not containing г 
and call it T~. Then we define Г+ to be T~ U (г) (г ζ Ν). 
Just after the first optimization, the current description (Π,5) (see definition 4.1) de­
scribes the subset of I(v) where the maximal excess is minimal. 
Since exc(T+,x) < exc(T~,x) for each i S Ν, χ e Ι(υ), the same subset of Ι(υ) is 
described if the collection S would have been W U {T,+ \i £ N}. 
Hence, {T,+ | г g TV} can be added to S after the first optimization. It has to be done 
in such a way that the system of inequalities and equations continues to obey definition 
4.1 of a description (П, S). We can add the equations: 
yT+=c-(v(Tl+)-x(T+)) (г e TV), 
in which 1/У+ denotes the difference between the last found maximal excess с (which 
equals exc(T~,nu(v))) and the excess of Г
г
+
 with respect to the current point χ G Π 
(see again definition 4.1). Hence, с = exc(T~, nu(v)) = 1 — x{T~) for all ι e Π and the 
equations to be added become: 
у
т
+ -Хг = 0 (г e Ν). 
If χ, is a basic variable for some г € Ν, we add row £ with At, = 1 to the equation 
corresponding to T,+, in order to continue to have a basis. 
If x, is detected to be constant on Π for some г G N (because there is an equation of 
the form i , = constant), then the equation corresponding to T,+ becomes 
yT+ = 0. 
In this case T,+ will not be added to <S, since the excess of T,+ is constant already. If we 
would add T,+ to 5, it might cause a superfluous linear program to solve. 
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Now we can grve the algorithm, adjusted to elementi of SQ AS long as we choose T~ 
to be a member of B' such that г $. T~, the choice of T~ is of no importance at all 
We might as well rename the variable y-j*- by у
г
 (since (г) ^ W, this name is not used 
before) It has the advantage that the coalitions T~ (г € TV) do not need to be chosen 
when the algorithm is actually implemented 
Algorithm 5.12 
initialization 
Let (TV, υ) € S0" Let Π = Ι(υ) and S = W„ Let г' e TV 
Let (Π, <S) be described by 
χ e B.+ , y e 1R+ 
x(N) = 1 
y
s
 + x(N\S) = ι (t'eSeS) 
ys - x(S) = o (i'ëSeS) 
Run through the procedure of algorithm 4 4 once 
Let 5 ' = {(г) € N\ there is no row of the form xt = constant} 
Add 5 ' to 5 5<— S u S ' 
For each (г) € <S', add equation yt — xt = 0 If x, was a basic-variable, pivot in such 
a way that xt is again a basic variable 
as long as 5 φ φ run through the procedure of algorithm 4 4 once more 
The algorithm is based on a collection with at most |W| + η elements 
5.5 The nucleolus of restricted games 
In situations in which some coalitions cannot be formed, e g because of lack of commu­
nication, it can be appropriate to give such coalitions no value Therefore we define the 
following type of games 
Definition 5.13 A game with restricted communication or a restricted game is a triple 
(N, B, v), m which N ¡s the player set, В Ç M and ν Bu{N} —> IR is the characteristic 
function 
A restricted game is called zero-normalized if υ{ί) = 0 for all (г) e В The imputation 
set of a zero-normalized restricted game is defined to be 
I{B, v) = {x e TRN | a;(TV) = v{N), x, > 0 for all г e TV with (г) € В} 
Restricted games can be considered as specific truncated games in the sense of MaschTer 
et al (1992) truncated games can have any polyhedral subset of IR as set of attainable 
allocations and in general they do not consider all coalitions 
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The nucleolus of the restricted game (Ν,Β,ν) is by definition Nu(I(B,v),B) (see again 
section 4.2 for an explicit definition). Since I(B,v) need not be compact, the nucleolus 
can be empty. 
Like the imputation set, the definition of the core of (Ν, B, v) is modified too: 
core{B,v) = { i e R " | x(N) = v{N), x{S) > v(S) for all 5 G В). 
Derks and Reijaierse (1992) define the core of the collection В to be: 
core(B) = {x g R* I x(N) = 0, x(S) > 0 for all S € В}. 
Hence, core(B) equals core(B, 0) and can be described as the cone of all side payments 
that are not unfavorable for coalitions in B. They show that core(B) equals the vector 
{0} if and only if В is balanced and В U {N} spans ft . With the same technique, we 
prove a similar result concerning the restricted nucleolus. 
Firstly, we give an application of Farkas' Lemma, in order to prove the main result of 
this section. 
Lemma 5.14 : Let В 6 2м. Then the following statements are equivalent: 
(ι) В is balanced, 
{n) for all у € B,Nwith y(N) < 0: if y(S) > 0 {S € B), then y{S) = 0 for all S € В. 
Proof: If В is balanced, there are As > 0 (5 € B) with Г ) 5 е в Ases = eN. 
Let у € IR." with y{N) < 0 and y(S) > 0 for all S 6 В. Since y(S) = (y,e
s
), we have 
0 > y(N) = Σ Asî/(5) > 0. Hence, y(S) = 0 for every S 6 В. 
To prove that (г) follows from (гг), we apply the following version of Farkas' Lemma 
(Proposition 2.8.a, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1988)): let A € MaiP x Ç(R), b € RQ. 
Either {x e Βζ. I xA = b} φ φ, or {y € TRQ | Ay > 0, (6, y) < 0} φ φ. 
We choose Ρ equal to В U {N} and Q equal to N. Define Ast = 1 if г e S and As, = 0 
if not. Let AN, — —1 for all ι e N. Hence, the rows of A arc е$ (S 6 В) and — e^. Let 
b= - Usee es-
If we assume (гг), the set {y ζ R \ Ay > 0,(b,y) < 0} is empty. Hence, the set 
{x £ R + | xA = 6} is non-empty. For each element χ of the latter set we have: 
-ijvejv + Σ xses = - Σ es-
seB see 
This gives: Σ ( ^ 5 + l)es = XN^N-
Tc 4- 1 
We get the balancing weights Xs = (S £ B). D 
xN 
Theorem 5.15 : Let (N, B, v) be a zero-normalized restricted game. Then Nu(B, υ) φ φ 
if and only if В is balanced. 
jv Proof: Suppose В is not balanced. Then by Lemma 5.14 there is a vector у € R such 
that y(N) = 0, y(S) > 0 for all S 6 В and y{T) > 0 for at least one Г € В. Let 
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χ € Ι(Β,υ). Then χ + y G Ι(Β,υ) and exc(S,x + y) < exc(S,x) for all S G В with at 
least one strict inequality. Hence, χ cannot be an element of the nucleolus. We conclude 
that Nu{I{B,v),B) = φ. 
Suppose that В is balanced. Let Π be the linear subspace 
{y e R w | y{S) = 0 for all S G В U {Ν}}. 
Let a; be an arbitrary point in I(B, v). If у G Π, then χ + у G Ι(Β, ν) and ц о Ев{х) = 
0во£ 5 (х + г/) ( s ee section 4.2 for the definitions). Hence, if we look for a lexicographical 
best element of I(B, v), we might as well restrict our attention to Л = (x+U.-1) ПІ(В, ν). 
Define: Ω = {ζ G Λ | max exc(S, z) < max exc(S,x)}. 
Every element of Ω is lexicographically strictly better than all elements of Λ\Ω. There­
fore the sets have the same nucleolus, i.e. Nu(A.,B) = Nu(Q, B). The nucleolus of a 
non-empty compact set is non-empty. Since x€iì, Ω is non-empty. Hence, in order to 
prove that Nu(A, Β) φ φ, it is sufficient to show that Ω is compact. The set Ω is a poly­
hedral set, i.e. it is the intersection of a finite number of halfspaces. Polyhedral sets are 
the sum of a polytope Ω
ρ
 (a compact polyhedral set) and a cone Ω
€
. Let у € iìc. Then 
y(N) = 0. We have that χ + Xy Ε Ω for all λ > 0. Therefore y{S) > 0 for all Se В. By 
Lemma 5.14 we infer that y(S) = 0 for all SeB and therefore that убП. 
On the other hand, because x + y € Ω, we have that у e П х . We get: у 6 ППП 1 = {0}. 
Hence, Ω equals Ω
ρ
, which is a compact set. 
We conclude that Nu{I(B,v),B) φ φ. In fact, if χ e Nu(ü,B), then Nu(I(B,v),B) = 
x + U. D 
Corollary 5.15: Let В bc balanced and Jet (Ν,Β,ν) be a zero-normalized restricted 
game. Then the nucleolus consists of a single point if and only if В U {N} is complete. 
Proof: The last statement of the proof gives that the nucleolus is a singleton if and only 
if Π = {0}. This is the case if and only if eN, es(S e В) span IR . D 
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II Some combinatorial games 
6 Г-component additive tree games 
According to Maschler et al. (1972) the bargaining set of a convex game coincides with 
its core and the kernel consists of the nucleolus only. In this chapter we prove the same 
properties for Г-component additive games (or graph restricted games in the sense of 
Myerson (1977) and Owen (1986)) if Γ is a tree. The chapter is based on Potters and 
Reijnierse (1995). 
6.1 Introduction 
Cooperation often requires communication. Especially if the number of players is large, 
lack of communication can put severe restrictions on the cooperation possibilities. In the 
tradition of Myerson (1977), Owen (1986) and van den Nouweland (1993) we model the 
cooperation and the communication aspects separately. As usual, the potential profits 
from cooperation are given by a TU-game (Ν, v) which we assume to be superadditive. 
Communication possibilities are modeled by an (undirected) graph Γ = (І , E) on the 
player set N. The potential profit of a coalition S can only be realized in as far as the 
players in S can communicate, i.e. the actual value of a coalition S is 
Σ "(η 
TÇS/Γ 
in which S/T is the set of components of S. So the introduction of a communication 
graph Γ defines a projection ñp from the cone of superadditive games SAN onto a cone 
in the space of all games with player set N, TUN: 
Rr(v)(S) := £ „(Τ). 
Tes/г 
The linear map Rr commutes with zero-normalization, i.e. ñr(^o) = Rr(v)o- As Rr is 
a projection (i.e. Rr ° Rr = Rr), the image of TUN under RT consists of the games 
(N, v) with Rp{v) = v. A game υ is called Г-component additive if Rr(v) = v. In this 
chapter the graph Γ will be a tree, i.e. each pair of nodes i, j in Γ is connected by 
exactly one path. The class of Г-component additive tree games coincides with the class 
of games with restricted cooperation with the so-called total dependency property in 
Kuipers (1994). 
We will prove the following results ((N,v) is superadditive, Γ is a tree): 
(a) The game (N,R
r
(v)) is balanced, 
(ò) The bargaining set M(Rr(v)) and the core core(Rr(v)) coincide, 
(c) The kernel K.(Rr(v)) consists of the nucleolus nu(Rr{v)) only, 
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(d) The nucleolus of the game Rr(v) is the unique point χ satisfying the equalities 
x{N) = v(N) and s4(x) = sJZ(x) if there is an edge between г and j . The function st3 
is defined by 
stJ(x) := max{v(S) — x(S) | i € S Ç N\j, S is connected in Г}. 
In Maschler et al. (1972) it is proved that convex games have the properties (o), (6) 
and (e). In Muto et al. (1987, 1988) information market games, big boss games and 
cJan games have been shown to have these properties too. In fact, big boss games (and 
therefore also information market games) are games of type Rr{v) where Г is the 'spider's 
web graph'. There are only edges between the 'big boss' and each of the other players. 
Curie! et al. (1994) consider so-called σ-component additive games. These games are 
exactly the zero-normalized superadditive games of the type Rr(v) wherein Г is the 
'chain' σ(1)—σ(2) σ(η). For games of this type and in particular for sequencing 
games (see e.g. Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1988)) the results of this chapter hold too. 
Let us give some more terminolgy concerning graphs, in particular trees. An undirected 
graph Γ consists of a finite set of nodes N (we identify a node with its corresponding 
player) and a finite set of edges E. In our interpretation, it is not useful to have two 
edges with the same endpoints and therefore we can identify an edge with the pair of 
nodes it connects. We denote the assertion: "There is an edge that connects nodes i 
and j . " by (i,j) € Γ . 
A (simple) path from i&Ntoj£N,j^iisa, sequence of different nodes i = 
io,ii,... ,ip = j with (i*_i,tfc) € Г for к = 1,... ,p. An undirected graph is a tree if 
each pair of (different) nodes is connected by exactly one path. 
If Г is a tree, the choice of a root r, a node of Г, introduces a partial order on the nodes 
of Г: г •< j if and only if the (unique) path from τ to j contains the node г. If, moreover, 
г φ j , then г -< j . 
Moreover we can introduce Г , as the subgraph on the nodes {j e N | г •< j}. For all 
г Ε N the graph Г , is also a tree and Г>_
Г
 = Г. If IV, contains just one node (i.e. node 
г), then i is called a Jeaf. 
The set of connected coalitions in Г is denoted by Cr­
in Owen (1986) (see also van den Nouweiand (1993)) it is proved that the image of TUN 
under Rr is the linear subspace of TUN generated by the games {uj· | Τ e Cp}. We will 
give another proof for the case that Γ is a tree: 
Proposition 6.1 : if Γ is a tree, the range ofR? is the linear subspace ofTUN generated 
by the games {щ· \ Τ e Cr}. 
Proof: Every game (N, v) can be decomposed into a linear combination of unanimity 
games {uT \ Τ С Ν}. If ν = Етслт Ут^т, the linearity of Rr gives that 
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Rr(v) = ETCNUTRTM-
Let Τ be the intersection of all connected coalitions containing T. As in a tree Γ 
the nonempty intersection of two (or any finite number of) connected coalitions is also 
connected, Τ is a connected coalition. It is clear that Дг(ит) = Щ- Hence, the same 
weights can be used to show that Rr{v) is in the linear subspace of TUN generated by 
the games {uT | Τ € Cr}: Rr{v) = Σ 2/τ"τ· ^ 
TÇN 
6.2 Balancedness 
In Owen (1986) it is proved that Rr(v) is superadditive if (TV, v) is superadditive. In the 
case that Γ is a tree we prove that Rr(v) is even balanced. 
Proposition 6.2 : (Le Breton et al. (1991)) Г-component additive tree games are bal­
anced. 
Proof: We must prove that an equality ESCN 2/ses — £N with ys > 0 gives the inequality 
YISCN VsRr(v)(S) < Rr(v)(N). First we reduce the situation to balanced relations for 
connected coalitions. From ΣβζΝ Vs^s = eN we infer 
елг = Σ ysßs = Σ ys{ Σ ет) = Σ ( Σ VSVT 
SÇN SÇN Tes/г ï'ecr s-.Tes/r 
and Σ ysRv(v)(S) = ¿ ys( Σ "(Τ)) = Σ ( Σ Vs)v(T). 
SÇN SÇN res/r тес
г
 sTeS/r 
Hence, it is sufficient to prove the Bondareva/Shapley condition for balanced collections 
with connected coalitions only. In fact, it is enough to prove the condition for minimal 
balanced collections consisting of connected coalitions only3. So, let В be a balanced 
collection of connected coalitions not containing a proper balanced subcollection. Let 
Ti e В. If Τι = Ν, we have В = {Ν} and we are finished. If 7\ φ Ν, there is a 
player i\ e Т\ and a player j \ & T\ with (ti,ji) € Г. From the balancedness we infer 
that there is a coalition T-i 6 В with ji € Т^ Ç N\i\. As 7\ and Г2 are connected and 
Г is a tree, we find 7\ Π T2 = φ and Γι U T2 is connected. If 7\ U T2 Φ Ν, we can find 
players ¿2 € T\ U T2 and j2 & T\ U T2 with (¿2, j2) ε Γ. As before, there is a coalition 
T3 e В with j 2 € T3 Ç N\¿2. Then T3 Π (Ti U T2) = <^  and Ti U T2 U T3 is connected. 
Proceeding in this way we find after finitely many steps a subset of В that is a partition 
of N. As ß is a minimal balanced collection, В is this partition. For partitions the 
Bondareva/Shapley condition follows from superadditivity. D 
M 
3 The set {λ e Β. | λ is the corresponding weight vector of a balanced collection} is a polytope. 
The extremal points of this polytope correspond to the minimal balanced collections. К all extremal 
weight vectors obey the Bondareva/Shapley condition, all convex combinations obey it too. 
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6.3 The bargaining set 
The main result of this section is that the bargaining set and the core coincide for games 
of type Rr(v) if υ is superadditive and Γ is a tree. The following lemma holds for every 
TU-game. It will be used as well in the next chapter about simple flow networks. 
Lemma 6.3 : Let (N,v) be a TU-game with a non-empty imputation set and ¡et χ € 
I(v)\core(v). Suppose there is a coalition S* and a vector z* e R+ such that· 
(г) exc(T, x)<0 for aUTeM with Τ П S* = φ 
(η) ζ* (Τ) > ехс{Т, χ) for all Τ € M 
{m) c(z*) Ç S' 
(гг>) z*{S*) = exc(S*, χ) = v{S') - x(S'). 
Then χ<£Μ(υ). 
Proof: Since χ $ core(v), we have by (гг) that ζ" φ 0. Hence, c(z') is non-empty and so 
is (by (ггг)) S*. Since exc(N,x) = 0 < z'(S') = exc(S*,x), S* is not the grand coalition. 
Let г € c(z*). Define the vector у € IR as follows. 
Ук = Xk + z*k + —z' for all keS*,k^i 
У, = х, + щг; 
To verify that {S',y) is an objection of player г with respect to χ against any player 
j outside S', we have to check that j/(5*) = v(S*) and that yk > Xk for all к € S*\i. 
Because z* 6 R + , we have that yk — Xk > ¡s4z* > 0 for all к 6 S*\i. By property (гг;) 
we have: 
Σ » - <s*) + j^rz; + Е й + π ^ Ο = x(ST) + *·($*) = v(S'). 
kes· \ö I kes-\, Ρ I 
We show that (S*, y) is justified. For a counterobjection of j against г, player j needs 
a coalition Τ with J É T J I I and a vector г б Е with z(T) = v{T), Zk > у к for all 
A; e S* Π Τ and zk > Xk for all к € T\S*. Suppose that such a pair (T, z) exists. 
If Τ Π S* = φ, then (by property (г)): 
0 > exc(T,x) = υ{Τ) - x{T\S') > z(T) - z{T\S') = 0. 
If Τ Π S" φ φ, then (because г' ^ Τ and the properties (гг) and (ггг)): 
0 = z{T) - z{T Π S') - z(T\S*) < v{T) - y(T η S') - x(T\S') 
< v(T) - x(T Π S') - ζ·{Τ Π S') - x{T\S*) = exc{T, χ) - ζ'(Τ) < 0. 
Both cases lead to a contradiction. Hence, no coalition Τ is suitable for a counter 
objection. We conclude that χ is not an element of the bargaining set D 
Theorem 6.4: Let Γ be a tree on the player set N and let (N,v) be a T-component 
additive game Then the core and the bargaining set of ν coincide. 
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Proof: Suppose χ is ал element of I(v)\Core(v). We construct a coalition S* and 
a z* S R + with the properties (г),.., (iv) of the previous lemma. This construction 
requires two steps. 
The construction of z~ 
Firstly we construct the vector z* and a coalition T* containing the players with z* > 0. 
Choose any node r in Г for root and start with Τ* = φ. The coordinates z* are defined 
inductively going from the leafs of Γ to r. If к is a leaf of Г, we take z*k = 0 and put the 
node к into T* if and only if exc((k),x) = 0 (i.e. х* = 0). 
For arbitary г, the coordinate z* can be defined as soon as the coordinates z} with j > i 
have been defined. If so, we put 
z, := max{exc(S,x) - z*(S\i) \ S € C r, г G S Ç Ту,} 
and ζ* = ζ, V 0. We extend Γ* with г if and only if z, > 0. Notice that i e Τ* if ζ' > 0 
but also if z* = z, — 0. For each player г € Τ* there is a connected coalition 5, with 
г e 5, С Г , with z*(S,) = exc(S„x). After finitely many steps we have defined the 
vector z* > 0 completely. We have z*(S) > exc(S,x) for all S Ç Cr and therefore also 
for all non-connected coalitions. This gives property (it) of Lemma 6.3. 
Furthermore, for every i € Τ* we have that z*(St) = exc(S%,x). 
The construction of 5* 
Notice that the collection {5,},
е
г- is a covering of T", i.e. Uier· ¡>, Э T*. The collection 
can be a redundant covering of the set T'; it is possible that a coalition S} can be skipped 
without losing the covering of T*. In order to obtain an irredundant covering of Г* we 
investigate whether the coalitions S, are necessary to cover Г*. We start this scanning 
procedure with the coalitions S, with the property that the path from r to г does not 
contain a point of T*, unequal to i. We give these coalitions a label * (5, —> S*). E.g., if 
τ 6 Γ', in the first stage only the coalition ST obtains immediately a label. Proceeding 
inductively, if a node j e S* for some H j w e skip the coalition S,. If all nodes г € Τ* 
with i < j have been investigated and coalition S3 has not been skipped, we give the 
coalition Sj a label (S¡ —> S*). After a while all remaining coalitions are labeled. We 
have obtained a collection {5*},
е
т', Τ' С Τ*, still covering the set Γ*. The following 
claim shows that the elements of this collection are mutually disjoint. 
Claim: Ifi^j, then S* Π S* = φ. 
Proof: Suppose that к e S* Π S*. The path from τ to A: contains the nodes г and j . 
Let us assume without loss of generality that г 4 j . Then the path from г to A; contains 
the point j and as S* is connected and г, к € S* we have j 6 5*. Then the coalition S} 
would have been skipped. D 
Take S* = Щ г ' &*· Then property (гг) of Lemma 6.3 is obeyed. We get: 
z'(N) = z*(S') = Σ z'(S;) = Σ eictS;, !) < exc(S',x) < z'(S'). 
іет' іет' 
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The first equality holds because S" Э T' D c(z*). The first inequality follows from 
superadditivity. Hence, z*(S") = exc(S*,x): property (гг>) of Lemma 6.3. 
Hence, the pair (z*,S*) satisfies the conditions (гг), (ггг) and (ιυ). 
If Τ is a connected coalition with Τ Π S* = φ, we have ζ* (Τ) - 0 > exc(T,x). If 
ехс(Т, χ) were zero and г € Τ is the point of Τ closest to the root r, the node г were 
in T* Ç S* (see the construction of г* and T*). Hence, condition (г) has been satisfied 
for connected coalitions. Since the value of any coalition is the sum of the values of its 
components, the property holds for any coalition disjoint from S*. 
We apply Lemma 6.3 and conclude that χ £ M{v). Hence, M(v) Ç core(v). Since 
M(v) Э core(v) for all 777-games with a non-empty imputation set, the sets coincide. 
D 
6.4 The kernel 
In this section we prove the properties (c) and (d) mentioned in the introduction of the 
chapter. 
Theorem 6.5 : If (N, v) is a T-component additive tree game, the kernel К(г>) consists 
of the nucleolus nu(v) only. 
Proof: Г-component additive tree games are zero-monotonic, and therefore Theorem 2.1 
can be applied: the kernel equals the prekernel. 
Let χ G /C(i))(= K.*(v)). In section 5.3 is shown that the collection of connected coalitions 
determines the nucleolus of a Г-component additive tree game. Let for every i e f t 
B't(x) = {SeCT \exc(S,x)>t}. 
Theorem 5.2 gives: if for every Í 6 E the collection B't(x) is balanced on c(x), then 
χ = nu(v). We show that these collections are balanced (which is a stronger property). 
Since χ is an element of the kernel, it is also an element of the bargaining set. By Theorem 
6.4, it is a core allocation. Because, for every coalition 5, exc(S, x) = Zires/r exc(T, x) < 
exc(T',x) for every T' e 5/Г, we have that stJ{x) = st](x) for every t,j with (z,j) € Г. 
Hence, χ is an imputation with s
v
( i ) = st](x) = sJt(x) = sJt(a;) for all (t,j) G Г (here 
IC(v) = fC'(v) is used). 
Let So e B't(x). If there are players i,j with i e S0 Ç N\¡ and (i,j) Ε Г, there is a 
coalition Si G B't(x) with j G Si С N\i (since stJ(x) = s;,(x)). 
We can do the same with S0USi: if there is a pair of players (k, £) with к G SoUSy Ç Ν\ί 
and (к, ί) G Γ, then there is a coalition S2 G B't(x) with £ G S2 Ç N\{S0 U Si). 
Continuing this process, we get a partition {So,..., Sp} of coalitions which is a subset 
of B't(x). Partitions are balanced. Hence, for every So G B't(x) there is a balanced 
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subcollection of B't(x) of which 5 0 is a member. So B't(x) is the union of balanced 
collections and is therefore balanced itself. We conclude that χ is the nucleolus of v. D 
Remark: In the proof of the theorem the only property of χ that is used is that a; is a 
core allocation satisfying st](x) = s}i(x) for all (i,j) € Г. 
Corollary 6.5: If (Ν, ν) is a T-component additive tree game, then 
x&I*(v) and stJ(x) = sJt(x) for all (i,j) e Γ -ί=ί- χ = nu(v). 
Proof: If χ — nu(v), then χ is an element of the (pre)kernel and therefore the left hand 
side statement holds. Conversely, let χ be a preimputation satisfying the equalities 
stJ(x) = Sji(z) for all (i,j) 6 Γ. We distuinguish two cases: χ is an element of the core 
and χ is not. 
If χ € саге( ), then the remark above shows that χ is the nucleolus. 
If χ $ core(v), then the collection В consisting of all connected coalitions with positive 
excess with respect to χ is non-empty. Let S € В with maximal excess. 
If (i,j) G Г with г € S С N\j, we have stJ(x) > 0 and therefore sJt(x) > 0. Hence 
there is a coalition Τ ζ В with j 6 Τ С N\i. As S and Τ are connected in the tree 
Γ, 5 Π Τ = φ and the coalition S U Τ is connected. Then, by superadditivity, S UT 
is a connected coalition with a larger excess (at least exc(S, x) + exc(T, x)) than the 
excess of 5. This is in contradiction with the fact that 5 has maximal excess. Hence, 
no imputation ι outside the core satisfies s,j(x) = sJt(x) for all (г, j) € Г. D 
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7 Simple flow games 
This chapter considers simple flow networks. It is based on Reijnierse, Maschier, Potters 
and Tijs (1993). We introduce the minimum cut solution and characterize it in terms of 
one person efficiency, consistency and converse consistency. Furthermore we give several 
relations between the core of a simple flow game and four other solution concepts: the 
minimum cut solution, the least core, the kernel and the bargaining set. 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter flow networks as introduced in Kaiai and Zemel (1982a, 1982b) are 
considered. They proved that flow games are totally balanced and non-negative and, 
conversely, that every non-negative totally balanced game can be derived from a flow 
network. Curie!, Derks and Tijs (1989) proved that the class of non-negative balanced 
games can be obtained by flow games with veto control on the arcs. The latter Kalai 
and Zemel paper, in which arcs are owned by a player, describes an easy way to find 
a core element of the game: take a minimum cut of the flow network and give each 
player the total capacity of his arcs in the cut. We will consider the set of core elements 
obtained in this way. This is called the minimum cut-solution (MC -solution). It can 
be seen as a refinement of the core. In this chapter we look at simple flow networks, i.e., 
networks in which each player owns only one arc, but not necessarily all arcs are owned 
by a player (public arcs are allowed). Furthermore all capacities are one. Firstly, we 
characterize the MC-solution in terms of one person efficiency, consistency and converse 
consistency. Furthermore, we prove that, for simple flow networks, the MC-set is the 
set of the extreme points of the core. For the subclass of directed simple flow networks 
without public arcs this result was obtained by Kaiai and Zemel (1982b). 
In the second part of this chapter we will look for relations between the core and other 
well known solution concepts. We will show that, provided the core is non-empty and 
the grand coalition is not the only coalition with a positive value, the least core is equal 
to the core. We will characterize the simple flow games of which the core is a subset of 
the kernel. An example is given in which the kernel is not a subset of the (non-empty) 
core. Finally we will show that if a simple flow network is superadditive, the bargaining 
set equals the core. This makes the kernel a subset of the core. 
7.2 Preliminaries 
Firstly we give a description of a flow network. A flow network can be described by a 
graph with node set V and arc set E. There are two distuinguished nodes: the source 
(So) and the sink (Si). Arcs can be directed or undirected. It is allowed that several 
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arcs have the same end points. An arc e has a capacity cap(e) G 1R+. There is a (finite 
and non-empty) player set N. We assume that N Ç IN (later on in the chapter an 
ordering of the players in the union of all possible player sets is needed). 
We define an ownership-multifunction, called arc, which assigns to each player the arcs 
he owns and to each coalition the arcs of its members. Arcs not owned by a player are 
called public arcs. 
There is a natural way to obtain a TtZ-game v¡ from a flow network ƒ: the value v/(S) 
of a coalition S Ç. N is Ъу definition the value of a maximum flow from source to sink 
that uses only arcs owned by S and public arcs. A cut is a set of arcs C, such that each 
positive flow from So to Si uses at least one arc of C. Notice that we only have a proper 
game if Vf(<J>) = 0, i.e., arc(N) is a cut. We only consider this type of now networks. 
The set of flow networks with the property that arc(N) is a cut will be denoted by F. 
Games derived from a flow network are called now games. 
To shorten notation we denote Е
е
е о
с а
И
е ) by cap(D). By definition сар(ф) = 0. For 
any TU-game ν the core is defined by 
core(v) = {x € B.N \ x{N) = v(N), x(S) > v(S) for all 5 С Ν}. 
We define core(f) = core{v¡). 
A minimum cut is a cut with minimal capacity. Suppose there is a minimum cut m 
without public arcs. We define em e JR as follows: 
e™ = cap{arc(i) Π m) (i€ Ν) 
The max flow-min cut Theorem (2.4) tells us that em is efficient, i.e. em(N) = v/{N). 
If all capacities are 1 and each player owns exactly one arc, we call the flow network 
simple. This definiton is not completely the same as in Kalai and Zemel (1982a), Granot 
and Granot (1992) or Granot (1994). KaJai and Zemel (1982b) do not allow public arcs 
and they have costs on the (only directed) arcs. Granot and Granot (1992) do not allow 
public arcs either and have only undirected arcs. In Granot (1994) the arcs are directed 
and each arc has some revenue. He gives results in the case that public arcs are allowed 
as well as in the case they are not allowed. 
We denote the class of simple flow networks with SF. If m is a minimum cut that 
does not contain public arcs in a simple flow network, em is the indicator vector of the 
coalition arc~l(m). 
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7.3 Examples of flow games 
To let the reader get acquainted with the subject we give two examples of flow networks. 
1,5 
So¡ 
Example 7.1 2,20 
1,10 
2,10 
1,20 
2¿_ 
There are two players. The first number at an arc indicates the owner, the second 
number the capacity. There is one minimum cut and its capacity is 20. The imputation 
corresponding to this cut is (10,10). This is not an extreme point of the core of the 
associated flow game, as the core is the set {(5 + x, 15 — x) | 0 < χ < 10}. Later on we 
will see that if the flow network is simple, this cannot happen. 
If public arcs are allowed, it still holds that em € core(f) for all minimum cuts m that 
do not contain public arcs. The proof of this is similar to the proof Kedad and Zemel 
(1982b) give, since public arcs are not allowed in m. It is however possible that such an 
m does not exist. This is the case in the following four player flow network. 
So. Eli. 
Example 7.2 
The arcs with ρ as the first coordinate are public. The only minimum cut consists of 
the undirected public arc alone. It is easy to check that the core contains the vector 
{(1,0,0,1)}. In section 7.6 we will show that if the flow network is simple, the core is 
non-empty if and only if there is a coalition S which owns a minimum cut. 
7.4 The Absolut ion 
A solution φ on a family Q of TU-games assigns to each game in Q with player set N a 
subset of IR . Well known concepts are the (pre)imputation set, the core, the bargaining 
set, the kernel and the single point solutions (pre)nucleolus, Shapley value and τ-value. 
As we already did with the core, we can generalize any solution concept ψ to SF by 
defining φ{ί) = φ(υ;) (f £ SF). We can also define a solution on SF directly; for 
simple flow networks we introduce the MC-solution (Minimum Cut solution) as 
MC(f) = {em | m is a minimum cut of ƒ, arc(N) Э τη}. 
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We can characterize the MC-solution on SF with the aid of three properties. For that 
we need some definitions. The preimputation set of a game (JV, v) is defined by 
Γ(ν) = {χ 6 TRN \ x{N) = v(N)} 
and the imputation set by 
I(v) = {x € IR." I x(N) = v(N), x{i) > v{i) for all г € TV}. 
Let ƒ 6 SF, U С N,U Φ Φ- The restriction of f to U, notation fu, is the simple flow 
network derived from ƒ by deleting the arcs owned by N\U. Let (JV, v) be a cooperative 
game. The subgame υυ is the game with player set U and characteristic function vu 
with vu(S) = v(S) for all S CU. Notice that for all ƒ e F and all subsets U of the 
player set of ƒ : 
v[fU) = (vf)U-
For χ e ft , the restriction of χ to Ή, , denoted by xu, is defined by x^ = xt for all 
г e U. To shorten notation we use v~u {f~u,x~u) instead of vN\u (fN^u,xN^u). 
A game is called totally balanced if for all S С JV, the subgame vs is balanced, i.e., has 
a non-empty core. 
For any I É R we define c(x) to be the carrier of x, i.e. 
c(x) = {ι€ Ν\χ,φΟ}. 
Now we introduce three properties which solution concepts may have: 
A solution φ on SF is one person efficient if for each one player simple flow network ƒ : 
Vif) = MN)}. 
A solution φ on SF is called consistent if for each ƒ ε SF with more than one player, 
for all χ e </?(ƒ) and for all U С c(x) we have x~u € <p(f~u). 
A solution v? on SF is converse consistent if for all ƒ ε S F with more than one player: 
for all χ e ƒ*(ƒ) : if x~l € <¿>(/-*) for all г 6 φ ) , then χ 6 p(/)· 
For surveys on consistency we refer to Driessen (1991) and Thomson (1990). 
7.5 Characterization of the MC-solution on SF 
Theorem 7.3 : MC is the unique solution on SF that obeys one person efficiency, 
consistency and converse consistency. 
The theorem follows from the following two propositions: 
Proposition 7.4: MC obeys one person efficiency, consistency and converse consis­
tency. 
Proof: (one person efficiency): If there is one player, his arc forms a cut. If it is 
a minimum cut, then it is the only minimum cut, so {(1)} = MC(f). If not, then 
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ν f (Ν) = 0 and the empty cut is the minimum cut. Hence, {(0)} = MC(f). In both 
cases MC(f) = {vf{N)}. 
(consistency): Let ƒ G SF, χ G MC {f) and let U С c{x). We prove that arc(c(x)\U) 
is a minimum cut in f~u. We know that arc(c(x)) is a minimum cut in ƒ. If we delete 
the edges of U, the remaining arcs form a cut in f~u. For any cut С in f~v, COarc(U) 
is a cut in ƒ. Hence, by the max flow min cut Theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1956), 
cap(arc(U)) + cap(C) > Vf(N). Furthermore, cap(arc(c(x)\U)) = v/(N) — cap(arc(U)) 
and therefore arc(c(x)\U) is a minimum cut in f~u. 
(converse consistency): Let ƒ € S F with more than one player. Take χ G /*(ƒ) and 
assume that x~' G MC(f~') for all i G c(x). We have to prove that χ G MC(f). 
If c(x) = φ, then Vf(N) = 0, which gives that the empty set is the only minimum cut, 
so 0 = χ G MC(f). 
If c(x) = {i}, then 0 G MC(f~l), so vj(N\i) = 0. So arc(i) is a cut. Because χ is 
efficient, x, = Vf(N) = 1. So orc(i) is a minimum cut. Therefore χ € MC. 
If |c(x)| > 1, take ι 6 c(x). Because x~l e MC(f~'), we have Xj = 1 for all j 6 c(x)\{¿}. 
Also we know that огс(с(х)\{г}) is a minimum cut in ƒ " ' , so arc(c(x)) is a cut in ƒ. 
Remove an other player i' and conclude that i , = 1. Because χ is efficient, arc(c(x)) is 
a minimum cut. So MC obeys converse consistency. D 
Proposition 7.5 : Let φ Ъе a solution on SF obeying one person еШсіепсу and consis­
tency. Let ф be a solution obeying one person efficiency and converse consistency. Then 
ψ С ψ. 
Proof: By induction to the number of players. If \N\ = 1, ip(f) = ψ(/) as both φ and 
•ф satisfy one person efficiency. 
Now let \N\ > 1 and let <р{д) Ç ψ(д) hold for all simple flow networks д with less than 
η players. Let ƒ g S F with η players. Take χ G <£>(ƒ). Because φ obeys consistency, 
for every i e c(x) it holds that x - ' G φ{/~') Ç Ψ{/~1)· Because ф obeys converse 
consistency, χ G φ{/)· D 
Proof of the theorem: We can conclude that for any solution φ that is one person 
efficient, consistent and converse consistent, it must be that 
MC Ç φ Ç MC. This proves the theorem. D 
The next three examples of solutions show that one person efficiency, consistency and 
converse consistency are logically independent on SF. 
Example 7.6: Let ip(f) = R for every ƒ G SF with player set ΛΓ. Then φ obeys 
consistency and converse consistency but is not one person efficient. 
Example 7.7 : The preimputation set obeys one person efficiency and (trivially) con­
verse consistency, but not consistency. 
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Example 7.8 : In section 7.2 we assumed that for all flow networks the player set is a 
subset of the natural numbers. Therefore the union of all player sets of flow networks 
in SF equals IN. Let N be a finite subset of IN. Let χ and y be two elements of R . 
We declare χ to be lexicographically better than y if χ = y or if there is а к ζ Ν 
such that xk > yk and x¡ — y¡ for all / < k, I 6 N. Let φ be the 4exicograpbic-best-of-
MC-solution' when it assigns to a simple flow network ƒ the empty set in case MC(f) 
is empty, and the lexicographically best element of MC otherwise (because MC(f) is 
a finite set and the lexicographical ordering is total and transitive, a unique majorant 
exists). For one person flows φ equals MC, so φ obeys one person efficiency. 
Claim: φ also obeys consistency. 
Proof: Let z £ ψ{}) and let U Ç c(z). We have to prove that z~u € <p(f~u)- Because 
z e MC (f) and MC obeys consistency, we know that z~u € MC(f~u), and thus <p{f~u) 
is non-empty. Let y ζ φ{}~υ). Then агс(с(у)) is a minimum cut in f~u. Therefore 
arc(U U c(y)) is a cut in ƒ. We have cap(arc(c(y))) = v/(N\U) = Vf(N) — cap(arc(U)). 
Hence cap(arc(UUc(y))) = v/(N), so arc(UL>c(y)) is a minimum cut; eUUc^ e MC(f). 
Therefore z is lexicographically better than eUuc^y\ Hence, z~u is lexicographically 
better than (eUUci-y^)~u, which is just y. Because у € <p[f~u), we also have that у is 
lexicographically better than z~u. Hence, z~u = у. Π 
Since φ Φ MC, it cannot obey converse consistency. 
7.6 The MC-solution and the extreme points of the core 
It is easy to see that MC Ç ext(core(f)) (ƒ 6 SF); each player gets in a point χ 6 
MC(f) either zero or one. If a player gets zero, he cannot get anything less in the core. 
If a player i gets one, then x(N\i) > Vf(N\i) > vj(N) — 1 = x(N\i). Hence, player 
г cannot get anything more in the core. Therefore χ is an extreme point of the core. 
The converse statement holds too. This has already been proved by Kalai and Zemel 
(1982b) in the case that there are no public arcs. 
To prove it in the case public arcs are allowed, we will use the notions path and unit 
now and a characterization of the core of a simple flow network. 
A path is a (with respect to inclusion) minimal set of arcs that connects the source 
with the sink. The set of all players who own an arc on a fixed path is called a path 
coalition. We can talk about the first, second, . . . , last player of a path coalition P, just 
by looking at the order of the arcs in the path, starting at the source. Note that each 
minimal winning coalition Ρ in the game v¡ is a path coalition (P is minimal winning 
if v(P) > 0 and v(T) = 0 for all Τ £ Ρ). 
A unit flow is a flow from source to sink that uses capacity of one of the arcs of one 
fixed path and uses no other arcs. The algorithm of Ford and Fulkeison (1956) applied 
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to flow networks gives that each flow from source to sink with integer capacities is the 
sum of edge disjoint unit flows. It also shows the existence of a maximal flow that is 
integer valued. 
Lemma 7.9 : Let ƒ € SF. Tien y € core(f) if and only if y 6 1(f) and y(T) > 1 for 
each minimal winning coalition Τ Ç N. 
Proof: If y € core(f), the right hand side statement is obviously true. 
Let y ζ 1(f) such that the right hand side statement holds and let S Ç N. Because of 
the existence of an integer valued maximal flow, v/(S) equals the maximal number of 
pairwise disjoint paths in the subnetwork fs. Each path coalition contains a minimal 
winning coalition. Because, y > 0, we have y(P) > 1 for each path coalition P. Hence, 
y(S) > Vf(S). Since y(N) — VF(N), y is an element of the core. 
Theorem 7.10: Let ƒ e SF. Then MC(f) equals ext(core(f)). 
Proof: We have already seen that MC(f) Ç ext(core(f)). Now let χ € ext(core(f)). If 
\N\ = 1, the core consist of one element; {(0)} or {(1)}. If core(f) = {(0)}, the empty 
set is a minimum cut without public arcs, so MC(f) = core(f). If core(f) = {(1)}, the 
non-public arc is a minimum cut and again MC(f) = core(f). 
Hence, let us assume that |ΛΓ| > 1 and that MC(g) equals ext(core(g)) for all g £ SF 
with less then \N\ players. 
Case 1: There is a player г with x, = 0. 
Let g be the \N — l|-flow network in which the arc of player i has been changed into 
a public arc. Because 0 <
 д
(ф) = υ f (i) < xt = 0, vg is a well defined game. Let 
z £ core(g). With (z, 0) is meant the vector І б Н with z, = 0 and z~l = z. Then for 
all TCN: 
(z,0)(T)=z(T\i)>vg(T\i) = vf(T). 
Conversely, if y e core(f) with y, = 0 and Τ С Ν\ι, then: 
y(T) = y(T U i) > vf (Τ U i) = Vg(T) 
This gives that core(g) = {y~l | у € core(f), yt = 0}. Since x, = 0 and χ is an extreme 
point of core(f), χ is also an extreme point of {y € core(f) \ yt = 0}. Hence, x~l is an 
extreme point of core(g). 
By induction ι - ' ε M С (g) and therefore it is a 0,1-vector. Hence ι is a 0,1-vector 
itself. Because χ € core(v¡) and 0 = x(N\c(x)) > v/(N\c(x)), the carrier of χ is a 
cut. Because cap(c(x)) = \c(x)\ = x(N) = vf(N), it is a minimum cut. Therefore 
χ e MC(f). 
Case 2: Let χ be an extreme point of the core with χ > 0. 
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Let F be the coalition of players who own an arc that can be reached From the source 
with the use of public arcs only. Let L be the coalition of players who own an arc from 
where the sink can be reached with the use of public arcs only. Let Ρ be a minimal 
winning coalition. Then Ρ is a path coalition. The first player of Ρ is a member of F. If 
another player of Ρ would be a member of F too, the coalition consisting of this player 
and all his followers in Ρ were winning as well. Because Ρ is minimal winning, this 
cannot be the case. Hence, for every minimal winning coalition Ρ we have | P D P | = 1. 
In a similar way it can be proved that \P Π L\ = 1. Hence, 
Y^{eF — eL)t = 0 for all minimal winning coalitions P, (*) 
i€P 
in which eF (eL) is the indicator vector of F (L). Let e = rnin xtt let y = χ — e(eF — eL) 
and let ζ = χ + e(eF — eL). Then y and ζ are both non-negative. Because of (*), 
y(P) = z(P) = x(P) > 1 for all minimal winning coalitions P. As a consequence of 
Lemma 7.9, both y and ζ are elements of core(f). 
Because χ = Ыу + ζ) and χ is an extreme point of the core, χ = у = ζ. Hence, 
e
F
 — e
L
 is the 0-vector. Thus F = L and every minimal winning coalition contains one 
player. Because χ € core(f) and χ > 0, every player is a member of a minimal winning 
coalition. Hence, x, = 1 for all i £ N. We conclude that arc(N) is a minimum cut and 
χ 6 MC(f). 
D 
If we omit the restriction of unit capacity, not all extreme points are in MC, as example 
7.2 shows. 
7.7 Other solution concepts 
In this section we look at relations between the core and other classical solution concepts; 
the least core, the kernel and the bargaining set. 
The least core 
For simple flow games, three well known solution concepts are strongly related to the 
core. The first one is the ieast core (£), see Maschler et al. (1979). To define this we 
need the notion of excess. Let 
exc(S, x) = v(S) - x(S) 
and 
earc,nax(i) = max{exc(S,x) \фС S Ç Ν). 
The least core is the set of imputations which have the lowest maximal excess, i.e.: 
C{v) = {xe I(v) | exc
max
{x) < excTOaI(i/) for all y 6 I{v)}. 
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For any TU-game with a non-empty imputation set, the least core is non-empty. We 
prove that if the core of a simple flow game is non-empty, the core coincides with C, 
except for one special case: 
Proposition 7.11: Let ƒ 6 SF. If core(f) ψ φ and N is not a minima] winning 
coalition, then core(f) — £(ƒ). 
Proof: Take an integer valued maximal flow and decompose it into Vf(N) unit flows. 
Each of these unit flows corresponds with a path coalition. In a core allocation each 
of these path coalitions gets at least 1. As the unit flows are edge disjoint, these path 
coalitions get exactly 1. If one of these path coalitions is not minimal winning, it contains 
a player who gets 0 (take a player outside a minimal winning subset of this path). 
For players whose arc has not been used by the maximal flow nothing is left; they get 
0 in core elements. If N is not minimal winning, there is a coalition S Ç N with 
exc(S, x) = 0 for every χ £ core(f) (take for S any path used in the maximal flow or a 
player who gets 0). Hence, for imputations inside the core, the maximal excess equals 
zero. For imputations outside the core, the maximal excess is strictly larger than zero. 
This gives that the core equals the least core. D 
Remark: if N is minimal winning, exc
max
 is minimized in the case of an equal split, 
while the core equals the imputation set. 
The core-kernel 
Let χ € I{v). We define the surplus of player г with respect to player j as: 
s,j(x) = max{v(S) - x(5) [ г € S $ j}. 
The Jcernei (/C) is the set of imputations for which holds that: 
if s,j(x) > sJt{x), then Xj = v(j). 
The core-Jrcrnei {CK.) is the intersection of the core and the kernel. 
The kernel is a concept introduced by Davis and Mascnier (1965). Granot and Granot 
(1992) give a beautiful characterization of the intersection of the core and the kernel in 
the case all arcs are undirected and non-public. They call two players г and j inseparabie 
if all path coalitions that contain г also contain j and vice versa. They prove that the 
core-kernel equals the set of all core allocations that assign the same to inseparable 
players. 
However, in the case we examine this is not true, as the next five person simple flow 
network shows: 
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Example 7.12 
Since all capacities are one, at each arc only the name of its owner is stated. There 
is no inseparable pair of players, so if the result of Granot and Granot (1992) would 
still hold, the core is a subset of the kernel. However, the core is the convex hull of the 
imputations (0,1,0,1,0), (0,1,0,0,1) and (0,0,1,0,1), while e.g. s45((0,1,0,0,1)) = 0 and 
eM((0,l,0,0,l)) = - l . 
This example also shows that Theorem 4.4 of Gianot and Granot (1992) cannot be 
generalized to our type of flow networks. This theorem says the following. Let Τ : 
соте(у) —> R. be the function that rearranges the coordinates of χ ξ. соте( ) in non-
decreasing order. If all arcs are undirected and non-public the nucleolus of a simple flow 
game is the core element with the lexicographically largest T-value. In this example this 
element is (0, 5,1, | , | ) , while the nucleolus is (0, | , | , | , | ) . 
However, some weaker properties of the core-kernel are valid: 
Lemma 7.13 : Let ƒ 6 SF, x G CK.(f) and let i and j be inseparable. Then x, = x
r 
Proof: Observe that vf(i) = vf(j) = 0. Let Τ e argmax{v/(5) - x(S) \i e 5 j j} (with 
'argmax' is meant the collection of coalitions where the maximum is obtained). 
If arc(i) is a part of a path in the restricted flow network fT, this path is also a path in 
the original network ƒ. That cannot be, since we assume that г and j are inseparable 
and j g T. Hence, ν f (Τ) = /(Т\г). Because 2: G core(f), we have —i t = v¡(i) — χ, < 
s,j(x) = Vf(T) - x(T) = Vf(T\i) — x{T\i) — x, < -x,. This gives sl3(x) = —x, and 
because of the symmetry s]t(x) = —xy Since χ is an element of the kernel, st]{x) > sJt(x) 
implies that x3 = vj(j) = 0. Because χ € core(vf), sy( i) < 0. Hence, stJ(a;) < sJt(x). 
Again because of the symmetry, stJ(x) equals sJt(x) and therefore i , = x¡. D 
We give a characterization of the simple flow games with CK. equal to the core. Therefore 
we need three definions: a path coalition Ρ is said to be reguiar if x{P) = 1 for all 
χ € core(f). An equivalent definition is: a path coalition Ρ is regular if x{P) = 1 for all 
extreme points χ of the core. Extreme points of the core correspond with minimum cuts 
without public arcs of ƒ (Theorem 7.10). Hence, regular paths are exactly those paths 
that have precisely one arc in common with each minimum cut without public arcs. In 
example 7.12, (23) and (45) are regular, while (125) is not, because (25) is a minimum 
cut, which makes χ = (0,1,0,0,1) a core element with i(125) = 2. 
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A player г is called an N-dummy if v/(N) — Vf(N\i) = 0. If player г is a member of 
some minimum cut without public arcs, he gets 1 in the extreme point χ of the core 
corresponding to this cut. This implies that Vf(N\t) < x(N\i) = Vf(N) — 1 and player 
г is not an N-dummy. If player i is not a member of any minimum cut without public 
arcs, i , = 0 for all χ € ext(core(f)), and therefore i , = 0 for all χ € core(f). Hence, г 
is an iV-dummy. 
We can conclude that a player is an ЛГ-dummy if and only if he is not a member of some 
minimum cut-coalition. In example 7.12 player 1 is the only N-dummy. 
A flow network ƒ is said to be separating if for each pair of non-iV-dummies i, j there 
is a regular path coalition containing г but not j . The flow network in example 7.12 is 
not separating; there is no regular path containing 2 and not 3. 
Proposition 7.14: Let ƒ € SF with a non-empty соте. Then core(f) = CIC(f) if and 
only if f is separating. 
Proof: ( =$• ) : Let г and j be two (different) non-N-dummies. We have to prove that 
there is a regular path coalition Ρ containing i but not j . 
Take a point χ in the relative interior of the core. Then x, > 0. If s,j(x) = —ε < 0, then 
χ — ε(β, — e,) e core(f)\C!C, so core(f) φ CK.(f). Therefore s,
:
(x) = 0. 
There is a coalition S containing г and not j with excess 0. Consider the restricted 
flow network fs. Because exc(S,x) = 0, we have vj(S) = x{S). This gives that 
x
5
 € core(fs). 
Take an integer maximal flow in the restricted flow network / s and divide it into unit 
flows. Each unit flow corresponds with a path coalition which gets 1 in every allocation 
in core(fs). Members of S not in one of these path coalitions get 0 in every allocation 
in core(fs). 
Because x, > 0, г must be a member of a path coalition P. Since j & S, j £ Ρ as well. 
Since x(P) = 1, the excess of Ρ is 0. Because Ρ has excess 0 somewhere in the relative 
interior of core(f), it has excess 0 everywhere in the core. Therefore Ρ is regular. 
( <= ) : Let г and j be different players and let χ € core(f). Then stJ(x) < 0, since all 
excesses are non-positive. If x, = 0, then ехс((г),х) = 0, so s,3(x) = 0. If x, > 0, then г 
is not an iV-dummy. If j is an N-dummy neither, we have by assumption a regular path 
coalition containing i but not j , so s,¿(x) = 0 . If j is an iV-dummy, then by definition 
Vf(N) = vj(N\j), so the core allocation χ allocates zero to j . Hence, exc(N\j,x) = 0. 
Again s4(x) = 0. We have found stJ(x) = 0 in all cases. Therefore stJ(x) = sJt(x) for 
all гф j and all χ € core(f). Hence core(f) = CK.(f). D 
The next example shows that К can be strictly larger than CIC, even when the core is 
non-empty: 
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Example 7.15 
The value of the grand coalition is 3. The extreme points of the core are e45s and 
e789 (Theorem 7.10). Consider the imputation χ = (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0). This is not 
an element of the core, e.g. exc((47),x) = 1. It is however a kernel element, because 
for every pair of players i,j, s,j = 1. For instance, вц(х) = еяс((15689),і) = 1 = 
eic((47),a;) = s^. 
On the other hand, in the next section we prove that if a simple flow network is superad­
ditive, the bargaining set equals the core. Since the kernel is a subset of the bargaining 
set, the core-kernel then equals the kernel. Since the flow networks which Granot and 
Granot (1992) consider are superadditive, their results concerning the core-kernel also 
hold for the kernel. 
The bargaining set 
The bargaining set (ΛΊ) is a concept introduced by Лишали and Maschier (1964). It 
was introduced as an alternative for the core, in case the core is empty. The bargaining 
set contains the core, but even when the core is non-empty, it can be strictly larger than 
the core. Equality of the core and the bargaining set has been proved: 
- for convex games (Maschler et al. (1979)). 
- for Г-component additive games if Г is a tree (Potters and Reijnierse (1995), previous 
section). 
- for big boss games (Potters et al. (1990)). 
In our attempt to prove that ΛΊ equals the core a counterexample was found in example 
7.15. If we look at flow networks generating superadditive games, the situation changes 
(Theorem 7.17). A game υ is called superadditive if v(S)+v(T) < v(SuT) whenever Sn 
Τ = φ. We call a flow network ƒ superadditive if the generated game v¡ is superadditive. 
For superadditive flow games we have the following characterization: 
Proposition 7.16: Let ƒ e SF. Then the following properties are equivaJent: 
(г) ƒ is totally balanced. 
(n) ƒ is superadditive. 
(иг) the capacities of any public arc can be increased without changing the values 
of the generated game. 
Remark: If the capacities of the public arcs are increased, the resulting flow network is 
not simple anymore. If one does not like to leave the class SF, (ггг) can be replaced by: 
(hi') duplicating public arcs does not change the generated game. 
Simple flow games 71 
Proof (г) =>· (гг) holds for any TU-g&me 
(гг) => (ггг) Let S Ç N Let к be the largest number of pairwise disjoint path 
coalitions contained in S Notice that a path coalition cannot be empty, since otherwise 
the path consists of public arcs only, while arc(N) is a cut Take a maximal integer flow 
in the restricted network fs This flow can be decomposed into Vf(S) pairwise disjoint 
unit flows, which correspond with paths Each of these paths contains the arcs of a path 
coalition Therefore Vf(S) < к Path coalitions have value 1 We can conclude from 
superadditivity that v¡ (S) > к The number к does not change when the capacities of 
the public arcs are increased 
(ггг) ==• (г) If the capacities of all public arcs can be increased without changing the 
values of the game, then for each coalition S there is a minimum cut of the restricted 
flow network fs without public arcs Therefore fs is balanced (Theorem 7 10) So ƒ is 
totally balanced D 
The rest of this section deals with the proof that for superadditive simple flow networks 
ƒ the bargaining set equals the core 
We use again Lemma 6 3 which is 
Lemma 6.3 Let (N, v) be a TU-game Let χ e I(v)\core(v) Suppose there is a 
N 
coalition S* and a vector z* 6 R + such that 
(г) exc(T, x) < 0 for all Τ € M with Τ Π S* = φ 
(гг) ζ* (Τ) > ехс(Т, χ) for all Τ £ Μ 
(m) c(z') Ç S* 
(lìi) ζ* = exc(S*, χ) 
Then хІМ( ) 
Theorem 7.17 For all superadditive f € SF the bargaining set equals the core 
Proof Let ƒ e SF be superadditive For any χ G I(f)\core(f) we look for a coalition 
S* and a vector z* with the properties required in Lemma 6 3 Let S* be a coalition 
with maximal excess that is not a subset of another coalition with maximal excess Then 
property (г) of Lemma 6 3 is obeyed, since if there is a coalition Τ & M with Τ Π S' = φ 
with a non-negative excess, superadditivity gives exc(TL> S*,x) is at least exc(S*,x) 
It takes more effort to find the vector z* Starting from the flow network ƒ we construct 
another (not simple) directed flow network ƒ which generates the same flow game as ƒ 
does 
If a public arc is undirected, we replace it by two oppositely directed arcs with the same 
end points as the original undirected one This does not effect the generated game Then 
the capacity restrictions on the pubhc arcs are removed Because of superadditivity this 
does not change the generated game too (see Proposition 7 16) So, we can assume that 
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all public arcs are directed and have infinite capacity. If a player owns an undirected arc 
we give him two oppositely directed arcs between the same nodes instead, both having 
capacity one. At first sight one might expect that this action increases the power of 
the involved player. However, if S Ç Ν, there is always a maximal flow in fs without 
cycles. Because the two new edges of a player form a cycle, at least one of them is not 
used in this flow. Therefore this cycle free flow can also be obtained in the original flow 
network. Hence, the value of coalition S has not increased. 
Finally we put an extra directed public arc from Si to So called e'. The result ƒ is no 
longer an element of SF, but it generates the same flow game as ƒ does. 
Let E' be the set of arcs in ƒ. For an arc e we define head(e) to be the node where e 
is pointing at and tail(e) the node where e is coming from. For a node ν G V we define 
in(v) = {e G E' I head(e) = v} and out(v) = {e G E' \ tail(e) — v}. 
A circulation now is a flow for which the inflow of each node is equal to its outflow. 
Let χ G R + be given. We define x' G R"
r c
 in the following way: x'
e
 = xt for all e and 
i with e e агс(і). Note that arc(i) can only contain one or two arcs. Let us consider 
the following linear program called LP: 
(1) ife. € R 
(2) ye > 0 (e G E) 
(3) J/, < 1 (e G arc(N)) 
(4) Σ у<- Σ 2/β = 0 (weV) 
eGouí(u) e6¿n(tí) 
(5) maximize ye> -Т,
е&втс(п)х'еУе 
Notice that χ' is not a variable of this program (it is a parameter) and that the polyhedral 
set of feasible points does not depend on x'. The feasible points in LP are exactly the 
feasible circulation flows in the network ƒ. The objective of the program is to maximize 
the gains if every unit flow from source to sink yields one unit and x'
e
 has to be paid for 
every unit flow through arc e (e G arc(N)). Hence, we understand x'
e
 as a cost vector 
on the non-public arcs. 
Claim 1: The extreme points of the polyhedron of feasible points of LP aie integer. 
Proof: Let y be an extreme point of the polyhedron. Let Ky = {e € E' \ ye is non-
integer}. Let ƒ' be the subnetwork (V, Ky). If a node has degree 1 (the degree of a 
node υ equals |m(v)| + |out(^)|) in the subgraph ƒ', either the inflow or the outflow of 
this node is non-integer. This cannot be, since the inflow equals the outflow (equation 
(4)). Starting from a node with degree larger than one, one can find a cycle in ƒ' (not a 
E' 
circuit, see section 2.2 for the definitions). Take this cycle and orient it. Define t G R 
to be: 
t
e
 = 0 if e does not lie on the cycle. 
t
e
 = ε if e is directed according to the orientation of the cycle. 
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t
e
 = — ε if e is directed opposite of the orientation of the cycle. 
For positive but sufficiently small ε, y + t as well as y — t is an element of the polyhedron. 
This is in contradiction with the assumption that y is an extreme point. D 
Claim 2: The value of LP equals exc(S*,x); the maximal excess ofx. 
Proof: The polyhedron is non-empty, as y = 0 is an element. The linear program has an 
optimum because y
e
> < vj(N) for all feasible flows y. Let О be the face of the polyhedron 
of feasible points in which the maximum is attained. Then О is non-empty. Since it is 
a subset of H + , it does not contain a linear variety. Therefore it has extreme points. 
Let у be an extreme point of О (and thus of the polyhedron of feasible points). Claim 
1 shows that у is an integer vector. Hence y
e
 e {0,1} for all e € arc(N). Let S = {i € 
N | there is an e € arc(i) with ye = 1} and let v(LP) be the value oí LP. ye, equals the 
value of a maximal flow from source to sink in ƒ ; the restriction of ƒ to S. This is by 
definition Vf(S). 
If a player г with x, > 0 has two arcs and both are used, both are used with capacity one. 
Define a flow у1, equal to у except that y*
e
 = 0 for both arcs of player i. We get another 
feasible point with the same quantity flowing through arc e' and with costs Σ x'
e
y
e
 — 2x,, 
which contradicts the assumption that у is an optimal point. 
Therefore, for all i € N we have: Σ!
ε
€α>·φ) х'
е
Уе
 = xt it г & S 
Еесагф) Х'еУе = ° e l s e · 
Hence, Y,x'
e
y
e
 = x(S) and 
v(LP) = y
e
, - Ee<=arc(N) ¿еУе = vf(S) ~ X(S) = eXc(S, x). 
Therefore: v(LP) = exc(S,x). 
Let {j/e}
e
gE be a maximal flow in ƒ under the condition that no edge of N\S* is used. 
We can make a feasible flow in ƒ by taking y¿ = υ ¡{S*). Now we have a feasible point 
of LP with value v¡(S') - x{S'). So, we find v(LP) = exc(S, x) = exc{S\ x). D 
To find the vector z* with the properties of Lemma 6.3 we consider the dual linear 
program, LP*: 
(1*) z'e > 0 ( е е arc(N)) 
(2') u
v
 e E, {veV) 
(3*) иSi - Uso = 1 
(4*) Mfatl(e) - U h c a d (e) > 0 (e £ P) 
(5*) utatl{e) - uhead(e) +z'e> -x'e (e e arc{N)) 
(6*) minimize ^ z'
e 
eearc(N) 
The set Ρ is set of public arcs, the arc e' excepted. 
The dual problem has the following interpretation: the u-variables give a potential value 
to each node v. As only differences of u-variables occur in the constraints of LP", we can 
assume that us0 = 0 and therefore (by (3*)) uj, = 1. The z'-variables can be interpreted 
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as extra payments on non-public arcs. The inequalities (5*) state that the total payment 
x'
e
 + z'
e
 is at least the difference of the potential values in head(e) and tail(e). Going 
along a public arc does not increase the potential value (inequality (4*)). The objective 
is to minimize the total extra payments. 
Let (z1*, и*) be an optimal point of LP* and define z* = X)eeorc(j) z'\ • 
In the next claim we show that z* satisfies the conditions (гг), (ггг) and (ггі) of Lemma 
6.3. 
Claim 3: The maximal excess with respect to x + z* equals zero and is obtained in 5*. 
furthermore the carrier of z* is a subset of S*. 
Proof: The duality Theorem gives: 
z*(N) = v{LP') = v{LP) = exc(S',x). 
Let y* be an optimal point of the primal such that y* = 0 for every edge e of N\S* 
(see the end of Claim 2). Let e e arc(N). If z'* > 0 we have y* = 1 by complementary 
slackness. Hence, as y\ > 0 implies e ε arc(S'), we find c(z*) Ç 5* (property (ггг)) and 
z*(S*) = exc(S*,x) (property (iv)). 
Remains to prove that z*(T) > exc(T,x) for all coalitions Τ С N. 
Let Τ € M and decompose a maximal flow in fT into v¡(T) unit flows. Along a path 
from source to sink used by such a unit flow the total payments are at least one. This 
follows from the inequalities (4*) and (5*) added along the path and equation (3*). If 
we add the unit flows and use the fact that the paths used by these flows are disjoint, 
we find z*{T) > Vf(T) -x(T)= exc{T,x). This gives property (гг). 
This finishes the proof of the claim, the construction of (5*, z') and the proof of Theorem 
7.17. D 
We have seen (example 7.15) that Theorem 7.17 cannot be generalized by deleting the 
property of superadditivity. The next 4Â;-person flow network shows that we also cannot 
skip the unit capacity-condition: 
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So 
4k - 1 
Example 7.18 
Si 
4k, 2 
The flow network Д is a parallel linking of к identical four person networks. The arcs 
connected to source or sink are public with capacity 2. Players with rank number 
divisible by 4 have an arc with capacity 2, the others have an arc with capacity one. 
Lemma 7.19 : For ¡arge к, the imputation xk = (0, 5,0,I5,0, \, 0, \\,..., 0, ¿, 0,15) is 
an element of the bargaining set, but neither of the kernel nor of the core. 
Proof: If к = 1, it can be easy checked that there are three coalitions with positive 
excess with respect to i i , namely (12), (23) and (134), all with excess \. For general к 
the maximal excess is ^k. 
We abbreviate χ* by χ and f к by ƒ. Suppose player г has an objection (S, y) against 
player j . Let y' e R be (y,x]N\S). 
Claim: The maxima] excess with respect to y' is at least \k. 
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Proof: We know that y'( = χι for all i g S, y't > χι for all l e S and 
y'(N) - x(N) = y(S) - x(S) = v{S) - x(S) = exc(S,x) < \k. 
In particular, (y' — x, exc
max
(j/')) is feasible in the following linear program: 
α e R.+ , t e IR 
t + a(R) > exc{R, x) (R С ЛГ) 
-α(Λ0 > -ík 
minimize t 
Hence, the value of the program is a lower bound for excmax(y'). 
The dual of the program is: 
bR > 0 (ÄCJV), и > О 
Елэ^д - и < 0 {e € Ν) 
maximize — ¿ки + ^exc{R,x)bp. 
A feasible point of the dual is: 
bR = | if R = (1,2, 5,6, . . . , 4A: - 3,4Jfc - 2), Л = (2,3, 6,7, . . . , 4¿ - 2,4fc - 1) 
or R =(1,3,4, 5,7,8, . . . , 4k - 3,4A - l,4fc) 
6д = 0 else 
« = § 
These three coalitions have excess \k with respect to x, and thus — |fc • | H- ¿A = |fc is 
a lower bound for the value of the programs. This proves the claim. D 
To find a counter objection we consider a coalition R with exc(R, y') > ¿¡k. If г & R, we 
have exc(R\i,y') > |/c. 
Otherwise: exc{R\i, y') = exr(R, y') + (vf(R\i) - vf(R) + y,) > exc(R, у')-1>±к-1. 
Furthermore: exc(RUj\i,y') - vf(RUj\i)-y'{R\i)-Xj > exc{R\i,y')-l\ > \k-2\. 
Hence, for к > 15, player j can use coalition Τ = R U j\i for a counter objection. 
Hence, every objection against χ has a counter objection, which makes χ an element of 
the bargaining set. Since Su(x) = \k > ¿k — 1 = S4i(x), χ is neither an element of the 
core nor of the kernel. D 
7.8 Final remarks 
Let SF be the set of flow networks such that each player owns one arc (the property 
that all capacities must be one is omitted). The MC-solution is still well defined on SF. 
It still obeys one person efficiency and consistency, but as the following example shows, 
it does not obey converse consistency anymore: 
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2A 
Яп. Ч
2
 ( \si 
V Р,,3 У 
Example 7.20 
There is only one minimum cut without public arcs; MC(f) = {(2,0)}. If MC were 
converse consistent, (0,2) should be in MC(f), because vj2 is the null-game, so (0) € 
MC(vf). 
An argument for including (0,2) in an (MC-like) solution concept is that the effective 
capacity of the arc of player 2 is in fact 2. If we diminish the capacity to 2, arc(2) wouJd 
be in MC . 
Definition: Let ƒ € SF. Let Τ be the set of acyclic flows in ƒ from source to sink. The 
effective capacity of arc e (denoted by Шр(е)) is: 
cäp(e) = max{<7e | g € Τ} 
Let ƒ be the flow network arising from ƒ in the case that all capacities are changed into 
the effective capacities. Notice that v¡ = vj (ƒ € SF). 
In the example cap(arc(l)) = cap(arc(2)) = 2 and the effective capacity of the public 
arc is zero. So ƒ is: 
2¿^ 
So. h¿ ( 
Figure 7.21 
Let MC{f) = MC(f) (ƒ € SF). 
MC is characterized by one person efficiency, consistency and converse consistency. The 
proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.3. 
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III Fair division 
8 Fair division games 
If some commodity (e.g. a cake or an inheritance) is divided among a number of people, 
they may benefit from reallocating their shares. Legut (1990) introduced fair division 
games to model this situation. These games express the benefits coalitions can obtain 
by trading with the shares allocated by some 'fair-division' mechanism. 
In Legut et al. (1991) trade-economies are considered in which a quantifiable good 
(like land) is the unique commodity. There is no 'a priori' allocation but every player 
has an initial endowment. The games which are generated by these economies are 
fair division games too. Such an economy has competitive equilibria and equilibrium 
payoffs associated with such equilibria. Economies which generate the same fair division 
game can have different sets of equilibrium payoffs. We can however define the set of 
all imputations of a fair division game which are equilibrium payoff in some economy 
generating the fair division game. 
We describe the set of all fair division games. Secondly we provide an algorithm that 
separates fair division games from non-fair division games. In comparison with the 
description in Legut (1990), this approach is much easier. 
8.1 Introduction 
The model used in Legut et al. (1991), was discussed earlier in the Ph.D. Dissertation 
of BerJiant (1982). It includes a player set N and a piece of land L. Let (L; B; v) be a 
space, in which υ is a finite non-atomic measure and В is the collection of measurable 
subsets of L. Each player г has a non-negative Lipschitz continuous density function ƒ, 
on L. The utility densities induce utility functions μ, on B: 
μ,(Β) := f f, d(u). (г € TV, Б € ß) 
JB 
Each player г has an initial endowment Ω, e В. The endowments form (up to sets of 
measure zero) a partition of the land. Hence, an economy e is characterized by a triple 
e = (JV, {Ω,},
εΛ
Γ, Ш.елО-
We can associate with such an economy e a Tl/-game (N,v
e
). It is defined by: 
v
e
(S)=sup<^2 ƒ, d(y) {X},gs is a measurable partition of us \ Í {S Q Ν) 
(tes JY' J 
where Q,s = Utes^,. An equivalent definition is: 
v
e
(S) = JL l n s max ƒ, d(u), (S С Ν) 
where 11 n
s
 is the indicator function of Ω5. 
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Games derived in this way are called fair division games. In Legat et al. (1991) a 
characterization of the class of fair division games has been given, for which we need the 
following definition. Let Τ Ç N and let г G N\T. The game и^
г
 is defined by: 
u^,(S) = 1 if S Π Τ φ φ and ι € S, 
uT,i(S) = 0 else. 
Such a game can be interpreted as follows: player г owns a piece of land and the members 
of TV are potential buyers. Members of Τ value the piece with 1, the others with 0. 
Theorem 8.1 : (Legut et al. (1991)) A zero-normalized TO-game υ is a fair division 
game if and only if υ is a non-negative ¡mear combination of the games in {uf, | г € 
N,TQN\i}. 
For Τ С TV with \T\ > 2 we define, like in Derks (1991), wT to be the game: 
wr(S) = max (0, \S Π T\ - 1) for all S С N. 
The dual of v, is the game v' defined by 
v*(S) = v(N) - v(N\S). {S С Ν) 
We have for every coalition Τ С N that u f (5) = 1 if and only if S Π Τ φ φ and indeed, 
и*
Гі
 is the dual of wrtt. Note that w^l}) — щ,3) = u*tJ. 
Let Qf be the cone of zero-normalized convex games with player set N. The following 
lemma summarizes some elementary properties of the set of games WT-
L e m m a 8.2 : 
(1) For all Τ С Ν, \Τ\ > 2: wf = —и
т
 + Е.ег и> 
(2) For all Τ С Ν, \Τ\ > 2: wT is an extreme direction οΐΟξ. 
(3) {WT I Τ С Ν, \T\ > 2} is a base of the zero-normalized games with player set N. 
(4) For T={ii...i
m
),\T\=m> 2, we have: 
Proof: (1) As for any game ν we have that v** = v, it is equivalent to prove: WT = 
- " τ + Σ , ε τ " Ϊ · L e t 5 Ç i V . If \TnS\ = 0, then - u f ( 5 ) + Σ ,
ε
τ < ( 5 ) = - 0 + 0 = 0. If 
\TnS\ > 0, then - u f ( 5 ) + E,€T«.*(5) = - l + | T n 5 | . Hence, w*T = Σ , ε τ " . ~ «τ· 
(2) Let \T\ > 2. Firstly, we prove that the game itj- is an extremal direction of CQ. let 
uT = vi+ v2 with w b v2 e C0
N
. Then v,(S) > 0 for all S С N. Hence, if uT(S) = 0, 
then v,(S) = 0 (г € {1,2}. Let S be superset of T. Since UT(S) = UT(N) and convex 
games are zero-monotonic, we have v,(S) = vt(N). Hence v\ and v2 are multiples of щ·. 
Therefore t*r is an extreme direction. 
It is easy to see that the statements ν is convex, v* and —v are concave and ν + α is 
convex for every additive game α are equivalent. As the game UT is convex, — ІІТ is 
concave and % is convex because of (1). Suppose that WT = VI + v2, such that V\ and 
v2 are convex games. Then, as dualization and zero-normalization are linear operations, 
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we find -(v{)o - (1)2)0 = -(wf)o — T · The last equality holds beause of 8.2 (1). The 
game UT is an extreme direction of the cone of zero-normalized convex games. Therefore 
~(vì)o = λΐίτ and —(^ 2)0 = (1 — A)ur for some A e [0,1]. Hence, v\ = \wT and 
V2 — (1 — X)WT- We conclude that WT is an extreme direction of the cone of convex 
games. 
(3) We have that (—i¿f)0 = Σίετω> ~ " τ *°г a ^ Τ С N. It is known (and easily to 
prove) that {υ,χ \ \T\ > 2} is a base of the zero-normalized games. Therefore, 
{-«τ + Σ,6Γ«ιΙ ΙΓΙ > 2} is a base too, which is {wT\ \T\ > 2}. 
(4) Let S С N and к = \T П S\. If к = 0, then wT(S) = 0 = u ^ , l ) l m ( 5 ) + 
"(и .
m
- 2 ) ,w I ( 5 ) + --- + < 1 , 2 ( 5 ) · 
Otherwise, let ρ be the smallest number in N with i
v
 € 5. Then ω?
Χι
 , > J t Д5) = 0 
for 0 < к < ρ, because ( ι
χ
. . . г*) П S = <Α· For к > ρ, ω*
η
 , t ) Η t (S) = 1 if and only 
if ïjt+i € S. This holds for |5 П T\ - 1 values of k. Hence, ¿2<j<m"(„.,,_,),,,(5) = 
max (0, \S Π Γ| - 1) = TUT(S). ' D 
Notice that in 8.2(4) the order of succession of the players can be chosen freely. Therefore, 
for any T" С Γ, we can choose the order such that (i\... г*) = Τ' (к = \T'\) and derive 
that wT - wT, = uf,,.. lm_l)ilm + ... + u¡tl u ) i H + i . 
The following lemma provides an algorithm to write a zero-normalized game υ as a linear 
combination of wr's. 
Lemma 8.3: Let (N,v) be a zero-normalized TU-game. If — (v*)o = Σ\Α\>2^Α^Α, then 
Proof: Lemma 8.2 gives 
υ* =v¿+ Σ,ΖΝ *{г)и, = Σ\Α\>2 -М-ім) + Е.елг *(г)щ 
= Σ|Λ|>2 ^A{W*A - EjeA Uj) + Е,елг (г)и, 
Therefore: 
V = Vo = (Е|Д|>2 ^A{WA - Σ}ζΑ «J) + Σ.6ΛΓ «*(»Κ)θ = Σ|Λ|>2 ^AWA • 
To use the lemma it has to be known how the (unique) decomposition of ν into unanimity 
games can be found. We give a procedure to find this. Let (TV, v) be a zero-normalized 
TU-game (not necessarily non-negative). A subgame vs is called zero valued iîvs(T) = 
v(T) = 0 for all Τ Ç S and a coalition S is called minimal non-zero valued if v(S) φ 0 
and v(T) = 0 for all Τ ς S. 
Procedure: Let Vo = ν and let к = 0. As long as г>* φ 0: 
Let Sfc be a minimal non-zero valued coalition of ь- Define Xsh = Vk{S) and v^+i = 
υ — Xskus- Increase к with 1. 
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This procedure ends after at most 2n iterations, since υ*+ι has one zero valued subgame 
more than Vk- We end up with the zero game. The game υ has been decomposed into 
unanimity games because: 
V = V0 = Xso
uSo +v1 = Xs0USo + As.USi + «2 = • · · = Σ ^skusk-
к 
8.2 Determining a game to be a fair division game 
Lemma 8.2 (4), combined with Theorem 8.1 gives: 
Corollary 8.2: A zero-normalized game г; is a fair division game if and only if there 
are non-negative coefficients μτ (\T\ > 2) and VS,T \T\ > 2, S Э Τ) such that 
υ = Σντ'
111? + Σ VS,T{WS - шт)· 
TÇS 
Proof: A zero-normalized fair division games is non-negative linear combination of games 
in {uf, I * ε Ν,Τ С ЛГ\г}. If Τ С N is a one person coalition, say Τ = (j), then 
uj., = u,j = wtJ. If \T\ > 2, then u^t = wrm — wr-
On the other hand, suppose that S,T Ç N and Γ Ç S. Let S be (гі.. .i
s
) and Τ be 
( i i . . .г(). By Lemma 8.2 (4) we have: 
w
s
 - wT = ui ,,_,),„ + . . . + < b l 2 - w{li ч _ і ) л - ... - u;ut2 
~
 И (И l.-l),t. + · · • + U u tt+3,4+1-
Hence, Ws — №т is a fair division game. The collection of zero-normalized fair division 
games forms a cone D 
The following algorithm determines whether game υ can be decomposed in this way. 
Algorithm 8.4 
Step 1: Write ν as a linear combination of %'s (see Lemma 8.3): 
υ = Σ τ ^TWT — Σ τ STWT w ' t h λτ > 0> ¿τ > 0, and Лт = 0 or δχ = 0 for all T. 
Let Л = {S С N | A
s
 > 0} and let Δ = {Τ С N \ 5
Т
 > 0}. 
Step 2: Construct a flow network Г„ as follows. The node set V consists of a source, 
a sink and a node for each coalition Τ in Λ U Δ. The nodes will be called So, Si and 
node(T) ( Т е Л и Δ). The arc set E consists of directed arcs. For all 5 e Λ there is 
an arc from the source to node(S), called arc(S). The capacity of this arc is Xs- For 
all Τ e Δ there is an arc called arc(T) from node(T) to the sink with capacity δτ· If 
5 6 Λ, Γ G Δ and S D Τ, there is an arc called arc[S, T) from node(S) to node(T) 
with capacity min(As,¿T)· We give an example of such a network. 
Example 8.5 : Let ν = Wu3i + 2адігз + w134 + w12 - 2wi3
 —
 w23 — 1^ 24. 
Figure 8.6 is the corresponding flow network (a node is represented by So, Si or its 
corresponding coalition): 
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(123) (1234) (134) 
Figure 8.6 
Step 3: Find a maximal source to sink flow with the maximal flow algorithm of Ford 
and FulkersoD (1956). If its value equals ΣτεΔ *r> * n e n v ' s a fair division game. If the 
value is less, then ν is not (the value cannot be more, since the arcs going to the sink 
form a cut with capacity Στ^τ)· 
Theorem 8.7: Let (N,v) be a zero-normalized TU-game. Then algorithm 8.4 deter­
mines whether ν is a fair division game. 
Proof: Define λ, S, Λ, Δ and Γ„ as described in algorithm 8.4. Denote {T e Δ | Τ Ç S} 
by Δ 5 for each S e Λ and denote {S € Λ | Τ Ç S} by Λτ for each Τ € Δ. We show 
that if υ is a fair division game, then there is a flow ƒ from source to sink with value 
ΣΤΕΔ &τ and if such a flow exists, then υ is a fair division game. 
If ν is a fair division game, corollary 8.2 gives that there are non-negative coefficients 
μτ and I/S,T such that υ = ^μτίνχ + Σ VS,T{WS — ^т)· 
те s 
If for some pair of coalitions S, Τ both i/ς,τ and μτ are positive, we can decrease US,T and 
μτ with t and increase μ$ with t, where t equals mm(vs,T,ßr)- Hence, we may assume 
that if i/s.T > 0, then μτ = 0. Because of this assumption μτ equals zero for all Τ £ Λ. 
We have: Xs = ßs + 5Z "ST ^or all 5 e Λ 
TeAs 
and δ
τ
 = Σ
 u
s,T for all Τ e Δ. 
seAT 
Define the flow ƒ by: 
f(arc(S)) = Σ vST for all 5 e Λ, 
тед5 
ƒ (orc(T)) = £ v
s
,T = δτ for all Γ e Δ, 
S€AT 
f(arc{S, Τ)) = uSiT for all S 6 Λ, Τ e Δ, S D T. 
It can be easily verified that ƒ is flow from source to sink that obeys the capacity 
constraints. Furthermore, the value of ƒ equals the inflow of the sink, which is ΣτεΔ *r-
Conversely, suppose that we have a (maximal) flow ƒ from source to sink with value 
ΣτεΔ *r- Then the capacity of all arcs going to the sink are used completely. Hence, 
ór = EseAr f(arc(S,T)) for all Τ e Δ. Define: 
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ßs = A s - £ f(arc(S,T)) for all S e Λ, 
TeAs 
μτ = 0 for all Τ І Λ, 
fs.r = }{arc{S,T)) for all 5 e Λ, Τ € Δ, S Э Τ 
Usx = 0 otherwise. 
Because μ3 equals the capacity of arc(S) minus f(arc(S)), μ$ is non-negative for all 
Se A. 
We have: ν = Σ A^Ws — Σ ^ г ^ г 
а'ел Тед 
= Σ ( / ^ + Σ f(arc(S,T)))w
s
- Σ Σ / ( « r c ( S , T ) ) W T 
seA тел«; тел seAr 
= Σ »sws + Σ Σ f(arc{S,T)){w
s
 - wT) 
seA TtAseAr 
= Σ V-sWs + Σ Σ VS,TÌ.WS - WT). 
seA тел seAT 
We conclude that υ is a fair division game. D 
We perform the algorithm on an unspecified zero-normalized monotonie three-person 
game. It leads to a simple characterization of the class of three-person fair division 
games. 
Let υ be a zero-normalized monotonie three-person game with let v(N) = а, г<(12) = 
&3, υ(13) = i>2 and u(23) = &i. We denote the game by a scheme of the seven coalitional 
values: 
a 
63 62 b\ 
0 0 0 
Taking the dual of the game gives: 
a 
a a a 
a — b\ о — i>2 α — 63 
We zero-normalize a n d mul t ip ly wi th — 1: 
2a — 63 — &2 — 61 
a — 62 — b\ a — 63 — 61 о — Ò3 — i>2 
0 0 0 
The resulting game equals (a — b2 - Ьі)щ2 + (a — b3 — bi)ul3 + (a - b3 — Ьг^гз + (^з + 
ί>2 + ί»ι — a)ujv· Hence, the original game is equal to: 
(o - 62 - bi)wi2 + (a - O3 - &i)wi3 + (o - &2 - i>i)w23 + (Ьз + &2 + bi — a)uiN- (*) 
If the coefficient of w^ is negative, υ is not a fair division game. We infer that: 63 + 
62 + &i - a = υ(12) + υ(13) + v(23) — v{N) > 0. Furthermore, the sum of the negative 
coefficients plus the coefficient of uijv has to be non-negative too. If there is one negative 
coefficient, say the coefficient of Wu, we get: (a — ¿>2 — 6i) + (Ò3 + b2 + 61 — a) = 63 = 
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и (12) > 0. This inequality does not give an extra requirement, since the monotonicity 
of υ gives already that υ(12) > 0. 
If there are two negative coefficients, say the coefficients of w^ and Ш13, we get (a — Ь-i — 
&i) + (a - b3 - bi) + (Ò3 + b2 + 61 - o) = a - bi = v(N) - u(23) > 0. Again, this does not 
give an extra requirement. 
Finally, if there are three negative coefficients, we have: 
2a - b3 - h - 61 = 2v{N) - t)(12) - u(13) - i>(23) > 0. 
We conclude that if v{N) < v(12) + ν(13) + w(23) < 2v(N), then ν is a fair division 
game. On the other hand, if υ is a fair division game, the sum of the coefficients in 
equation (*) is non-negative. 
We proved the following proposition: 
Proposition 8.8 : A three-person zero-normalized monotonie TU-game υ is a fair divi­
sion game if and only ifv{N) < υ(12) + u(13) + v{23) < 2v{N). 
8.3 Equilibrium payoffs 
Let e = (TV, {Ω,},
ε
^, {/,},gjv) be an economy with land. A price equilibrium of e consists 
of a measurable partitioa X = {Χι,. • • X
n
) of L and a bounded measurable function ρ 
on L (the price density) such that for all г € Ν: 
Xtç argmax j f ( / , _ p ) . 
Since we model the economies with TíZ-games, we assume that side payments are al-
lowed. In the T[/-setting there is no constraint on the size of side payments. Hence, 
there are no budget constraints. If {X,p) is a price equilibrium, the vector χ € R 
defined by: 
Xi= [ (f,-p)+ ί Ρ (i£N) 
Jx, Jn> 
is called the corresponding equilibrium payoff. We will call 1 E R an equilibrium payoff 
of the fair division game ν if there is an economy e which generates ν such that 1 is 
an equilibrium payoff of e. The set of equilibrium payoffs is called ep{v). The following 
theorem characterizes ep(v): 
Theorem 8.9 : (Legut et al. (1991)) Let ν be a fair division game. A vector χ 6 R 
is an equilibrium payoff of ν if and only ifi-veto fair division games v, exist sucb that υ 
equals £,u, and χ is ал element ofj)core(t;¡). 
We refer to Chapter 2 for the definition of an ¿-veto game. To find all equilibrium payoffs 
various decompositions can be necessary. 
Corollary 8.9: ep(v) is a convex subset ofcore(v). 
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Proof: The core is a superadditive solution concept, which means that core(vi) is a 
subset of core(y). Furthermore, if χ € £core(u¿) and y e Z)core(wj), then 
\x + (1 - X)y e Ecore(Xvi) + Ecore{(l - λ)υ|) С £соге(А^ + (1 - λ)ν|). 
The games (Au¿ + (1 — A)i>¿) form another decomposition of υ into г-veto fair division 
games (A e [0,1]). This gives the convexity of ep(v). D 
In general, the inclusion is strict (see Example 9.5). However, for three-person fair 
division games we prove equality: 
Proposition 8.10: If ν is a three-person fair division game, then every core element of 
υ is an equilibrium payoff of v. 
Proof: We assume that ν is zero-normalized. Let x£core(v). We explicitly give three 
veto-games «i,t>2 and г>з with the required properties of Theorem 8.9. Consider the 
following table: 
Table 8.11 
Щ 
V3 
N 
Xl 
x2 
Хз 
(12) 
l i 
І2 
/(1,(12)) 
/(2,(12)) 
0 
(13) 
^i-/(1,(13)) 
о 
хз - /(3, (13)) 
(23) 
о 
хг - /(2, (23)) 
х3 - /(3, (23)) 
The table represents three zero-normalized games. The occurring coefficients f(i,S) 
(\S\ = 2, i e S) have to be chosen in such a way that the games are fair division games 
(with the right veto players). This is the case if they are monotonie, i.e. 0 < ƒ (г, S) < i¿. 
The games sum up to υ if for г, S with г ζ S and \S\ = 2: 
Eies f {i, S) = v{S) - x(S) = exc{S, x). 
We denote exc(S,χ) by es. Notice that, since χ € core(v), —e(S) > 0 for each two-
person coalition S. To determine values of ƒ that obey these properties we construct 
again a flow network Γ. The node set V of Γ consists of a source, a sink, a node for each 
player, called the node of г or simply i (г € Ν), and a node for each two person coalition 
S, called (the node of) S. The arc set E consists of directed arcs. For allie N there is 
an arc from the source to the node of i. The capacity of this arc is a;¿. If г 6 S, there is 
an arc from i to S. The capacities of these arcs are sufficiently large, for instance v(N). 
Finally there is an arc from 5 to the sink with capacity — e(S) (S 6 N with \S\ = 2). 
The network is demonstrated in the following figure: 
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Let ƒ be a maximal flow from source to sink We denote the flow through an edge from 
node a to node b by ƒ (a, 6) The flow ƒ gives the values of ƒ (г, S) in the table Let 
S Ç N with \S\ = 2 and let г 6 S The inflow of the node of player г is at most x, 
The outflow of this node is at least ƒ (г, S) Since the inflow equals the outflow, we have 
χ
ι > ƒ (гі S) The following claim completes the proof 
Claim X),
€
s ƒ (г, S) = —e(S) for each two-person coalition S 
Proof Since in each node the inflow equals the outflow, we are finished if we can show 
that the capacity of each arc to the sink is used completely by ƒ This is true if these 
arcs form a minimum cut 
Consider all cuts of the network that do not contain an arc from the node of a player to a 
node of a two-person coalition These cuts axe the only candidates for being a minimum 
cut 
There are two of such cuts with three elements, one with capacity Xi+x2 +13 and one 
with capacity — Σ e(S) By Proposition 8 8, we have that 
- Σ f (S) = 2x{N) - («(12) + ü(13) + «(23)) < υ(Ν) =
 Xl+x2 + x3 
There are three cuts with four elements, not containing one of the previous ones One 
of them is {orc(l), arc(2), orc(13), arc(23)} We have 
- Σ e(S) = -e(13) - e(23) + a;(12) - «(12) < -e(13) - e(23) + x
x
 + x2 
Other cuts contain a cut mentioned already or contain an arc with a large capacity We 
conclude that {arc(12),orr(13),arc(23)} is a minimal cut This proves the claim and 
the proposition D 
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9 Population monotonie allocation schemes 
In SprumoDt (1990) the concept of a population monotonie allocation scheme (pmas for 
short) has been defined as a kind of extension of a core allocation (cf. Moulin (1989)). 
A pmas gives a core allocation for every subgame vs of a Ti/-game ν such that every 
player г gets a weakly higher payoff in larger coalitions. 
Section 9.1 gives a list of known properties of games with pmas-extendable allocations. 
It includes the main results of Spiumont (1990). Some of our proofs are shorter than 
the proofs of Sprumont, the others are included for completeness. 
Section 9.2 shows an analogy between the class of fair division games and the class of 
games with a pmas. Furthermore, we give an example of a four person fair division 
game that has a core element that is not pmas-extendable and a core element that is 
pmas-extendable but not an equilibrium payoff. 
Two open questions concerning population monotonie allocation schemes are discussed 
in the last section of this chapter: 
Is there a (relatively) fast algorithm to determine whether ν has a population 
monotonie allocation scheme? 
Let (N, v) be a game with a pmas with only integer values. Does a pmas of ν exist 
that is integer as well? 
9.1 Known results with partly new proofs 
Definition 9.1: Let (N,v) be a TU-game. A population monotonie allocation scheme 
or pmas of the game ν is a table χ = {xs,t}scN,içN with the properties: 
(г) x
s
,t = 0 for allSCN, i <£ S, 
(гг) ¿ xs,t = v(S) for all S С Ν, 
•es 
(m) x
s
,, < ir,, for allS,TÇN, S CT. 
We denote {xs,i}ieN by χς- If χ is a pmas of ν, then χχ is called a pmas-extendable 
allocation. If y = x\, then χ is called an extension ofy. The class of games with player 
set N that have a pmas is called PMN. The class of all games with a pmas is called 
PM. 
This definition is slightly different from the definition of Sprumont. His definition does 
not define xs,, for i φ S. To give an example we refer to table 9.6. Table 8.12 can be 
considered as a (transposed) pmas as well. 
The following theorem gives a list of properties of population monotonie allocation 
schemes and games with a pmas. Only assertion 9.2 (8) is, as far as we know, a new 
result. 
90 
Theorem 9.2: (cf. Sprumoat (1990)) 
(1) Additive games have a pmas. 
(2) If (N, v) and (N, w) have population monotonie allocation schemes, then (Ν, ν + w) 
has them as well. 
(3) Games with a pmas are totally balanced (but not every totally balanced game has 
a pmas). 
(4) Every core element of a convex game is pmas-extendable. 
(5) A game (N, v) has a pmas if and only if it can be decomposed into η games 
(N,vt), where vt is zero-monotonic and i-veto (i€N). 
(6) The class of games PMN equals the cone В+(м
№
 | veto(W) φ φ), where W is a 
collection of coalitions of N and veto(W) = Q 5 (the simple games u
w
 are 
denned in section 2.1). SeW 
(7) The statements: 
(a) For all у e В, : if {у, u
w
) > 0 for all simple zero-monotonic veto-games u
w 
with player set N, then (y, v) > 0. 
(b) ν has a pmas. 
are equivalent. 
(8) Let (N,v) e PMN. Then there is a pmas χ of υ with xNti = v(N) - v(N\l) and 
2N,k = XN\j,k for all j , к € N with j < k. 
Proof: 
(1) If (JV, a) is additive, the unique pmas of α is defined by: 
zs.i = о(г) for all S С N and г e S, 
zs,i = 0 else. Π 
(2) If χ is a pmas of ν and у is a pmas of w, we can add the schemes coordinatewise 
and get a pmas of υ + w. D 
The properties (1) and (2) give that 'having a pmas' is a property that is covariant. 
Hence, we may restrict our attention to zero-normalized games. 
(3) Let χ be a pmas of υ and let vT be a subgame of υ (see chapter 2). We have for 
each S CT: xT(S) = Σ xT,, > £ is,, = v{S) = vT{S). 
tes tes 
Hence, ν is totally balanced. The following example gives a totally balanced game 
without a pmas: 
Example 9.3 : (the 2,2-glove game) Players 1 and 2 have a ¡eft hand glove. Players 3 
and 4 have a right hand glove. The value of a coalition equals the number of proper 
pairs of gloves it can form. 
It is easy to verify that this game is totally balanced. Suppose the game has a pmas χ 
. Then, e.g. І(І2З),І = 0, because 
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Z(123),l = « ( 1 2 3 ) - І(123),2 - Я(123),3 < ( 2 3 ) - І(23),2 - Я(23),3 = 0. 
The same holds for Х(ігз),2 and thus, і(ш),з = 1 < Хлг.з- Since the roles of the players 
are interchangeable, we get: 4 < Σ% ΧΝ,Ι = 2. Hence, such a pmas χ does not exist. D 
(4) The extremal points of the core of the convex game υ are Weber-vectors (see 
Weber (1988)). Each Weber-vector corresponds to an order of the players. The Weber-
vector χ corresponding to the natural order is: 
χ = (v(l), w(12) - v(l),..., v(N) - v{N\n)). 
We define y by y
s<t = v(S П ( 1 . . . %)) - t i ( S f l ( l . . . t-1)) for all SC Ν, ie N. To infer 
that y is an extension of x, we check the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of definition 9.1. 
(г): If i І S, then j/s,. = v{S Π ( 1 . . . г)) - v(S Π ( 1 . . . i - I ) ) = 0. 
(гг): We have: 
Σν*,' = Έν*Λ = (ν(3ηΝ)-ν(5η(1.. .n-1))) + .. . + (v(Sn(l))-v(<t>))=v(S). 
«es leN 
(iii): If ν is convex, then for all Τ С N and k,l e N with fc φ I and Τ П (kl) = φ: 
v(T U (kl)) - v(T Uk)> v(T U i) - (Т). 
Therefore, ysuj,i > 3/s,i for all j , 5 with S Ç N and j ^ S. 
Hence, χ can be extended to a pmas. In the same way every extremal point of the core 
can be extended to a pmas. The observation that the pmas-extendable core elements 
form a convex set, finishes the proof. D 
(5) Let χ be a pmas of the game (N,v). We can define for each г 6 N the games 
(N, %) by u,(S) = xs,i (г € Ν, S Ç Ν). The games
 г
 are zero-monotonie, have 
veto player г and sum up to v. Hence, a game ν has a pmas if and only if it can be 
decomposed into η games (N, vt), where v, is zero-monotonic and г-veto (г € І ). In 
particular, zero-monotonic veto games have a pmas. D 
(6) Let a; be a pmas of the zero-normalized game (N,v). By (5), we have a decom­
position υ = 2 ,
 г
, where V{ is zero-monotonic and г-veto for every г 6 N. The game 
vt is a positive combination of simple zero-monotonic г-veto games. In general, there 
are several decompositions possible. One of them is described in Theorem 1.22 in DerJcs 
(1991). As we use it once again, we will give the decomposition explicitly: 
Let 0 = υ,(φ) = λ0 < λχ < ... < Ад = v,(N) be the values of the coalitions in 
the game vt. Define the simple monotonie г-veto games w^,..., WR as follows: 
w
r
(S) = 1 if and only if vt(S) > Xr. (S Ç Ν) 
R 
This gives: Vi = ^(K — λ
Γ
_ι)ω
Γ
. D 
A special feature of this decomposition is that u>i > ... > wR. 
(7) We use the following version of Farkas' Lemma (see Proposition 2.8.a, Nemhauser 
and Wolsey (1988) or section 5.5): Jet A € MatPxQ(U), b € RQ. 
Either { i e R + | i A = i i } / ф, от {у e R Q | Ay > 0, (b, у)<0}ф φ. 
92 
Let Ρ be the set of simple zero-monotonie veto-games with player set N, let Q = 2N and 
let b — v Define AUWtS = uw(S) for all uw eP, 5 e Q 
By result (6), ν has pmas-extendable allocations if and only if {χ ζ IR+ | χ A = 6} φ φ 
Statement (о) is a reformulation of "The set {y G R | Ay > 0, (b, y) < 0} is empty" 
D 
Example 9 10 shows an application of this result 
(8) Let (N, v) 6 PMN We have to prove that there is a pmas χ of и with ідг.і = 
υ(Ν) — v(N\l) and rrjvjt = XN\j,k for all j , к 6 N with j < к 
Let us assume, for the time being, that υ is a simple zero-monotonic г-veto game, say 
ν = u
w
 Without loss of generality we assume that if j is another veto player of v, then 
г < j Define xw by 
x
w
 = v
(5)
 f o r a ] 1 SÇN, 
xj3 = 0 for all S С N and j φ ι 
We have that xfi, = v(N) = v(N\j) = i m , , for all j <г (because j is not a veto player) 
Furthermore, ι $
 k = 0 = x% k for all j,k £ N with к φ г This gives that 
k>l t > l 
Hence, (8) holds true for simple zero-monotomc г-veto games 
If υ is an arbitrary element of PMN, there arc A^ > 0 (W is a collection of coalitions 
with veto(W) φ φ) such that ν = £
w
 X
w
u
w
 Let χ = J2W λ№ x
w
 Then a; is a pmas of 
υ with the required properties D 
Lemma 9 13 is an application of result 9 2(8) 
9.2 Fair division games 
In chapter 8 we discussed economies with land Games that are generated by such an 
economy are fair division games We show that if we replace the initial endowments 
of the players by (disjoint) parcels with veto control, we get the class of games with 
pmas-extendable allocations (cf chapter 7, where we refer to Cunei, Derks and Tys 
(1989), who replaced ownership of arcs by veto control) 
Firstly, we give the definition of an есолоту with veto control Let N be a player set 
and let (L, B, u) be a space m which В is the collection of measurable subsets of L and ν 
is a finite non-atomic measure In the model L is considered to be a piece of land Each 
player г has a non-negative Lipschitz continuous density function ƒ, on L The utility 
densities induce utility functions μ, (г € Ν) on В Let V = {Vi¡}kcK be a measurable 
partition of the land (K is a finite index-set) Elements of V are called pareéis Parcels 
do not belong to one owner, but are controlled by coalitions For each parcel Vi¡, there 
is a monotonie simple game (N,pk) with at least one veto player, say г* A coalition S 
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can make use of Vk if Pjt(S) = 1. Hence, an economy with veto control e is characterized 
by: 
e={N,{Vk,pk}keK,{ft}teN). 
The associated TU-game (N, v
e
) is defined by: 
v
e
(S) = sup < Σ / ft d{v) {^}tes is a measurable partition of A
s
 >, {S Ç N) 
Les y· J 
in which As is the union of the parcels Vk with Pk{S) = 1. An equivalent definition is: 
^ S ) = / t U A s max ƒ,</(,,), (SCN) 
in which UAS is the indicator function of As- The following proposition shows that 
games generated in this way are non-negative elements of Ρ M and vice versa. 
Proposition 9.4 : A non-negative TU-game (Ν, υ) has pmas-extendable allocations if 
and only if there is an economy with veto control e such that ν — v
e
. 
Proof: Let υ be generated by e. Suppose, for the time being, that the partition V 
contains only one element Vk· Then v
e
(S) = 0 for all S Ç /V with г* ^ S. Hence, 
v
e
 is a monotonie veto game. Games that are monotonie and have a veto player, are 
zero-monotonic as well. By result (6) of Theorem 9.2, v
e
 has a pmas. 
If there is more than one parcel, e can by decomposed into |ΚΊ one-parcel economies, 
just by considering each parcel separately. Hence, v
e
 is the sum of the games, generated 
by these one-parcel economies. Therefore v
e
 has a pmas-extendable allocation. 
On the other hand, let (І , v) be a non-negative game with a pmas. Result (6) of section 
9.1 gives that zero-monotonic games with pmas-extendable allocations are in the cone of 
simple zero-monotonic veto games. Therefore non-negative games with pmas-extendable 
allocations are in the cone of simple monotonie veto games. Hence, it is sufficient to 
give for each positive multiple of a simple monotonie veto game \u
w
 an economy with 
veto control that generates \u
w
. This can be done as follows. Let e be given by: 
L = [0,1], 
ƒ, = AH¿ for each г € Ν, 
К = {к} and pk = u
w
. 
Then the generated game is \u
w
. D 
Let us return to the class of fair division games. In Legut et al. (1991) it is proved that 
an equilibrium payoff is pmas-extendable. We shall give an example of a four person 
fair division game with an element of the core which is not pmas-extendable and a core 
element which is pmas-extendable but not an equilibrium payoff. This result can be 
considered as a continuation of Proposition 8.10, where it has been proved that for each 
3 person fair division game we have core(v) = ep(v). 
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Example 9.5 : Let υ be the following zero-normalized four person game: 
v(N) = 7, 
u(123) = 5, v(124) = 4, w(134) = 3, u(234) = 4, 
u(12) = 2, v(13) = l, w(14) = 2, w(23) = 2, u(24) = 2 and υ(34) = 2. 
Let y = (3,2,2,0). Then t/ is an element of the core. Suppose that χ is an extension of 
y. Since v(14) = 2 and y4 = 0, we have X(u),i = 2. Furthermore, u(34) = 2 and y4 = 0 
gives Х(з4),з = 2. Therefore Я(із4),і + і(із4),з > 4, which is more than u(134). Hence, y is 
not pmas-extendable. 
Let y' = (2, 2,2,1). The following table shows that y' is pmas-extendable (to save space, 
the table is transposed). The entries with a bar have value 0 (by the definition of a 
pmas). 
Table 9.6 
N 
2 
2 
2 
1 
(123) 
2 
2 
1 
-
(124) 
1 
2 
-
1 
(134) 
1 
-
1 
1 
(234) 
-
1 
2 
1 
(12) 
1 
1 
-
-
(13) 
1 
-
0 
-
(14) 
1 
-
-
1 
(23) 
-
1 
1 
-
(24) 
-
1 
-
1 
(34) 
-
-
1 
1 
(1) 
0 
-
-
-
(2) 
-
0 
-
-
(3) 
-
-
0 
-
(4) 
-
-
-
0 
We prove that y' is not an element of ep(v). The game ν equals the following linear 
combination of games ws (SC Ν): 
ν = 2wi2 + ω 1 3 + 2u>23 - 2ш12з + 2и>Ш4· 
We see that there is only one maximal flow in the network that corresponds to ν (see 
section 8.2). If υ = Σ,νι with νι г-veto fair division games, then W4 = 2u*23 4- Therefore 
every equilibrium payoff gives two units to player 4. D 
9.3 Searching for population monotonie allocation schemes 
This section deals with the question how to determine whether a zero-monotonic game 
has population monotonie allocation schemes. It can be done by linear programming. 
For instance, one can search for a feasible point in the following polytope: 
xs,, > 0 for all S Ç Ν, \S\ > 2, г € S, 
E,es*s.. = v(S) for all 5 С ЛГ, |S | > 2, 
xsuj,t > xs,, for all S С Ν, \S\ > 2, г e S, j i S. 
This is a table with n(2" _ 1 -1) variables and 2 " - n - l + n ( n - 1)(2" - 2-1) constraints. 
Is there another algorithm to determine whether υ has population monotonie allocation 
schemes? We give some necessary conditions for a game being in PM and show a 
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direction in which such an algorithm might be found. The idea is as follows (it is suited 
for integer valued games): 
Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized monotonie TV-game with integer values. Try 
to find a simple monotonie veto game и with the property: 
ifvÇPMN, thenv-uePMN. (1) 
Subtract и from v. Repeat this procedure until there are arguments to conclude 
that no veto game has this property or until it results into the zero-game. If 
the procedure stops because of the latter argument, the simple games that are 
subtracted along the way give an (integer) pmas of v. 
To find games with property (1) or arguments that such games do not exist, we define 
strong (and later on weak) pmas catchers: 
Definition 9.7 : Let (N, v) be a TU-game. A strong pmas catcher is a pair of tables 
{w, TO) = ({u?5,ti®s,,}sçjv,.eAr) such that: 
For each pmas χ of ν we have: w < x < TO. 
Notice that if υ £ PM, then any pair of tables with the right proportions is a strong 
pmas catcher. Let us give a rather tight strong pmas catcher: 
Lemma 9.8 : Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized monotonie TU-game. Define (w, то) as 
follows: 
fl>*,= ψ§ HT) - (Т\г)}, 
ws,,= ψ£$ΠΤ)- Σ VTJ]. 
зет\, 
This pair of tables is a strong pmas catcher. 
Proof: We can assume that υ € PMN. For any pmas ι of υ and every pair (S, i) with 
г e S we have: 
и s,, = υ(Τ) - v(T\i) = Σ zr j - Σ XT\,J > хт.г > xs,i, 
зет jeT\» 
where Τ 6 argmin [„(y) _
 v
(T\i)]. Furthermore: 
ii!s,i = v{T) - Σ wTj < υ(Τ) - Σ iTj = хт,, < xs,i, 
зет\, jer\i 
where Τ 6 Mgrnx [
ν
(χ) _ £
 WTJ]_ Π 
J€T\« 
We can make the pmas catcher even tighter by the following procedure: 
Lemma 9.9 : Let (w, TO) be a strong pmas catcher of the game (N, v). Define (w , TO ) 
as follows: 
®'s,,= ψ^№τ,„ν(Τ)- Σ WTJ], 
jen« 
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for all S, i with г Ç S. If г £ S, define u/Sl = Ws t — 0. Then (w ,w) is again a strong 
pmas catcher. 
Proof: Let i b e a pmas of «. Let S Ç N and г G S. If n?
s
, = Τχ,ι for some TDS, 
then it is clear that is,. < ®si- Otherwise: 
zs,. < IT,. = «CO - Σ ITJ < i>(T) - J ] ffiTj 
jer\> j€T\» 
for all Τ Э 5. Hence, we have that χ < ГО . In a similar way it can be shown that w < 
χ for all population monotonie allocation schemes χ of v. D 
Hence, whenever we have a strong pmas catcher we can iterate the procedure of Lemma 
9.9 until no progression is made anymore, i.e. (w , ro ) = (w, ®)· Because it is an integer 
procedure, this happens in finite time. 
Pmas catchers give necessary conditions for games to have a pmas. For any game 
ν ζ PM and each strong pmas catcher (w, ro) of « we have: 
w < ro and Σ U/s,. < v{S) < 5Z®s,t for all S Ç N. 
«es «es 
Let us illustrate this with an example. 
Example 9.10: Let « be the following 5 person game: 
v(N) = 14, 
«(1234) = 6, «(1235)= 11, «(1245)= 7, «(1345) = 11, «(2345) = 3, 
«(123) = 4, «(124) = 3, «(125) = 4 , «(134) = 5, 
«(135) = 1 1 , «(145) = 3, «(234) = 3 , «(245) = 2. 
Coalitions that are not mentioned have value 0. 
The game does not have a population monotonie allocation scheme. This can be deter-
2 " 
mined with the help of Theorem 9.2 (7). Namely, let y 6 IR be defined by: 
«(1345) = y(1234) = «(2345) = 1, 
»(135) = «(134) = «(234) = y(245) = - 1 . 
Other coalitions have value 0. It is easy to verify that all zero-monotonic veto games «, 
have a non-negative inner product with y. If for instance player 1 is a veto player of «,, 
then 
3/(1345)«,(1345) + г/(135)«,(135) = «,(1345) - «,(135) > О, 
3/(1234)«,(1234) + «(134)«,(134) = «,(1234) - «,(134) > 0 and 
у(2345)«,(2345) + «(234)«,(234) + «(245)«,(245) = 0. 
The left sides of these (in)equalities sum up to the inner product of у and «i. 
On the other hand, (y,«) = 1 1 + 6 + 3 - 1 1 - 5 - 3 - 2 = - 1 . Hence, according to 
Theorem 9.2 (7) we get that υ £ PM. In fact, Theorem 9.2 (7) gives that for every 
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game (Ν, ν) $. ΡΜΝ there is a vector y that separates ν from the cone PMN. However, 
in general an appropriate vector y seems hard to find. Therefore we focus our attention 
to pmas catchers. Can we determine with the help of a pmas catcher whether ν has 
population monotonie allocation schemes? Consider the following table: 
V 
14 
6 
11 
7 
11 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
11 
3 
3 
2 
2N 
(12345) 
(1234) 
(1235) 
(1245) 
(1345) 
(2345) 
(123) 
(124) 
(125) 
(134) 
(135) 
(145) 
(234) 
(245) 
W 
2 0 2 1 0 
2 0 2 1 -
1 0 1 - 0 
0 0 - 0 0 
2 - 2 0 0 
- 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 - -
0 0 - 0 -
0 0 - - 0 
2 - 2 0 -
0 - 0 - 0 
0 - - 0 0 
- 0 0 1 -
- 0 - 0 0 
w 
11 3 7 3 8 
3 1 3 2 -
10 0 7 - 7 
5 3 - 3 4 
9 - 7 0 6 
- 2 1 3 0 
3 0 3 - -
3 1 - 2 -
4 0 - - 4 
3 - 3 0 -
9 - 7 - 6 
3 - - 0 3 
1 1 2 -
- 2 - 2 0 
Rows that correspond with coalitions with value zero are left out. The tables w and w 
are obtained by taking the catcher of Lemma 9.8 and applying the procedure of Lemma 
9.9 once. Applying it again does not increase w nor decrease w . Since w < n> and 
5Ztes^s,t < v(S) < Jliçsws,t f°r all S Ç N, the pair of tables does not show that 
υ $. PM. However, we can apply Theorem 9.2 (8). It says that if ν € PMN, then there 
is a pmas χ of ν with xs,k = xN\]tk for all j,k € N with j < k. Since, W (Ш5),4 = 0, 
there were a pmas χ with хц,4 = 0. On the other hand, because ц» < χ for any pmas 
χ of v, we have Хлг,4 > 1· This contradiction leads to the conclusion that υ £ PM. We 
can use this argument to find another necessary condition: 
If (N, v) e PMN, WN,k 5~ ™)? ®N\j,k for any strong pmas catcher (w, ®) of v. 
Since we would like to know whether a game is an element of PM, it is not necessary 
to find all population monotonie allocation schemes of v; just one will do. Therefore we 
define the notion weak pmas catcher. 
Definition 9.12: Let (N,v) be a TU-game. A weak pmas catcher is a pair of tables 
(w, И·) such that: 
IfvÇ. PMN, then there is at Jeast one pmas χ with: w < x < TO· 
Again, if υ 0 PMN, then every pair of tables with the right proportions is a weak pmas 
catcher. The following lemma gives a weak pmas catcher: 
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Lemma 9.13 : Let {Ν, ν) be a TV-game and ¡et (w, w) be a strong pmas catcher of v. 
Define (w, И>) by: 
ffi
s,· =
 w
s,t Л min Шдг ,^ 
ws,, = max [„(Г) - £ ® r j 
]€Τ\, 
for all S, г. Then {y¡, H>) is a weak pmas catcher. 
Proof: Let a; be a pmas of ν with the properties given in assertion 9.2 (8). Then χ < w . 
The fact that v¡ < x can be derived in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 9.8. D 
If we apply this lemma to the game of example 9.10 we get the weak pmas catcher: 
υ 
14 
6 
11 
7 
11 
3 
4 
3 
4 
5 
11 
3 
3 
2 
2N 
(12345) 
(1234) 
(1235) 
(1245) 
(1345) 
(2345) 
(123) 
(124) 
(125) 
(134) 
(135) 
(145) 
(234) 
(245) 
w 
11 2 2 1 1 
4 2 2 1 -
10 0 2 - 1 
5 2 - 0 0 
10 - 2 1 1 
- 2 2 1 0 
3 0 1 - -
2 0 - 0 -
4 0 - - 0 
4 - 2 1 -
1 0 - 2 - 1 
3 - - 0 0 
2 2 1 -
- 2 - 0 0 
w 
11 2 1 0 0 
3 1 1 0 -
10 0 1 - 0 
5 2 - 0 0 
9 - 1 0 0 
- 2 1 0 0 
3 0 1 - -
3 1 - 0 -
4 0 - - 0 
3 - 1 0 -
9 - 1 - 0 
3 - - 0 0 
- 1 1 0 -
- 2 - 0 0 
Because e.g. WN,3 > Голг.з we infer that ν $. PM. 
If (y/, w) is a weak pmas catcher, we can apply the procedure of Lemma 9.9 to get a 
tighter weak pmas catcher (the proof of this assertion is similar to the proof of Lemma 
9.9). The following observation can also give a tighter weak pmas catcher: 
Lemma 9.15 : Let (щ?, ш) be a weak pmas catcher of the game (Ν, v). Suppose that 
for some S, j with j £ S we have: 
v{S)+wsuJJ=v(SUj). 
Then the following pair (w , И) ) is a wealc pmas catcher as well: 
w
suj,i = ws,t for all г e S 
Ws,i — Visual for all i ζ S 
W = W and w = w at all other coordinates. 
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Proof: Let χ be a pmas of υ with w < x < V). We have: 
WSUJJ < XSUJJ < v(Suj) - v(S) = Wsu,j-
Therefore: 
Σ
 x
sujj = v(SUj)- xsujj = v{S) = Σ xs,i-
íes tes 
Hence, xsuj,i = xs,i for all i G S. We conclude that upper bounds for xstl are also upper 
bounds for xsu),i and that lower bounds for isuj.i are also lower bounds for xs,t. Π 
Let us now focus on the simple г-veto games that have to be subtracted according to the 
algorithmic scheme at the beginning of this section. If a tight pmas catcher is known, 
one can find games that can be subtracted for sure: 
Lemma 9.16: Let (w, w) be a weak pmas catcher of the game (N,v). Suppose there 
is ant ζ N and a i ε К such that for each S Э г: 
Ws,t > f + 1 or WS,i < t. 
Define the simple monotonie г-veto game и by: 
u{S) = 1 if and only ifws,, >t + l. (S Ç N) 
Then ν e PMN implies that v-ue PMN. 
Proof: Let χ be a pmas of ν with w < at < H>. Define the game υ, by vt(S) = xslt 
(S Ç N). Decompose vt into simple monotonie г-veto games in the way it is done in 
the proof of Theorem 9.2 (6). Since v,(S) > t + 1 for all coalitions S with ws,i > * + 1 
and u,(£) < t for all S with ws,\ < i. the game и appears in the decomposition with a 
coefficient of at least (f + 1 ) — t. Hence, there is a decomposition of υ in which и appears 
with a coefficient of at least 1. This decomposition shows that v — u ξ. PMN as well. D 
Unfortunately, in practice it is not often the case that there are a player г € N and a 
number i £ N with the properties of the previous lemma. Therefore we can only use 
heuristic arguments in the choice of u, the game we are going to subtract. We give two 
options. 
Let (N, v) be a zero-normalized monotonie TV-game with integer values. Let (щ?, w) be 
the weak pmas catcher that is derived by taking the pmas catcher of Lemma 9.8 and 
then applying Lemmas 9.13, 9.9 and 9.15 as long as this leads to a tighter catcher. If 
W < W and Lemma 9.16 cannot be applied, try one of the following options: 
Option 1: Suppose there is a player г ε N such that for all S Э г: 
ν {S) = 0 or Ws,t > 1. 
Define и by u(S) = 1 if and only if Ws,, > 1· Subtract и from ν and compute a new 
pmas catcher (w, w). 
Option 2: Let г Ç N and define again и by u(S) = 1 if and only if Ws,, > 1. If the 
collection of minimal winning coalitions of и is a subset of the collection of minimal 
winning coalitions of v, subtract и from υ and start again. 
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We did not find a counterexample for these options, i.e. a game υ Ç PM with υ—и φ PM 
where и has been defined according to one of the options. However, there are (seven 
person) games where none of the options are applicable, but which do have population 
monotonie allocation schemes. Hence, it may be clear that there is still work to be 
done: proving (or refuting) that the options work and finding other games that can be 
subtracted. 
At the beginning of this section, we mentioned two open questions concerning population 
monotonie allocation schemes. The second question can be answered positively if our 
algorithmic scheme can be transformed into an algorithm: 
Question 9.17: Let (Ν,υ) 6 PMN with integer values. Does a pmas of ν exist that is 
integer valued? 
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10 On finding an envy free Pareto optimal division 
This chapter describes an algorithm to find an (a-)envy free Pareto optimal division in 
the case of a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods and linear utility 
functions. It is used to find an allocation in the classical cake division problem that is 
almost Pareto optimal and α-envy free. The chapter is based on Reijnierse and Potters 
(1994). 
10.1 Introduction 
The general cake division problem dates back almost fifty years to Knaster (1946) and 
Steinhaus (1948, 1949) and can be roughly phrased as follows: suppose we have a cake 
С and η people who can value different parts of the cake differently. Can one find a 
way to divide С among the η people so that each is satisfied with his share? Brams and 
Taylor (1992) give an overview of algorithms published over the years. They remark: "A 
consideration of the cake division problem requires addressing the following issues: (г) 
a definition of satisfactory and (ii) a choice of the mathematical framework in which to 
formalize the problem." We have chosen for a strong definition of 'satisfactory'. There­
fore we need rather strong conditions on the framework. Our aims are: to divide the 
cake such that every player likes his share best (envy freeness) and such that there is no 
other division that is strictly better for somebody and not worse for anybody (Pareto 
optimaiity). We consider the cake as the interval С = [0,1]. The involved people are 
called players. Each player i has a non-negative Lipschitz continuous density function 
ƒ,. We assume that the set of points where max ft vanishes has measure zero and 
ƒ ftdx > 0 for every player i G N. These utility densities give us utility functions μΐ on 
the (Lebesgue-)measurable subsets of the cake, i.e. player i's utility of D С С equals: 
μ,(ϋ) = jg ƒ,(я)IL D(I)CÍX, where UD is the indicator function of D. 
We divide С into a finite number of small intervals and approximate each density function 
ƒ, by a step function h„ constant in each of those intervals. The algorithm provides us 
a Pareto optimal envy free allocation, in case these step functions are the real densities. 
Lipschitz continuity is used to approximate the given densities by step functions 'as close 
as we like'. A consequence is that the result of our algorithm approximates an envy free 
Pareto optimal allocation 'as close as we like'. 
The algorithm we design in the following sections is also suited to handle α-envy freeness. 
Let α = (αϊ , . . . , α
η
) be a vector in H + + with Σ,£ΛΓ α, = 1. Let us assume that we are 
considering an allocation problem in which player г is entitled to obtain at least the a, 
part of the cake. An allocation {Д},6лт is called α-envy free if a~V«(A) > aJlfa(Dj) 
for every pair of players i and j . If e.g. player г is entitled to obtain half of the cake 
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and player j is entitled to one third, player г will compare 2д
г
(Д) with 3μ,(Ζ)7) and is 
satisfied if the first is at least as large as the latter. Player j will compare 3μ_,(Ζ)7) with 
2μ](Όι). If we take a, = n~l for all г, we get back the original notion of envy freeness. 
The discrete model that figures in the algorithm and that approximates the original 
(continuous) model, has already been studied by Gale (1960), although his interpretation 
is different. In his model a, stands for the budget that player ι can spend on a market 
of homogeneous goods. These goods play the role of the intervals on which the step 
functions are constant. Gale proves that there is a unique price vector on the goods 
such that the market clears. 
Our algorithm is designed to find this price and an allocation of the goods that together 
form a (Walras) equilibrium. We show that this allocation is, in our interpretation of 
the model, α-envy free and Pareto optimal. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 10.2 introduces the discrete model. 
We give the notions option and excess and explain their importance. We describe the 
algorithm informally as well as formally. In section 10.3 a flow network is introduced 
that makes the main loop of the algorithm polynomially bounded. Section 10.4 contains 
the proof that the algorithm stops after finitely many steps. Section 10.5 shows how the 
step functions can be chosen to give a satisfactory approximation. Finally we discuss 
the possibilities to extend the model in section 10.6. 
10.2 Preliminaries 
Let N be the set of players (\N\ = n e IN*). Let Q be a finite partition {D
x
,..., Dq} of 
the unit interval. Let U G MatnX4(BÏ+) be the utility matrix, i.e. ut] denotes the utility 
of player г of interval Dy. utJ = J¿ h,(a:)llo {x)dx = μ,(£)7). (г € TV, D-¡ 6 Q) 
The matrix U has no 0-rows or 0-columns. In the sequel we denote an element of Q by 
its index (j 6 Q instead of D} € Q) and call it good j . Let ρ 6 Щ_+ be a price vector 
assigning to each good j a price p3 > 0. We denote Y,J€KP] by p{K) for all К Ç Q. 
We normalize the prices by taking p(Q) = 1. X 6 Matnxq([0,1]) is an allocation (or 
division) if X), xtJ = 1 for all j € Q. An allocation X is Pareto optimal if there is no 
allocation X' such that: 
^UtjXtj < J^Uyiy for all г and ^ul3xl} < ^ u 4 x ^ for some i. 
1 3 3 3 
Furthermore the division key a 6 1R++ with Σ a, = a(N) = 1 is given. 
X is α-envy free if a~x Ц, UyX4 > a^
1
 £., ut]x,>} for all г, г' e N. If α, = n _ 1 for all i, 
then X is called envy free. A bundle is a non-negative vector in IR . A bundle χ is 
feasible if χ < eQ. An allocation X and a price vector ρ form an equilibrium if, for all 
г € N and (not necessarily feasible) bundles y G IR : 
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2 J xt]P] — Од and 
з 
if Y,VJPJ < <*„ then ^utJxtJ > ^
и
чУз-
3 3 3 
The relevance in this context of equilibria will be clear after the following theorem: 
Theorem 10.1 : Let N,Q be unite sets, η = \N\, q = \Q\, U e Μ α ί „
χ
, ( Ε + ) without 
vv о 0-rows and 0-columns, а € R + + and ρ € R + + · If(X,p) is an equilibrium with respect 
to U and a, then X is Pareto optima! and α-envy free. 
Proof: Let X' be an feasible allocation such that: 
Σ
η
υ
χ 4 — Σ ω 4 χ ύ f°r all г € І . 
3 3 
We have to prove that 
У^ u^Xtj = Σ ui3x'ij f° r а Ч ^ G N. 
3 3 
Firstly, observe that ρ > 0, because if Pj = 0 for some good ], a player г with utJ > 0 
would like to 'buy' an unbounded amount of this good. This cannot be the case in an 
equilibrium as we assumed that there is at least one player г with и
г] > 0. 
Define for each г G Ν: m, = max {u^pj1}. Hence, m t is the maximal utihty-price ratio 
player г can get. In an equilibrium, players only buy (parts of) goods with maximal 
utility-price ratio, otherwise they could exchange some amount of a good with a lower 
ratio for a good with an optimal ratio and get a higher utility for the same price. This 
gives for all г e Ν: 
3 3 3 3 
because x4 > 0 implies ui:lm~
l
 =p3. By adding these inequalities we get: 
1 = Σ Ρ ; = Σ Σ ^ > Σ « . = 1 
3 « J » 
and there must be an equality for all ι 6 Ν: Σ3 ω ν ι υ = Σ3 ut]x'y This gives the Pareto 
optimality. 
To prove that X is α-envy free, we must show that for all г, г' G Ν: 
α,« Σ
 и%зхч — Q t Σ и'зхі'з f° r а11 г>г' е N. 
3 3 
Let f(t,j) be the amount of money that player г spends on good j , i.e. f(i,j) = xtJPj 
for all ι G Ν, j G Q. 
We have: a y ^ u ^ Z y = o v ^ I ^ u — ! — = ^ m , ^ ƒ (г, j ) 
3 3 P] 3 
= aya.m, = a,m,^/(i ' , j) 
> a, 2 ^ ^ = a, 2^ гіуХ^ 
Pj j 
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The second equality holds, because if f(i,j) > 0, then PJTJI, equals utJ. The equality 
a% — Σ] ƒ(*! j) follows from the assumption that (X, p) is an equilibrium. D 
The algorithm we give at the end of this section finds an equilibrium. It is based on a 
free market price setting. That is, we start with an initial price and increase the prices of 
the goods in high demand and decrease the prices of goods in low demand. If ρ is a price 
that clears the market, i.e. there is an allocation X such that (X,p) is an equilibrium, 
then all players only buy (parts of) goods with a maxima/ utiiity-price ratio. 
The algorithm is based on the assumption that if a player cannot spend his complete 
budget on goods with maximal utility-price ratio, he does not spend part of it on other 
goods, but just keeps a part of his money. Therefore we define, for a given price ρ and 
every г € Ν, the option set of player г: 
JU) = (j g Q | —'-Í is maximal}. 
Pj 
If ρ is a price that clears the market, the total price of J(i) should be at least the budget 
of player i (i.e. a t ). Also, the total budget of any coalition of players has to be less then 
the total price of the union of the option sets of all members of this coalition. We will 
denote this set as follows: 
j(s) = (j ·>(*) (s ς Ν) 
íes 
Let us define the excess of coalition 5 w.r.t. price ρ to be: exc(S,p) = ce(S) — p(J(S)) 
and let the excess of ρ be: exc(p) = max {exc(S,p)}. 
Up is an equilibrium price, then exc{p) < 0. It turns out that the condition exc(p) < 0 
is also sufficient for an equilibrium price. 
Theorem 10.2: Let N,Q be unite sets, η = \N\, q = \Q\, U 6 Mat
nxq(IR+) without 
Ν О 
0-rows and 0-coiumns, а 6 IR++ and ρ G R++- Then the following statements are 
equivalent: 
(i) There is an allocation X such that (X, p) is an equilibrium. 
(it) For every S Ç N we have exc(S,p) < 0. 
The (constructive) proof will be postponed to section 10.3, since it uses a technique we 
discuss in that section. Note that exc(p) > exc(N,p) = 1 —p(J(N)) > 0 for every price 
vector p. Because of the theorem, our problem is reduced to: Find a price vector ρ with 
earc(p) = 0. 
In the proof of the finiteness of the algorithm we often use the following 'convexity 
statement'. 
Lemma 10.3 :IfS,TCN, then exc(S,p) + exc{T,p) < exc{S U Γ,ρ) + exc(S ΠΤ,ρ). 
Proof: Since J(S) U J{T) = J(S U T) and J(S) Π J (Τ) Э J(S П T), we have: 
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p(J(S)) + p(J(T)) = p(J(S) η J(T)) + p(J(S) U J(T)) > p(J(S U Τ)) + p(J(S Π Γ)). 
Therefore, as a(S) + a(T) = a(S U T) + a(S П T) we find: 
exc(S, p) + exc(T, p) < exc{S U T, p) + exc(S ΓίΤ,ρ). D 
Corollary 10.3: If S and Τ have maximal excess, then S ОТ and Si) Τ have maximal 
excess as well. 
Because of this corollary, we can define: 
S+ is the smallest coalition with maximal excess, 
So = T\S+, where Γ is the largest coalition with maximal excess, 
5_ is the complement of Τ (which is S+ U So), 
J + = J{S+), Jo = J{S0)\J+ and J_ = Q\(J0 U J+). 
The sets S+, SO and S- can be found by comparing the excesses of all coalitions. In 
section 10.3 we will show that the same technique which is used to prove Theorem 10.2 
can also be used for a faster solution of this problem. 
Given a price vector ρ we can represent the sets S+, So..., J- by a η χ g-matrix В with 
entries zero and one defined by: Ьц = 1 if j 6 J(i) {i € N, j £ Q). 
If we put the rows of S+ on top, the rows of So in the middle and the rows of 5_ at the 
bottom, and if we put the columns of J+ at the left side, those of Jo in the middle and 
the columns of J_ at the right, we get a matrix as shown in figure 10.4 (it is just an 
example, the zeroes are not denoted): 
J+ Jo J-
s+ 
So 
5_ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The table is subdivided into 9 blocks, of which the three blocks 'above the diagonal' are 
zero-blocks. If some good j is in the option set of no player at all, we can lower the 
price of this good, just until some player i takes it into its option set; there 'appears' a 
1 in entry (ij), while the other the other columns are unaffected. After this action, we 
normalize ρ such that again p(Q) = 1. 
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Hence, we assume that В has no 0-columns; J(N) = Q. The blocks in the diagonal 
have the property that every row or column contains at least one 1. If SO = φ, only 
the four 'corner'-blocks are non-empty. If S+ = φ, the empty coalition has maximal 
excess, which then must be 0. Hence, the process is at its end. Similarly, if S_ = φ, the 
grand coalition has maximal excess, which then equals 0 because of the assumption that 
J(N) = Q. 
An informal description of the algorithm 
Since the goods in J+ are in high demand, it seems natural to raise the prices of the 
goods in J+. The goods in J_ are in low demand and it is equally natural to lower the 
prices of these goods. Because J+ and J_ are non-empty during the algorithm, it is 
possible to multiply the prices of the goods in J+ with a factor > 1 and the prices of the 
goods in J_ with a factor < 1 such that the price of Q stays constant. More concretely, 
if we multiply the prices of J+ with (1 + ep(J-)) and the prices in J_ with (1 — ερ(J+)) 
the price of Q stays one for every ε > 0 (see Lemma 10.6). 
The choice of ε is the last decision we have to make. For arbitrarily small positive values 
of ε the ones 'below the diagonal' disappear, as the utility-price ratio on the diagonal 
becomes relatively better. Furthermore, the maximal excess decreases slightly as long as 
ε > 0 is not too large. This makes that we never can cycle if we choose ε carefully. If we 
increase ε, there will be a value for ε such that there appears a one 'above the diagonal' 
(i.e. in one of the boxes S+ χ (Jo U J_) or SQ Χ J J). The smallest value of ε where this 
happens is called ει. Because of Lemma 10.3 and the definition of 5_, the excesses of 
subcoalitions of S_ are negative. By lowering the prices of the goods in J_ this excess 
increases and it can happen that one of the coalitions in S- gets zero excess before ε\ 
is reached. The smallest value of e for which a coalition in 5_ gets excess zero is called 
ε2· For ε we take the minimum of ει and ε-ι. In section 10.4 is proven that only finitely 
many adaptations of the price vector are necessary to obtain an equilibrium price. 
Example 10.5: /1 0 2\ 
LetJV = (123), Q = {a, b,c}, α =|(1,1,1), ρ = |(1,2,3) and 17= 1 2 0 . 
VI 2 3/ 
Entry Uij is underlined if j € J (г). By calculating the excesses of all coalitions we 
get that S+ = (1), S0 = (2) and 5_ = (3) (in section 10.3 we will find a faster way 
to determine S+, S0 and 5_). Furthermore, J+ = {a}, J 0 = {6}, •/_ = {c}, exc(p) = 
exc(S+}p) = a( l )-p(a) = | - ì = Ì and exc(S+USQ,p) = a(12)-p({o,b}) = | - | = ±. 
In the example we multiply p(a) with 1 + 3ε and p(c) with 1 — ε for some ε > 0, as in 
that case p'(Q) = g(l + 3ε) + | + | (1 - ε) = 1, in which p' is the adjusted price vector. 
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After this adaption the option sets have changed. Player 2 is not allowed to buy good α 
anymore. This is not a problem, since he can spend all his money on good δ. Furthermore 
player 3 cannot buy the goods a and b anymore, but can still spend his money on good 
c, provided that ε is not too large. If we choose ε = | , the option set of player 1 will 
become {a, c}. This decreases the excess of player 1 (as well as the excess of coalition 
(12)) considerably. We should not choose ε > | , because in that case good a drops out 
of player l's option set, which can be considered as a regression, since player г is a player 
with a too high budget. If we choose e = \, then p' = |(2,3,4) and all excesses become 
non-positive. 
Summarizing we have the following algorithm. 
The algorithm 
N, Q are finite sets, η = \N\, q = |Q|, U G Mat
nxq(1R+) without 0-rows and 0-columns, 
N Q 
a G m + + . ρ € 1R-++, ρ is a variable price vector. 
t 
= *$&"» 
:=P(Q) 
Pi : = PjA (normalization of p) 
while exc(p) > 0 
do S+ := f]{S | exc(S,p) is maximal} 
So := \J{S | exc(S,p) is maximal}\5+ 
5_:= N\(S+\JS0) 
J+ := J{S+), J0 := J(So)\J+ and J_ := Q\(J0 U J+). 
Multiply the prices of the goods in J+ with factor 1 +ρ(7_)ε and the 
prices of the goods in J_ with factor 1 — ρ(,/+)ε, where 
ει := sup {ε > 0| no 1 appears }, 
ει := sup {ε > 0| all subsets of 5_ still have negative excess} 
and 
ε := πύη(ει,ε2). 
The algorithm can start with any strictly positive initial price. The price we choose has 
the advantage that all goods are in demand, i.e. J(N) = Q. 
We do not know have a bound for the total number of price-adaptions the algorithm 
requires, but in the next section is shown that each adaption is polynomially bounded. 
We have defined the adaption of the price in such a way that p(Q) remains constant: 
Lemma 10.6 : During the algorithm the price of all goods together is constantly one. 
Proof: Suppose that at a certain moment p(Q) = 1. Let p' be the next value of the price 
vector. Then: 
p'(Q) - p(J+)(l + ρ(^)ε) + p(J0) + p(J_)(l - p(J+)e)) = p(Q) = 1. D 
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We finish this section with a summary of questions that still have to be answered: 
(1) How to find the coalition S+, So and 5_ in a polynomially bounded way? 
(2) How to find the numbers ει and е
г
 in a polynomially bounded way? 
(3) How to find an equilibrium (X,p) if eic(p) < 0 (the proof of Theorem 10.2)? 
(4) Is the number of iterations finite and is it possible to make an estimation of this 
number? 
10.3 A flow network for several purposes 
In this section we introduce, for any given price vector, a flow network Tp. The compu­
tation of a maximal flow in Г
р
 gives us immediately the coalitions S+, So and S- for the 
given price vector p. If ρ is a price vector with exc(p) < 0 the maximal flow gives the 
allocation X making the pair {X,p) into an equilibrium. So, we prove Theorem 10.2 in 
a constructive way. Finally we use the network for the computation of ε-ι-
Let a price vector ρ > 0 be given. In the flow network Γ
ρ
 the node set V consists of 
a source, a sink, N and Q. The nodes will be called So, Si and node(i) (ι 6 N) and 
node(j) (j e Q). The arc set Ep consists of directed arcs. For all г e TV there is an arc, 
called arc(i), from the source to node(i). The capacity of this arc (called сар(агс(г)) 
or simply cap(i)) is a,. If good j has maximal utility-price ratio for player г, there is 
an arc from node(i) to node(j), called arc(ij). The capacities of these arcs are chosen 
sufficiently large, we can take cap(tj) = 2. Finally there is an arc from node(j) to the 
sink, called arc(j), with cap(j) =p3 (j € Q). For the convenience of the reader, we give 
the network corresponding to the example of the previous section: 
' I 0 2 \ 
N = {1,2,3}, Q = {a,b,c}, U a =1(1,1,1) and ρ =1(1,2,3) 
Figure 10.7 
In the following subsections we show how we can use this flow network to solve the open 
problems left in the preceding section. 
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How to find S+, So and S_ 
First we determine candidates for minimum cuts in the flow network Γ
ρ
. The set of all 
arcs adjacent to the source, i.e. arc(N), forms a cut of the flow network. This cut has 
capacity 1. Hence, no arc with capacity 2 is an element of any minimum cut. Therefore, 
if С is a minimum cut, there are I Ç N, К Ç Q such that С = arc(I) U arc(K). We 
denote such a set of arcs by (I,K). Because (ƒ, K) is a cut, we have J(N\I) С К. If 
К is strictly larger than J(N\I), we could replace К by J(N\I) and obtain a cut with 
less capacity. Hence, all minimum cuts are of the form {N\S, J{S)). 
We have: cap(N\S,J(S)) = l-a(S)+p(J{S)) = l-exc{S,p). This proves the following 
lemmas: 
Lemma 10.8 : Let С be a minimum cut. Then cap(C) = 1 — exc(p). 
Lemma 10.9 : Let S С N and К Ç Q. Let С be the set of arcs (N\S, K). Then the 
following properties are equivaJent: 
i S has maximal excess and К = J(S). 
ii С is a minimum cut. 
We are not only interested in a coalition with maximal excess, we need in the algorithm 
the largest and the smallest coalition with maximal excess. 
Until the end of this subsection we fix a maximal now ƒ through the Bow network Tp. 
Definition 10.10 : Let v, w 6 V. The node w is reachable from υ if there is a sequence 
of different nodes (v\,V2, • •. ,Vk) such that: 
- Vi S V for all I < k, Vi = v, v^ = w 
- For all I < к there is either an edge from v¡ to vi+l of which ƒ does not use the complete 
capacity or an edge from v¡+i to v¡ through which a positive quantity fiows. 
We label all nodes that are reachable from the source with a + and all nodes from which 
the sink can be reached with a —. The other nodes are labelled with a 0. If a node is 
labelled with a + as well as a —, the sink can be reached from the source. Then we have 
a flow-increasing path (see the algorithm of Ford and fWicerson (1956)). Since we have 
defined ƒ to be a maximal flow this cannot happen. 
Definition 10.11 : The sets S+, So, S_ are the sets of players whose nodes are labelled 
with +, 0, — respectively. The sets J+, Jo, J_ are the sets of goods whose nodes are 
labelled with +, 0, — respectively. 
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Note that this definition is different from the one in the algorithm. Hence, we must 
prove that these coalitions are the same as in the algorithm. 
We need some more notation, concerning the flow ƒ. Let г and j be nodes. Then f (г, j) 
is the quantity that flows through the edge from i to j if such an edge exists and zero 
otherwise. For all S, Τ Ç V we define 
/№Τ) = Σ Σ / ( Μ ) · 
Let e be an edge. Then /(e) denotes the flow through e. If S Ç E, we denote Eees f (e) 
with f(S). 
In the example, a maximal flow (and in fact the unique one) ƒ is given by f(l,a) — 
Ì, /(2,6) = /(3,c) = Ì and f (2, a) = f(3,a) = /(3,6) = 0. We get the labelling: 
So+ 
Figure 10.12 
The following proposition solves the problem of this subsection; it states that the sets 
S+, So and 5_ are precisely the corresponding sets we need in the algorithm. 
Proposition 10.13: 5+ and S+ U SQ are coalitions with maximal excess. Let S be a 
coalition with maximal excess. Then S+ Ç S Ç S+ U SQ. 
Proof: Let i £ S+. All arcs outgoing from node(i) have capacity 2 and are not used 
completely by ƒ. Hence, a node at the end of such an arc has been labelled with a 
+. Therefore the option set of 5+ is a subset of J+. If j G J+, node(j) is reachable 
from the source and there is, therefore, a sequence (i>i = So,V2,...,Vk = node(j)) with 
the required properties. It is easy to see that v^-i is a node of a player in S+. Hence, 
J+ Ç J(S+). We conclude that J+ = J(S+). Therefore, the set of arcs (S0 U 5_, •/+) 
forms a cut of the network. If we can prove that it is a minimum cut, we know that 
S+ has maximal excess (Lemma 10.9). Ford and Fulkcrson (1956) have shown that the 
value of a maximal flow equals the capacity of a minimum cut. The value of ƒ equals 
the outflow of the source, i.e. f (So, S+) + f {So, S0) + f (So, S-). 
The capacities of the arcs from J+ have been used completely by ƒ, since otherwise the 
sink were labelled with a +. Furthermore, all edges from a node not labelled with a + 
to J+ are not used at all. Otherwise, this node would have a label +. Therefore, 
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cap(J+) = f(J+, Si) = f(S+, J+) = f (So, S+). 
The capacities of the arcs to So U S- have been used completely by ƒ, since otherwise 
the node of some member of So U 5_ were labelled with a +. Hence, 
cap{So U S-) = f (So, S0) + f (So, S_). 
We conclude that the value of ƒ equals the capacity of (S0 U S_, J+) , and thus S+ has 
maximal excess. 
In a similar way one can show that J+ U Jo = J(S+ U So) and that (5_, J+ U J0) is a cut 
with the right capacity. Hence, S+ U So has maximal excess as well. 
Our next task is to prove that S, a coalition with maximal excess, contains S+. Let 
С = (N\S, J(S)) be the minimum cut belonging to 5 (see Lemma 10.9). Proving that 
S+ Ç S is proving that С П edge(S+) = φ. С is a subset of the edges of which the 
capacities are used completely by every maximal flow. Suppose that i € S+\S i.e., 
edge(i) € С Π edge(S+). If we find a maximal flow that does not use the edge of player 
i completely, we have a contradiction. Since node(i) is labelled with a +, there is a 
sequence (v\ = So,V2,... ,ν^ = node(i)) with the required properties. Let δ > 0. Define 
ƒ* as follows: 
i6(edge(i)) = f(edge(i)) - δ 
f6(v¡,v¡+i) = f(v¡, v¡+\) + δ if there is an edge from v¡ to v¡+i 
/'(wj+i, vj) = f(v¡+i, vi) — δ if there is an edge from v¡+i to v¡ 
fs(e) = /(e) for any edge e not yet specified. 
Because of the properties of the sequence (v\,v<¡,... ,vk), fs is an optimal flow from 
source to sink that obeys the capacity constraints, provided that δ has been chosen 
sufficiently small. We have constructed an optimal flow that does not use the full 
capacity of edge(i). Hence, edge(i) £ С and thus С Π edge(S+) = φ. It must be that 
S+CS. 
In a similar way it can be proved that С Π edge(JJ) = φ and therefore, S Ç S+USQ. О 
How to find ει 
The value of ει can be calculated directly in a poly normally bounded way. Let again m, 
be the best utility-price ratio for player i, i.e. m, — lnJ^-{u,]pJ1}. Take an entry (ij) in 
block S+ χ Jo· There appears a one at that entry if 1 + p(J-)e = ——. 
Hence, ει < Р ( І _ ) _ 1 ( ^ Ь Е Ш _ ι) for all (ij) e S+χ J0. 
With the same argument we get: 
ει < Ρ(Λ) _ 1 (1 - -^Тл) for all (ij) € 50 χ J -
•mtp(j) 
For entries in S+ χ J_ we get a one if 
l + p ( J - ) g _ mtp(j) 
1 - p(J+)e ut} 
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Hence,
 El < " Ь Р О ) ^ for а 1 1 ( } £ s χ ^ 
ει is the largest number that satisfies all these upper bounds. 
How to find ε2 
Also for ε2 a finite collection upper bounds can be found as follows. For any non-empty 
subset Τ of S- the excess will become 0 if: (1 - p(J+)e)p{J{T)) = a{T). Therefore 
p(J(T)) - a(T) 
£2 < ,
 T •. , 1¡rr^ for all Τ С S-, Τ φ φ. 
p{J+)p(J(T)) 
ε2 is the largest number that satisfies these upper bounds. This is, however, not a 
polynomially bounded subroutine, as there are exponentially many constraints. We can 
find ε2 in polynomial time in the following way. 
For η € [0, ει] we define the price vector ρ
η
 as the price vector obtained from the vector 
ρ by multiplying the prices of goods in J+ with (1 + ^p(J_)), the prices of goods in J_ 
with (1 — 77p(J+)) and leaving the prices of goods in Jo as they are. 
Starting with ηι = ει we compute the largest coalition T\ Ç 5_ with maximal excess 
with respect to ρ
ηι
. If this largest excess is non-positive we take ε = ε\. If this largest 
excess is positive, we decrease щ till exc(Ti,p
n
) vanishes: %• We compute the largest 
coalition Г2 with maximal excess with respect to p
m
. If this maximal excess vanishes, 
€2 = r¡2- Otherwise, we decrease 772 till exc(T2,pv) vanishes: 773. Proceeding in this way 
we get a strictly decreasing sequence ει = щ > % > Щ > • • • > %. We prove that 
T,+i Ç Tt for all ι > 0, г < к — 1. This means that after к < |SL| iterations we get 
that Tic = Tf¡-i- In that case 7* has maximal excess and excess 0 with respect to ρ
ηΐί
. 
Therefore ε2 = r//t. Hence, if we prove the following claim, we can find ε2 in polynomial 
time. 
Claim: T t + 1 С T.. 
Proof: Suppose that Tl+\ % T, for some index 1. We have (just like in Lemma 10.3): 
exc(Tt U Γ,+ι,ρ,,,) > ехс{Тг,р ) + exc(Tl+upVt) - exc(Tt П Тг+ир ) . 
As ехс(Т
г
оТ,+і,р ) < ехс(Т„рПж) (the definition of Γ,), wehaveexc(Tt+i,p4l) < ехс(Т,П 
Ti+l,PVt). 
The definition of T t + 1 gives exc(Ti+i,pVi+l) > exc(Tt Π Tt+i,pVx+l). This means that 
a{Tt+l\Tt) > p 4,+ l(J(T,+ 1)\J(T, Π T t + 1)). If we replace p„x+1 by p,, the inequality re­
mains valid (the prices on J_ decrease) and we find ехс(Т
г+і,р л) > ехс(Т,Г\Тг+і,р ). 
Contradiction. • 
Proof of Theorem 10.2 
The described flow network can also be used to prove Theorem 10.2: we assume that 
exc(p) — 0 and give an allocation such that {X1,p) is an equilibrium (the other part of 
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the theorem is trivial). Because of Lemma 10.8 wc know that the capacity of a minimum 
cut equals 1 and thus, the value of a maximal flow ƒ from source to sink is 1 as well. 
We define Xf by: , f (Li) 
P] 
First ly we show t h a t Xs is an allocation. T h e inflow of t h e sink is one. Therefore, for 
every j ζ Q, edge(j) has been used completely by ƒ . Hence, t h e outflow of node(j) 
equals p y T h e inflow of node(j), which is Σ ι € # ƒ (г, j) equals t h e outflow. T h i s gives: 
іет г'елт Рз Pi 
Hence, Xs is an allocation. The fact that players only buy (parts of) goods with optimal 
price-utility ratio gives that each player gets a bundle that obeys his budget constraint 
and has an optimal utility under this constraint. D 
10.4 Proof of the flniteness 
In this section we prove that the algorithm stops after finitely many iterations. Before 
we come to the theorem we fix some notations. We introduce a discrete time parameter 
t that counts the number of iterations. During a whiJe-loop the sets S+ ,5o, . . . , J_ are 
fixed. The value of the price vector changes from ρ to p'. We also use the notation ρ
η
, 
0 < τ/ < ε as wc did in the previous section. For a coalition Τ С N the option set of Τ 
with respect to the price vector ρ
η
 is denoted by J
n
(T). For a set К of goods we define 
the set S* (K) of potential buyers if the price ρ
η
 prevails by: 
3·
η
(Κ):={ί&Ν\^(ι)ηΚφφ}. 
If η = 0 we skip the subscript: J(T) = J0(T) and S"(K) = S¿(K). The option set J„(T) 
and the set of potential buyers S'(K) depend on the value of η. The following lemma 
gives two formulations of the fact that 'on the diagonal', i.e. in the blocks S+ x J+, 
So x Jo and S- x J_ nothing changes if η goes from zero to ε\. 
Lemma 10.14 : If η € [Ο,ε] and · stands for +, 0 or —, wc have 
(г) J„{T П S.) П J. = J {Τ Π S.) Π J. for every coalition TÇN 
(ti) S* [Κ Π J.) Π S. = S* {Κ Π J.) Π 5. for every set of goods К С Q. D 
Theorem 10.15 : The algorithm stops after finitely many iterations. 
We prove that in every iteration the price vector changes (Claim 0). After that we prove 
that there are values for i: tj < t2 such that: (г) for t > ti the coalition S+ and the 
option set J+ do not change anymore and (гг) for t > t2 the set J_ and the coalition S-
remain constant. For t > t2 the ß-matrix is also constant. As in every iteration of the 
algorithm something has to change this proves that the algorithm stops. 
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Claim 0: In every iteration the price vector changes i.e., ε > 0. 
Proof: It is clear that ei > 0. So we are finished if e2 > 0 too. Let Τ be a non­
empty subset of S_. Then exc(T U S+ U So,p) < exc(S+ U So,p) (by the definition of 
S+USo). As exc(TuS+US0,p)-exc(S+US0,p) = α(Γ) - p ( J ( T ) n J_) < 0, we have 
a(T) - p
v
(J(T) Π J-) < 0 for small positive numbers η (by Τ С S- and Lemma 10.14 
(i)). Then ехс{Т,Рц) < 0 for small positive numbers η. D 
Definition 10.16 : A coalition Τ is said to be of type I with respect to a price vector ρ 
if exc(T, p) > 0 and exc(R, p) < 0 for all R Ç.T. A coalition S is said to be of type II 
with respect to ρ ifexc(R,p) < 0 for all RÇ T. 
Claim A: If a coalition is of type II with respect to p, it is also of type II with respect 
to p'. If a coalition has type I with respect to p, it is of type I or II with respect to p'. 
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that eic(T,pT)) < 0 for 0 < η < ε if exc(R,p) < 0 for all 
лет. 
We consider the expressions a(TnS.)-p
n
(J(TnS.)n J.) for 0 < η < ε and . € {+, 0, - } . 
For » =• + the value of the expression decreases if η increases and for η = 0 it is equal 
to exc(T Π S+,p) < 0 . 
For · = 0 the expression is constant and for 77 = 0 it is non-positive. For, if it is 
positive, exc(S+ U (Τ Π So),ρ) is larger than exc(S+,p) = exc(p). 
For · = — the value of the expression increases with η. For η = ε it is the excess of 
T n S _ with respect to ρ
ε
 and this is at most zero by the choice of £2-
If we call the sum of these three expressions Σ
η
, we obtain 0 > Σ,, > exc(T,p
v
) for 
0 < η < ε. ü 
Claim В: After ßnitely талу iterations the coalition S+ stays constant. 
Proof: At the start of an iteration a coalition Τ of type I is always a subset of S+. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that Τ g S+ is of type I, then (Lemma 10.3) exc(S+ U T,p) > 
exc(S+,p) + exc(T,p) — exc(S+ Γ\Τ,ρ) > exc(S+,p), which cannot be the case. 
Because of Claim A, the collection of coalitions of type II is increasing. Then after finitely 
many iterations, say for t > τ\, this collection does not increase anymore. From that 
moment the collection of coalitions of type I remains constant as well. If the algorithm 
does not stop, there will be coalitions of type I in every stage. This means that, for 
t > τχ, the coalition S+ contains the members of type I coalitions. We define 
T+ := {г G N\ there exists a stage т2(г) > Τχ such that i € S+ for t > r2(i)}. 
The coalition T+ does not depend on the stage of the algorithm and it is non-empty if 
the algorithm does not stop. For t > r2 = Щ*>* r2(i) we have T+ Ç S+. For t > r2 
the number of ones in rows of players г 6 T+ can only increase and this must stop after 
some iterations. Say, for t > T3 the rows of players ¿ £ T + are constant. 
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Let i £T+. Then player г is not a member of S+ in some stage т4 (г) > т3 and the goods in 
J{T+) (not changing anymore) become too expensive for player i. Hence, J( i)n J(T+) = 
φ after stage т4(г). This means that, if t > max т4(г) := т4, the region N\T+ χ J(T+) 
of В contains no ones. This implies that exc(S+,p) = exc(T+,p) + exc(S+\T+,p) < 
exc(T+,p). The inequality holds, because all coalitions which are disjoint from T+ are 
of type II. Because S+ is the smallest coalition with maximal excess, we have T+ = S+ 
after stage t\ := т4. D 
Corollary B: Also the option set J+ is constant for t > t\. 
Proof: J+ = J(T+) is constant for t>t\. D 
We will prove the same for J_ and 5_. We use similar arguments but with the roles of 
the players and the goods switched. We need the notion dual excess. Let К Ç Q. The 
dual excess of К with respect to ρ is: 
exc*(K,p) := p(K) - a{S*(K)). 
The following lemma is in a way the dual of Lemma 10.3: 
Lemma 10.3*: Let K,LCQ. Then: 
exc*(K,p) + exc*(L,p) < exc*(K nL,p) + exc*{K UL,p). 
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 10.3. D 
Proposition 10.13*: The coalitions J_ and J_ U JQ have the largest dual excess and 
for every К with largest dual excess we have J_ С К Ç J_ U Jo. 
Proof: Let К Ç Q and Τ := {i \ J(i) Γ\Κ = φ}. Then J{T) Ç Q\K. We have: 
exc*(K,p) = p(K) - a(S*(K)) = а(Т) - p(Q\K) < а(Т) - p(J(T)) < ехс(р). 
There is equality if exc(T, p) = exc(p) and J(T) = Q\K. Therefore, if К has maximal 
dual excess, then S+ С Τ С S+ U S0 (Proposition 10.13) and also J+ С J (Τ) = 
Q\K Ç J+ U J0. Then J_ С К Ç J_ U Jo. Notice that, in particular, exc*(J_,p) = 
exc*(J- U Jo,ρ) = exc.(p). D 
Definition 10.16*: A set of goods К is said to be of type Г with respect to a price 
vector ρ ifexc*(K,p) > 0 and cxc*{L,p) < 0 for all L Ç. K. A set of goods is said to be 
of type ΙΓ with respect to a vector ρ ifexc*(L,p) < 0 for all L С К. 
Claim A*: For stages t > t\, a set of goods of type ΙΓ with respect to ρ is also of type 
ΙΓ with respect to p' and a set of goods of type Γ with respect to ρ is of type Γ or II* 
with respect to p'. 
Proof: This proof is largely similar to the proof of Claim A. 
Let К be a set of goods of type II* with respect to p. It is sufficient to prove that 
exc*(K,p^ < 0 for 0 < η < ε. 
Consider the expressions ρ
η
(ΚΠ J.) — ct(S*(Kn J.) Π S,) for 0 < η < ε and. 6 {+,0, —}. 
For · = — the value of the expression decreases if η increases and for η = 0 it equals 
ехс'(КП J-,p) < 0. 
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For . = 0 the value of the expression is constant and for η = 0 it is non-positive. For, 
if it is positive, eic*(J_ U (Κ Π Jo),ρ) is larger than eic*(J_,p) = exc(p). 
For · = +, if the value of the expression is positive for some η € [Ο,ε], it is certainly 
positive for η = ε. Ast > ti the potential buyers of Κ Π J+ are in S+ and p'(K Π J+) — 
a(S'(Kn J+)nS+) = exct(KnJ+,p') > 0. Then ехс*((КПJ+)UJ0\JJ-,p') > exc*(J0U 
J-,p')- For t > t\ we have exc*(Jo U J-,p') = eic(p') and we have a contradiction with 
Proposition 10.13*. 
If we call the sum of these three expressions Σ* we have 0 > Σ* > εχο*(Τ,ρ
η
) for 
0 < η < ε. D 
Claim B*: There is a stage t2 > ti such that the set J_ remains constant for t > t2. 
Proof: At the start of an iteration a set of goods К of type I* is a subset of J_. Sup­
pose, on the contrary, that К % J_ is of type I*. Then exc*(K U J-,p) > exc*(K,p) + 
exc'(J_,p) — exc*{K Π J_,p) > exc*(J-,p) = exc(p), which cannot be the case (Propo­
sition 10.13*). 
For t > ti, the collection of sets of goods of type II* is non-decreasing. After finitely 
many iterations, say t > f\ > t\, this collection does not increase anymore. From that 
moment the collection of sets of goods of type Γ remains constant as well. By that time 
all goods which are element of some set of type I* are elements of J_. If the algorithm 
does not stop, there are sets of type I* in every stage. 
We define 
K- := {j e Q\ there is a stage ^( j) such that j g J_ for t > τ^Ο)}· 
The set A"_ is non-empty and not dependent on the stage of the algorithm. 
For t > f2 := max f2(j) the number of ones in the columns of goods j e К- can 
only increase and this stops after finitely many iterations. Say, for t > fa, the columns 
of j € K- are constant. If j £ Är_, the good j is not an element of J_ in some 
stage fn(j) > T3. For players г with J(i) Π Κ- φ φ the good j is too expensive in 
the next stage and remains too expensive in all following stages. This means that for 
t > f4 :- max f4(j) the block {i € N\J(i) П Κ- φ φ] x (Q\AT_) contains no ones. 
Hence, exc*(J-,p) = exc*(K-,p) + exc*(JJ\K-,p) < exc*(K-,p) for t > f4. The 
inequality holds, because all sets of goods which are disjoint with K- are of type II*. 
Because J_ is the smallest coalition with maximal dual excess (Proposition 10.13*), we 
have J- = K- for t > t2 := f4. D 
Corollary B*: Also the coalition 5_ and the B-matrix are constant for t > t2. 
Proof: 5_ = {i 6 N\J(i) ПК-фф} for t>t2. D 
Proof of Theorem 10.15: If we are in a stage t with t > t2 and the price vector changes 
from ρ to ρ' = ρ
ε
, we have ε = ε2 < ε ι. Therefore there is a non-empty set T Ç 5_ with 
еіс(Г,р
Е
) = 0. Hence, exc(TU S+ U S0,p') = exc(p') and S- would change. D 
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10.5 e-Pareto optimal allocations 
We approximated the real utility distributions ƒ, with step functions. In the introduction 
we stated that the Lipschitz continuity guarantees that the outcome of the algorithm is 
as close as desired to a real Pareto optimal and α-envy free allocation. Look, however, 
at the following examples: 
Example 10.17: 
N = (12), a = (ì, Ì), fi(x) = 1 + 7 ( 1 - 1 ) and f2(x) = 1 +
 Ί
χ for all χ e [0,1], 
where 7 e (—1,1). If 7 = 0, the utility densities /i and f2 are constant and every 
(measurable) partition of [0,1] is Pareto optimal. If 7 > 0, player 1 prefers the left 
side and player 2 the right side of the segment. Up to sets of measure zero the Pareto 
optimal divisions are Х
г
 = [Ο,β) and X2 = [β, 1] with β 6 [0,1]. If 7 < 0, Υχ = X2 and 
У2 = X\ are the Pareto optimal allocations. Hence, small perturbations can change the 
set of Pareto optimal allocations considerably. 
Small perturbations can even change the utility of Pareto optimal points in a non-
continuous way as the following example shows: 
Example 10.18: N = (12), fi(x) = 1 and f2(x) = max(7,χ - ±) for all χ e [0,1], 
where 7 e [0,1]. For every 7 > 0 it is Pareto optimal to allocate ΛΊ = [0,/?) to player 
1 and X2 = [β, 1] to player 2 for β < 5 + 7 , e.g. β = \- Then player 1 values his part 
with j . However, if 7 equals zero, player 2 does not care about the left side, so player 
1 gets at least [0, \) from a Pareto optimal allocation. Hence, in every Pareto optimal 
allocation he gets a part of value at least ì. 
Nevertheless, our algorithm is robust against perturbations in the following sense. Let 
X be an allocation and let ε > 0. 
Definition 10.19: An allocation X is ε-Pareto optimal if for every allocation Y with 
μι{Υι) > Mt№) for all г 6 Ν, we ¿ave that μ
ι
{Υ
ι
) < μ,(Χ,) + ε for all г G Ν. 
Note that in example 10.18 ([0, \], ( |, 1]) is not ε-Pareto optimal if 7 = 0 and ε < ~. 
Theorem 10.20: Let {/,},елг be a collection of non-negative continuous functions on 
[0,1] with max ƒ, > 0 almost everywhere and ƒ f,dx = μ,([0,1]) = 1 for every player 
г 6 N. For every number ε > 0 a number <5 > 0 exists such that, for every collection of 
non-negative step functions {/i,}igw with max |/,(x) — ht(x)\ < δ, the outcome of the 
algorithm (X,p) (with the utility matrix based on {ht}) is ε-Pareto optimal. 
It is sufficient to choose the number δ such that 
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u»*™£±g
 + 2S<e. itN a t ( l - S) 
Proof: Let δ > 0 and {/і,},
е
лг be a collection of non-negative step functions with 
?e^  S № ) 4 W I < { · 
Let {£>!,...,Dq} be a (finite) partition of [0,1] into segments such that every step 
function Л, is constant on (the interior of) every segment D
r
 We denote the fraction 
of Dj assigned to player ι with xl}, like we did before, and the subset of D} assigned to 
player г with Xl}. Furthermore, Xt = Ц, XtJ. 
Define /À to be the utility function of player ι with respect to ft,, i.e., ¡м{С) = ƒ Hc^dx-
Notice that |£,(C) — μ,{0)\ < δ for all measurable sets С Ç [0,1] and all players г € N. 
Аг№) = ƒ O.Xlhtdx = T,3£Q ƒ V-xXJh,dx = Σ} utJxtr 
Let {У^ } be an allocation of [0,1] such that Ці{Х
г
) < м,(У
г
) for all г. Then 
A.(Ar.) < μ,(Χ,) + δ < fr{Y.) + δ < μ,(Κ,) + 25. 
Let, as before, m, be max ^ы·. 
Then for all г e І , j e Q vre have m~lutJ < p3 and x y > 0 implies m~ 1utJ = pr 
Hence, we have: 
a, < p{J(i)) = Σ Щ1и ^ m7l Σ u 4 = ™,_1£.([0, 1]) < m t _ 1(l + δ) 
jeJ(i) jet? 
and 
'"Γ
1
 ^
 m i - 1 ( S u y + ^ ) = Σ m,~lw>j + δτη~ι < Σ pj + δτη~ι = 1 + δτη~ι. 
Therefore we find: -—Ц < т Г 1 < 1 + δ - l - 1-δ' 
f Ну dx 
Define Yl3 =ΥτΠ Dj and угз = Л ^ '* , the fraction of Д, given to player г. Then: 
Σ ^ = Σ ^ < Σ Ρ ^ = Ι = ΣΡΛ = Σ ^ = Σ^§1· 
This gives us, for any specific player k: 
m^MXk) = J2m;1ß,{X,)-^,m-1ß,(X1) 
t гфк 
> E m r V . M - E V í A . M + zí) > т ^ А
к
( П ) - ^ . 
Hence, A*(**)>£*(ft) - 2"¿/11 + f f (fceJV). 
M 1 - ö) 
Therefore: μ*(Χ*) > М П ) - ^ У + ? - 25. 
a f c(l - ô) 
If we take δ <
 :
 , we have ßk(Xk) > ßk(Yk) — ε. • 
8η min, α, 
Notice that we did not use the Lipschitz continuity of the utility densities. We assumed 
it in order to obtain an explicit approximation of the utility densities and thereby an 
On finding an envy free Pareto optimal division 119 
ε-Pareto optimal allocation. 
Take any number δ > 0 and suppose that \f,(x) — f,(y)\ < K\x — y\ for all x, y € [0,1] 
and г € N. Let q £ N be a number with q~x < δΚ~ι and take the partition {D\,..., Д,} 
with Dk := [(k — l)ç_ 1 , fcç-1). Define the step functions 
я 
ht{x) = Σ(ηιω/,(î/))Ho t(i). 
Proposition 10.21 : For every player г ζ N and every number χ € [0,1) we bave 
\f,(x)-ht(x)\<6. 
The proof is straightforward. 
For completeness, we also define ε-α-envy freeness: 
Definition 10.22 : An allocation X is ε-α-envy free if 
α~
ιμ,(χ
ι
) > a~,lfa{xti) — ε foi all ι,i' € Ν. 
It is easy to verify that if we choose the step functions such that 
\ft(x) - ft,(i)| < ìe(min ak) for all χ € [0,1], г 6 Ν, 
the algorithm provides an ε-α-envy free allocation. 
10.6 Final remarks 
There are two extensions of the model in which we are interested. Firstly: can we adapt 
the algorithm in such a way that we can allow that players do not like goods (but the 
goods have to be divided anyway). The extension of the model is simple. The entries of 
the utility matrix U are allowed to be negative. 
The other extension is: replace the division key a by initial endowments. This can be 
modeled by a matrix Ω of the same size as U. The entries of Ω have to be non-negative 
and the columns have to sum up to 1. The fact that player г initially owns a% of good 
j will be expressed by: Ω 4 = ^ . If we choose Ω,_, = a, for all players г and goods j , 
we return to the original model. Again, can the algorithm be adapted? 
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IV Topics in non-cooperative game theory 
11 Equilibrium selection and consistency 
This chapter is based on Norde, Potters, Reijnierse and VermeuJen (1994). 
11.1 Introduction 
For two important classes of strategic games, the existence of Nash equilibria has been 
shown. The first class is the class of mixed extensions of finite games (Nash (1951)). 
The second class is the family of strategic games with compact convex strategy spaces 
and continuous utility functions with the property that the utility function of each 
player is concave in his strategy (Glicksberg (1952)). In fact, in many cases the set of 
Nash equilibria is too large and contains (from a strategic point of view) unreasonable 
equilibria (e.g. equilibria using weakly dominated strategies). This observation was the 
starting point of the theory of equilibrium selection (cf. Harsanyi and Selten (1982)) as 
well as the theory of refinements (cf. Van Damme (1987)) and stable sets (cf. Kohlberg 
and Mertcns (1986)). These theories have in common that they try for each game in 
a certain class of strategic games to find one equilibrium (equilibrium selection) or a 
non-empty subset of the Nash equilibria (refinements or stable sets) as a collection of 
preferable equilibria. For the two classes mentioned above we prove that these attempts 
are bound to lead to inconsistent solutions. 
Hence, we investigate solution rules φ defined on one of the following classes: Q¡, the 
class of all mixed extensions of finite games or Gc, the class of games with strategy 
spaces that are convex and compact subsets of finite-dimensional vector spaces and with 
continuous utility functions with the property that the utility-function of each player is 
concave in his own strategy. We assume that the solution rule φ assigns to each game 
G ζ Of (or G
c
) a non-empty set of strategy profiles and to each one person game a 
subset of the set of strategies in which the utility function takes its maximum. We shall 
prove that φ assigns to each game G 6 Gj (or Gc) the Nash equilibrium set NE(G), if 
ψ satisfies, moreover, the consistency property introduced by Peleg and Tys (1992). 
First we recall the definitions of a reduced game and a consistent solution concept. 
Let G = {№, {А
г
, Mi}tg;vG} be a strategic game in a class G of strategic games, in which 
At denotes the strategy space of player i and u, denotes his utility function. For S Ç NG, 
we abbriviate Ц,А
г
 by As-
Let i b e a strategy profile in Αμα and let S be a proper subcoalition of the player set 
iVGofG(i.e. Бф№,ф). 
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The reduced game Gs,x of the game G with respect to S and χ is a strategic game with 
player set S. Each player г £ S has the same strategy space Ai as in G and the utility 
functions {u¿}¿es are defined by и\{у) = u¿(y,x-5) for every strategy profile у £ A
s 
(with x~s (xs) is meant the restriction of χ to ANG\S (AS)). In the reduced game Gs'x 
the players outside S stick upon their strategies in χ and only the players in S are free 
to reconsider their choice. 
A solution rule ψ defined on G is called consistent if for every game G £ G, every proper 
coalition S Ç № and every element χ £ <p(G): 
(0 G 5 · 1 € G, 
(и) xs £ ψ(ΰ5·χ). 
Hence, under a consistent solution rule the players of a reduced game do not need to 
reconsider their strategy choice: they can play the same strategy as in the original game. 
The main theorem of this chapter states that there is only one solution rule ψ defined on 
9} (or Gc), satisfying non-emptiness (i.e <p(G) / φ for all G £ G), utility maximization 
(i.e. <p(G) Ç argmax и if G is a one person game in G and и is the utility function) and 
consistency: the Nash equilibrium solution NE. 
Theorem 11.1 : If G = G¡ от Gc and ψ is a solution rule defined on G with the properties 
non-emptiness, utility maximization and consistency, then <p(G) = NE(G) for all games 
G£G-
The proof of this theorem is the main topic of this chapter. Notice that the theorem not 
only gives a characterization of the Nash equilibrium solution on G/ and Gc', it also frus­
trates on beforehand every attempt to find a solution rule for G f or G
c
 (unequal to NE) 
that extends the idea of utility maximization, assigns to each game a non-empty subset 
of strategy profiles and satisfies consistency. All (proper) refinements of the Nash equi­
librium solution are therefore violating consistency or non-emptiness. As a consequence 
of the theorem perfectness, properness and persistency are inconsistent solution rules, 
as there are existence theorems for these types of Nash equilibria (cf. Selten (1975), 
Myerson (1978) and KaJai and Samet (1984)). Quasi-strictness (cf. Harsanyi (1973)), 
strongness (cf. Aumann (1959)) and coalitional proofness (Beraieim et al. (1987)) 
are consistent solution rules satisfying utility maximization (this is easy to check for 
quasi-strictness, see Peieg and Tijs (1992) for the other two solution rules) and therefore 
violate non-emptiness on G f • Of course these results are not new, but it is new that they 
all follow immediately from one theorem. 
In the following proposition we prove that every solution rule defined on any class of 
strategic games that satisfies utility maximization and consistency, is a subsolution of the 
Nash equilibrium solution. The proof uses the axiom converse consistency. A solution 
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conept ψ on Q is called converse consistent if for all games G £ Q and strategy profiles 
ifxs e <p(Gs·*) for all S £ NG, then χ e φ(Ω). 
Proposition 11.2: (Pelcg and Tijs (1992)) If φ is a solution rule defined on a class Ç 
of strategic games and φ satisfies utility maximization and consistency, then <p(G) Ç 
NE{G) for all games G&Ç. 
Proof: By induction to \NG\, the number of players in G € G- If G is a one person game 
in G, the Nash equilibrium set consists of the points where the utility function и attains 
its maximum value (if anywhere). Then utility maximization gives y(G) Ç NE(G). 
Suppose that the inclusion ¡p(G) Ç NE(G) has been proved for games G € G with less 
than η players. Let G be a game in G with η players and χ S 4>{G). Then, by consistency 
of φ, Gs,x € G and χς € ^(G5·1) for all proper coalitions S Ç NG. From the induction 
hypothesis we infer that Xs € NE(GS,X). Because the Nash equilibrium solution obeys 
converse consistency (PeJegand Tijs (1992)), we find χ 6 NE(G). D 
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for characterizing the Nash equilib­
rium solution non-emptiness, utility maximization and consistency. 
Proposition 11.3 : (Peleg et al. (1994)) Let (¿з be a solution concept defined on a class 
G with the properties non-emptiness, utility maximization and consistency. If for every 
game G e G and every Nash equilibrium χ e NE(G) a game Η e Ç/ can be constructed 
such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) NH Э №, 
(ii) yN" = χ for every у € NE(H), 
(in) HN°'y = G foreveryyeNE(H), 
then φ = NE. 
Proof: From Proposition 11.2 we know that v(G) Ç NE(G) for all games G € G-
Suppose that G € G and χ 6 NE(G). Take a game H Ç. G satisfying the properties 
mentioned in the proposition. Take y € φ(Η) (φ satisfies non-emptiness). Then χ = 
yN° e <p(HNG*) by consistency and Я " " * = G. Therefore, χ e < (^G). D 
Proposition 11.3 can be extended to classes of games in which the Nash equilibrium 
set is sometimes empty. In that case no solution rule φ satisfies non-emptiness, utility 
maximization and consistency (Proposition 11.2). However, if we replace non-emptiness 
by restricted non-emptiness (or r-non-emptiness) saying <p(G) Φ ф if NE(G) φ φ, we 
can prove the same result. 
In the following sections we construct for each pair (G, x) a game Η with the required 
properties in the classes G f and Gc-
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11.2 The construction of H in Q¡ 
In this section we construct for each game G € G f and each Nash equilibrium χ £ NE(G) 
a game Η € Q¡, satisfying the conditions (г), (гг) and (ггг) of Proposition 11.3. In Norde 
et al. (1994) a different construction is used. 
Let G be the mixed extension of a finite game with player set NG, strategy spaces 
Δ, (г 6 Na) and utility functions u, : ΤΙΑ} —у TR, Without changing the strategic 
aspects of the game, we can normalize the utility functions and assume that ut(x) 6 [0,1] 
for each г € NG and strategy profile χ € ANa. Let χ be a Nash equilibrium of G. 
Before the game Η can be given, for each positive number ε the game Η
ε
 is defined. We 
will show that there exists a number εο such that for every positive ε < ε<>, Η can be 
chosen to be a game strategically equivalent to H
e
. 
Let ε > 0. The game H
e
 has 4n players where η = | № | . The player set NH' consists of 
{г, г0, »ι, Î2 I г 6 NG}. The players of type г have the same strategy sets as before, i.e. Δ,. 
Players of type г0 have strategy sets A({etJ | j 6 c(x,)}), in which c(x,) = {j \ xtJ > 0} 
and Δ(.) denotes the set of probability measures. We denote |c(x,)| (the number of pure 
strategies that player г uses in x) by c,. 
The players of type i\ and %i have strategy sets A({T,B}) and A({L, R}) respectively 
(two pure strategies). We denote a strategy of player г by x„ a strategy of player го by 
p,, a strategy of players i\ and гг by (qt,q,) and (r„f,) respectively. 
We abbreviate J2jec(ît)xv by Xi{xt) and 5Djb¿c(í,)xik by Κ(χι) (which is of course 1 — 
A,(:r,)). A strategy х
г
 can be written as A,(i,)j/,+ А,(а;1)г,1 in which yt and zt are vectors 
in Δ, with carrier inside c(x,) and outside c(xt) respectively. If λ,(ι,) > 0 and Α,(ι,) > 0, 
y, and zt are uniquely determined. 
The utility of player io is only dependent on x, and p,: 
v°{x,p,q,r) = - Σ Pvj1 = -λ,(ζ,) Σ Ρχ,ψ-. 
jecfi.) х ч jec(î.) х ч 
The utilities of the players i\ and гг only depend on x, (in fact only on A,(i,)), q, and 
wl(x,p,q,r) = g,(r, - f, + Ä,(x,)r,), 
w,2(z,P,g,r) = 7\(g, - g, - A,(i,)g,). 
The utility of player г is dependent on x, p„ ç, and rt: 
«( = eu, + ν, + w„ 
in which 
vt{x,p,q,r) = A,(i,)-2+ 53 і ц ^ - - - 2 = λ , ( χ . ) Σ Уч<сг --¿) 
L
 ^ jec(i,) °*J » je<<*.) ^ ' 
and 
щ{х,Р,Ч,г) = (X,(x,)qi + A,(i,)gt) - | . 
Each original player г of G is involved in three conflicts; the w-game, the t\-game and 
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the uij-game. In the κ-game the other players in NG are his opponents, in the tegame 
player ¿o is his only opponent and in the u)¿-game the players ¿i and i2 are his opponents. 
This is reflected in the following figure: 
Vj-game Vj-game V -^game 
-+-
Λ 
π 
4 4 
-4~ 
Λ 
Π 
3\ 3l 
Ajp 
A 
k\ k2 
PVj-game И^-game HVgame 
Figure 11.4: An overview of the conflicts in H
e 
To demonstrate the construction we give an example: 
Example 11.5: Let N = (i), A¡ = Д({еі,е2,е3}) and щ(х) = Χχ + x2 for all χ e Ai. 
Let χ be the equilibrium (§, | ,0) . 
The game H
e
 has player set (i, ¿o,ii,i2). All added players have two pure strategies. A 
strategy of player i0 is denoted by (pi,P2)> a strategy of ίχ by (q,q) and a strategy of i2 
by (r, f). The utility functions of the players are: 
for player г: u'(x,p,q,r) - eu + υ + w = ε(χι Ч-іг) + (\хз + \x\Pi + \xiTh. - \) 
+((x1+x2)(l-q) + x3q-±), 
for player г0: v°(x,p,q,r) - -\p\X\ - 3x2i>2, 
for player i\. wl(x,p,q,r) = q(r — f + x3r), 
for player i2: w
2(x,p,q,r) = r(q - q - x3q). 
Because there is only one original player, the subscript г has been omitted. 
We calculate (along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 11.6) that in the 
unique equilibrium of the game # ( = Η
ε
), player г plays (5,5,0) and the other players 
play ( | , | ) . Let (x,p, q, r) be an equilibrium of H. 
If 9 = 1, then r = 0 (consider w1). If r = 0 then q = 0 (look at w1). Consequently, 
q φ 1. With a similar argument we find that if q = 0, then r = 1 and if г — 1 then 
9 = 1 . Hence, q e (0,1). The same holds true for т. If ц and i2 play mixed strategies, 
г — f + х3г = 0 and q- q- x3q = 0. This gives q — r — (2 + 1 3 ) - 1 6 [|, \) (cf. Claim 1 
of the proof of Proposition 11.6). 
Suppose χχ = x2 = 0. Then q = г = Ì. Let e¡ be a pure strategy of player г0 with 
Pj = max(pbp2)· 
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If player г deviates to e3, his utility with respect to the υ-game does not decrease. By 
deviating to e3 the utility of player i in the w-game increases with | . The value of eu 
increases too. Hence, player i can improve his utility. We conclude that χ φ e3 (cf. 
Claim 2). 
The next observation is that X\ = 2x2. 
Suppose for example that i i < 2i2· Then ei is the unique best reply of player iQ. Hence, 
ρ = βι. Consider the deviation by player г from χ to (χχ +x2)ei +x 3 e 3 . Neither the value 
of w, nor the value of eu changes. The value of υ, increases with 5X2. Since X\ < 2x2 
this is positive. In the same way the assumption that i i > 2іг leads to a contradiction 
(cf. Claim 3). 
We continue by proving that χ = x. By the previous observation, χ = (1 — x3)x + x3e3. 
Let e3 be a pure strategy of player i0 with p} — тах(рі,рг). Consider the deviation of 
player г from χ to (1 — x3)x + x3e}. Because q = r = (2 + Хз)_1, the increase of player 
i's utility in the game u;t equals: 
хз(1-29) = А ¿ + X3 
By the choice of j , the value of the utility function vt does not decrease. In the u-game, 
the utility of player г increases with the amount x3e. Hence, it is profitable to deviate if 
x3 > 0. Hence, x3 = 0 and χ = x. This gives that q = r = | (cf. Claim 4). 
Finally, we show that ρ = (¿, | ) . 
For player г, e\ and e2 are best responses in the εω-game, the w-game and the game 
HE. Hence, both strategies are best replies in the гі-game too. Therefore \p\ — 5P2 (cf. 
Claim 5). 
The following proposition shows that for every G € G/, the game Н
с
 has exactly one 
equilibrium (for small ε). 
Proposition 11.6: Let G 6 Q¡. There is а литЬег e0 > 0 such that for each positive 
number e < eo the game H
€
 has just one JVash equilibrium (x,p,q,r). This Nasb 
equilibrium is given by: 
χ = x, pi = c~le
c
(it) (equal split) and qt = rt = | for each i e №. 
Proof: Suppose, (x,p, q, r) is an equilibrium of H
e
. The proof has been subdivided into 
five claims. In the first claim the strategies qt and r, are expressed in A¿(xt): 
Claim 1: q, = r, = (2 + λ,(χ,)) - 1 for every player г e №. 
Proof: If qt = 1, then r¡ = 0 (consider ω,2). If и — 0 then qt = 0 (look at ω,1). 
Consequently q, φ 1. With a similar argument we find: if q¡ — 0, then r, = 1 and if 
r, = 1 then qt = 1. Hence, q¡ € (0,1). The same holds true for r,. If q, and r, are mixed, 
ГІ-ГІ + Х,(Х,)Г, = 0 and g,-9,-Â t(x,)ç, = 0. This gives qi = r¡- (2 + A¿(x,))~l e [|, 5]. 
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D 
The following Claim shows that x, and x, do not have a disjoint carrier. 
Claim 2: If ε < | , then Α,(χ,) > 0 for every г e NG. 
Proof: Suppose Xl(xl) = 0 and ε < | . Let ƒ € argmax {pi3 \ j € c(f,)}. If player г 
deviates to e,y, his utility with respect to the υ,-game does not decrease. Since λ,(χ,) = 0, 
we have by Claim 1 that q, = j — 1 — qt. Hence, by deviating to e,y the utility of player 
г in the w, game increases with | . The value of eu, decreases with less than | , since и 
has been normalized and ε < | . D 
Claim 3: If ε is sufficiently small, then x, restricted to c(xt) is a positive multiple ofx, 
restricted to c(x,). 
Proof: Suppose this is not true for some г 6 NG. Denote χ, = Α,(χ,)ι/, + λ,(χ,)ζ,. 
Let again j ' € argmax{p4 | j £ c(x,)}. Consider the deviation by player г from x, to 
^,(xt)e,y + λ,(χ,)ζ,. The value of wt does not change. The value of eu, decreases with 
at most eAj(x,) and the change in the value of v
x
 equals 
' ( i V - Σ ІМЧі)· 
j ec ( î , ) 
If we can find a positive number ε such that c,e < p,y — J ^ ytJplJ, we come to a contradic­
tion with the fact that player г plays a best response. This can be done if p4> > Σ] VijPty 
Since, by assumption, χ,}/χι} is really dependent of j , p,y< = 0 < p,y for some j " € c(x,) 
(look at υ,°). Therefore, 
P.y=P./ Σ yij=maxpy 'Σ, y„ > Σ 3/цРч· 
jec( i . ) j6c(f,) jec( i , ) 
Herewith Claim 3 has been proved. D 
In the next claim is proved that с(х
г
) = c(x,). 
Claim 4: For ε sufficiently small, Α,(χ,) = 1 for all г e №. 
Proof: We assume that ε is sufficiently small to apply the previous claims. Suppose 
that λ,(χ,) = max xk(Xk) > 0. Then λ,(χ,) € (0,1) by Claim 2. By Claim 3, x, = 
A,(x,)x, + A,(x,)z, for some z, € Δ, with carrier disjoint with c(x,). Let e,y be a pure 
strategy of player го with p„i = max « Consider the deviation of player г from x, to 
jec( i , ) 
A,(x,)x, + A,(x,)e,y. Because of Claim 1, the increase of player i's utility in the game w, 
equals: 
t - («*,)?,+ш.)=J. w (о - ϊ ^ ) - j ^ ) - ïl^j. 
By the choice of ƒ , the value of the utility function v, does not decrease. In the u-game, 
the utility of player г changes with the amount A,(x1)u,(e,J' — zt,x~l). Denote N\i by 
P. Because и, is a multilinear function, we have: 
u,(e,y-.z„x~') = u^e,,· - zt,(Xk{xk)xk + Xk(xk)zk)k€P) 
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= Σ
 и
'(еч' - ζ" {^k(xk)¡!k)kes, (*k{xk)zk)kep\s) (1) 
SÇP 
= ( Π λ * ( ζ * ) Κ ( ν - гг,х~') + Σ u«(e.j' - *ι> (*k(xk)xk)kes, ßk(xk)zk)kep\s) 
keP sep 
> O - Σ K(e„' - z„ (Л*(х*)Ё*)*е5. (Ait(it)zfc)/tep\5)| (2) 
S£P 
>-А,(і,)ЕМ -г.^.^)І (3) 
> -λ, ί ιΟίΖ'- 1 - I)· (4) 
The following arguments are used: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
because of the multilinearity the function can be expanded, 
el3' is a best response of player г to x~' in the ω-game, 
λ,(ζ,) > Ibes Atíifc) n*ep\s^fc(ifc) for all S Ç P, 
ut(x) G [0,1] for all χ 6 Δ^σ, so |u,(x — y)\<l for all x, y G Δ^ο. 
Together, the change in utility in eu, + v, + wt is at least: 
A , ( l , ) a
 -ελ,ίιΟ'ί^-
1
-!). 
2 + λ,(χ,) 
This is, for every Λ,(χ,) > 0, positive if ε < (3(2n _ 1 - 1))_ 1. 
Again, we have a contradiction with the fact that player г plays a best response, and 
therefore we conclude that Α*(χ*) = 0 for all к G №. Claim 4 has been proved. D 
Combining the results of the claims, we get that x, = x, and q
x
 = r, = Ì for all г € №. 
Claim 5: pl} = c~
l
 for all players i € № and all j G c(xt). 
Proof: For player г, for all j G c(x,), e, is a best response in the eut-game, the uit-game 
and the game Η
ε
. Hence, these pure strategies are best replies in the υ,-game too. 
Therefore pl} = — for all г G Ν, j G c(x,). 
This finishes the proof of Proposition 11.6. D 
The reduction of the game Η
ε
 to № with respect to the equilibrium (x,p, q,r), in which 
χ = x, p,— c71e
c
(il) and qx = r, = | for each i G №, 
gives ε times the original game G, as υ,(χ|,ρ,) = ад
г
(х(,д,,г,) = 0 for all xj € Δ, and all 
г e №. Clearly the restriction of this equilibrium to № gives χ again. If we modify 
the game Η
ε
 by dividing the utility functions of the original players by ε, we get a 
strategically equivalent game Я that can by used to apply Proposition 11.3. The first 
part of Theorem 11.1 has been proved. 
11.3 The construction of Η in Q
c 
Let G be a strategic game with compact convex strategy spaces А, (г G №), subsets of 
finite-dimensional vector spaces E,. Furthermore, for every г G №: 
(г) the functions u, : JJ A
x
 —> IR are continuous, 
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(гг) the functions ut(·, aT') : A, —> IR with χ, ι—У ut{xt, x~') are concave for every 
complementary strategy profile x~l € А/ус\,-
Let χ be an equilibrium of G. To construct Я we take NH = {г, ΐχ \ ι e NG} and 
Alt = At. Hence, Η has 2n players. Before we can introduce the utility functions we 
need the following observations. 
(1) If x„ xt and j/, are elements of At, then xx + xt — y, may not be an element of 
Al; but it is an element of E,. 
(2) There exists a continuous retraction of E
x
 to A
u
 i.e. there is a continuous map 
π, : E, —> At with π,(χ) = χ for χ G At. 
Let (χ, y) be a strategy profile in H, wherein χ denotes the strategies of the original 
players and y the strategies of the players in NH\NG. Using the short hand notation 
π~'(χ~ι + x~l + y~%) for {itj(xj + X] — %)Ьелг\іі we define for each г € NG: 
u*(x, y) = u,(xl 17Γ_,(ι-* + х - ' - у-')) - \xt - xt\\yt - xt\. 
Notice that u* is a continuous function and concave in x,. For the other players ii the 
utility functions are: v*(x,y) — —\у
г
 — xt\\. 
These functions are again continuous in (i, y) and concave in yt. Because of his utility 
function, player i\ can be called a follower of player г. 
Suppose that (x', y') is an equilibrium of Я. Then y' = x' (since for each г € Ν, the best 
response of player t\ is strategy х'
г
). If x[ φ î , for some г e NG, the deviation from x[ 
to î , gives player г a change in utility (u,(î) — η,(χ[, х~г)) + | ι [ - î , |2 . The first term is 
non-negative, the second term is positive. Hence, if χ φ £, we are not in an equilibrium. 
Therefore, the game Η has one equilibrium, namely (x,x). We can check the properties 
(г), (гг) and (ггг) of Proposition 11.3 and conclude that the second part of Theorem 11.1 
has been proved as well. D 
If G'
c
 is the class of strategic games with compact convex strategy spaces and continuous 
utility functions (we delete the concavity condition), the same construction can be used 
to prove 
Theorem 11.1.bis: If φ is a solution rule defined on Q'
c
 satisfying (r-non-emptiness), 
utility maximization and consistency, then φ = NE. 
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12 Search games with an immobile hider 
12.1 Introduction 
The type of games discussed in this chapter originates from Isaacs (1965). First let 
us explain the game in an informal way. It concerns a search space G, a topological 
space and two players, a hider (player 1) and a searcher (player 2). The hider chooses a 
point in G and the searcher starts an expedition to find the hider, starting from a point 
o e G, known to both players. The time elapsed before the searcher reaches the hider's 
point is the payoff to player 1. In this chapter the space G will be 'the realization of an 
undirected connected graph', a concept which we explain later on. For the time being, 
consider G as the union of finitely many compact curves in IR. In Gal (1980) this type 
of games is discussed also. He proves that games of this type have a value for which he 
gives lower and upper bounds. Moreover, he shows that very simple graphs may demand 
for rather complicated optimal strategies. 
We give an easy method to find a saddlepoint of the game for all realizations G of graphs 
that are so-called weakly Eulerian graphs. It is based on Reijnierse and Potters (1993). 
An (undirected) graph is called Eulerian if it is connected and all nodes have an even 
degree. An edge is called a bridge if it does not lie on any cycle. Bridges are necessary 
to maintain connectedness. A graph is called weakly Eulerian if it is connected and falls 
apart into Eulerian subgraphs when all bridges are removed. Notice that the remaining 
edges lie on at least one cycle, so by removing bridges no nbew bridges arise. Anderson 
and Aramendia (1990) also described an algorithm to find (or approximate) an equi-
librium for any kind of graph. The algorithm uses only strategies with finite support 
and can therefore only terminate if the game has an optimal hider strategy with finite 
support. In the example of Gal this is not the case. Anderson and Aramendia conjecture 
that their algorithm works on graphs of which each edge is part of at most one cycle. 
Such graphs are in the class of weakly Eulerian graphs: if all bridges are removed, all 
remaining connected components are cycles or singletons. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we introduce the search 
game in a formal way. In particular we draw attention to the concept 'realization of 
a graph'. In the third section we repeat Gal's results in brief. In section 12.4 we give 
our method to find an optimal hider stategy in case the graph is weakly Eulerian and 
illustrate the result with an example. In the final section we prove that the method of 
section 12.4 provides us with an optimal hider strategy. 
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12.2 Definition of the game 
Let G be a subset of R with the following characteristics. G can be described as the 
union of finitely many simple curves of finite length. Herein a simple curve e is the 
image of an injective function fe : [0, ¿(e)] —> R , with a continuous derivative such 
that | /é ( i ) | = 1 for all χ 6 [0, i(e)\. We demand that two different curves have at 
most end points in common and that G is connected. In this chapter a segment D is a 
closed and connected subset of a curve e, i.e. there are o, b € [0, £(e)] with a < b such 
that D = fe([a, b]). The length of segment D, denoted by £(D), equals 6 - o. A subset 
D of G is called an f-set if it is the union of finitely many segments Di,..., D/., such 
that \Di Π Dj\ < 2 for all i, j , i φ j . The length of an /-set D, denoted by £(D), is by 
definition E,fc=i¿(At). 
Let a,b € G. The G-distance of α and 6, denoted by dc(a, b) is by definition the length 
of a connected /-set containing о and b with minimal length. 
If we have a decomposition of G as a union of finitely many simple curves, wc define E as 
the set of curves in the decomposition and V as the set of end points of the curves in E. In 
this way we associate with a decomposition of G its underlying combinatorial structure, 
an undirected graph Г = (V, E, a). Conversely, we call the topological set G Ç R 
a realization of Г in R . An undirected graph has many (topologically equivalent) 
realizations and a subset G of R of the good type has many decompositions into curves 
and therefore has many underlying combinatorial structures. For example, consider 
Figure 12.1. The search space G is the realization of a graph Г with two nodes (o and 
o) and three edges (e\ ег and ез). G can be decomposed into four curves, which an 
assosiated graph Г' with three nodes (о, а
а
 and o) and four edges. 
For each point ρ of G, a decomposition can be chosen such that ρ is an end point of 
one or more curves. Then ρ is a node in the assosiated graph. Hence, we can (and will) 
assume that о is a node. 
The search space is the realization of an undirected connected graph Г, denoted by G. 
Though not quite correct we often use the word 'graph' also for the space G. Moreover, 
we use 'graph theoretical notions' like edge, chain, cycle and degree also in G. The 
notion degree needs some specification. The degree of a point χ ζ G is its degree in any 
decomposition (V,Ε,a) with χ € V (notice that this is well defined). Hence, there are 
only finitely many points in G with a degree unequal to two. Points with a degree larger 
than two are called crossings. 
We introduce a strategic zero-sum game with two players, the hider (H) and the searcher 
(S). The set of pure hider strategies, called X¡j, is simply the set of all points of G (so 
the hider is allowed to hide in the middle of an edge). A pure strategy of the searcher 
is a time interval [0,TS] and a patii, i.e. a map s : [0, Ts] —> G, with the following 
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properties: 
(1) <Ы*(*і),я(*2)) < l*i - *a| for all *i.*2 6 [O.T.]. 
(2) the map s is surjective. 
The first property gives the continuity of s as well as the maximal 'speed' of the searcher, 
which is 1. The second property guarantees that the searcher will find the hider. This 
property does not really affect the game, because search strategies that do not visit all 
points can never be used in a saddlepoint. Although paths do not necessarily start in o, 
the searcher can only use paths that do: the set of pure searcher strategies is defined as 
X
s
 = {(T„, s) | s(0) = о and s satisfies (1) and (2)}. 
Mostly, we refer to a pure strategy of the searcher by s 6 X
a
; the number Ts is not 
mentioned. The payoff function F to the hider for pure strategies s € Xs and q e Хц 
is defined as follows: 
F{s,q) = min {t > 0 | s(t) = q}. 
Note that the conditions (1) and (2) ensure that F(s, q) is well defined. The payoff to the 
searcher is —F. If we use payoff functions on different graphs, we distinguish them by 
superscript G and sometimes by subscript o. Hence, F(s, q) is denoted more completely 
by FG{s,q) or F?(s
:
q). 
A mixed strategy μ (ν) of the searcher (hider) is a regular Borei probability measure 
on Xs (XH)· We denote A(Xs) (A(X¡¡)) as the set of all mixed strategies. The payoff 
function F can be extended to the set of all mixed strategies: 
F(ß,v) = / F{s,q) ά(μ{8)Μ4))-
JXsxXH 
For more details we refer to the appendix. 
12.3 Results 
A path s is called closed if s(0) = s(T
s
). For each /-set D, let X(D) be the length of the 
shortest closed (but not necessarily surjective) path that visits each point of D at least 
once. Hence, in particular \{G) = min {T
s
 \ {T
s
,s) € Xs and s(Ts) = o}. Note that 
X{G) does not depend on o. Minimal surjective closed paths are called quasi Eulerían 
paths. If s is quasi Eulerian with T3 = ¿(G), then s visits each edge exactly once. In this 
case s is an Euierian path and G is an EuJerian graph. A connected graph is Eulerian 
if and only if the degree of every node is even (Harary (1969), page 64). 
Lets € Xs be a quasi Eulerian path. Define the 'reverse path' s of s with s(t) = s(Ts—t). 
Then s is a quasi Eulerian path too. 
Gal proved that the described game has a value, say ν or v(G,o), which satines: 
\t(G) < ν < \\(G). 
For the convenience of the reader, we repeat the proofs of these inequalities. 
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Proof: Let s € X$ be a quasi Eulerian path. Let the searcher play the mixed strategy 
( |s + | s ) . Let the hider play a pure strategy, say χ € G. As the path s visits all points, 
there is a i € [0,Tä] with s(t) = s{Ts-t) = x. So F(±s+±s,x) < \t + \{Ts-t) = \TS = 
jA(G). Hence, for every pure strategy of the hider (¿s + ¿s) guarantees the searcher 
that he will not have to pay more than ¿A(G). The same is true for mixed strategies of 
the hider. 
Lte the searcher play any pure strategy and let the hider use the uniform distribution. 
Because the maximal speed is 1, the time needed to search all G is at least £(G). There-
fore, the expected time to find the hider is at least \i{G). So the uniform distribution 
guarantees the hider an expected payoff of \t{G), if the searcher plays a pure strategy. 
But then the same holds for any mixed strategy too. D 
If Γ is an Eulerian graph, then £(G) equals A(G), so v(T) = \t{G). In the case that Γ 
is a tree, Gal proves that ν = §A(G) — ¿(G). 
To show the complexity of the problem, he works out an example in which Γ is a graph 
with two nodes (o and a) and three edges (βχ, e-i and ез) of length 1, going from one 
node to the other. He shows that the value of the game associated with this example 
equals (4+log 2)/3 in case о is the starting point and Xs is restricted to the paths Slja, 
defined (in a verbal way) as follows: 
Figure 12.1 
The numbers г and j are distinct integers in the set {1,2,3} and 0 < a < 1. The path 
SlJa starts from o, moves (with speed 1) along e¡ to o, moves along e, to the point aa 
which has a distance of a from a, moves back to a, moves along e* (k ζ {1,2,3}\{г, j}), 
and then moves from о to a
a
 along e3. Gal also shows that in this game hider strategies 
with finite support cannot occur in a saddlepoint. 
Let Г be an undirected connected graph and let Г' be the subgraph of Г in which 
all bridges are deleted. We call the maximal connected subgraphs of Г' the bridge 
components of Г. 
We call Г weakly Eulerian if all bridge components of Г are Eulerian graphs. We call 
G weakly Eulerian too. We will prove that for weakly Eulerian graphs ν equals |A(G). 
In the next section we construct in a weakly Eulerian graph a strategy w% (or wG or 
w if no confusion can occur) for the hider that guarantees him a payoff |A(G). Then 
ν = |A(G), by the inequality of Gal. Hence, we prove the theorem: 
Theorem 12.2 : Let G be a weakly Eulerian graph, and s a quasi Eulerian path. Then 
(ги^, | ( s + s)) is a saddlepoint and the value v(G, o) equals jA(G). 
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12.4 The definition of w 
In this section we define recursively a hider strategy Wg that turns out to be the hider 
component of a saddlepoint. Moreover we give an explicit calculation of w for a weakly 
Eulerian graph. 
From this moment G will be a weakly Eulerian graph. We assume that о is a node. Let 
υ(D) be the total weight of ν on D for any strategy ν e А(Хц) and any /-set D of G, 
so v{D)=!ID d{y). 
The strategy Wg is defined in a recursive way: 
(а) If G = {о}, then w(ó) = 1. 
(б) If G is a chain (i.e. G is no cycle and has no points of degree larger than 2) and о 
lies on one end, put all weight on the other end, say p. Hence, w(p) = 1. 
(c) If о is a dead end (i.e. о is a point of degree 1) and G is not a chain, let ρ be the 
nearest crossing to о (such a point exists). Let op be the smallest connected subset of 
G that contains о and p. Let G be the closure of G\op. We define w^ = w^. 
(d) If G is an Eulerian graph, w is the uniform distribution. 
(e) The point о can lie on a bridge component, say С If С is a single vertex which is 
a dead end, it concerns (c). Furthermore, if С = G, case (d) applies. Otherwise, we can 
we delete С from G and obtain a set in E, with, say, к connected parts (k > 1). Call 
the closure of these parts the branches of C, denoted by G\,... G*. Each branch has 
exactly one point, say o,, in common with C. Therefore: 
X(G) = A(C) + EA(G,). 
Hence, the following definition of w^ gives a probability measure on G: 
(ƒ) The last possibility is that о does not lie on a bridge component. Hence, о lies in 
the relative interior of a bridge. Because we have assumed that о is a node, this cannot 
be the case. 
Notice that w is really dependent on o. Let us demonstrate this computation in an 
example. Let G be the graph: 
All edges have length 1. It is not difficult to see 
that for a weakly Eulaerian graph G the length 
of a quasi Eulerian path equals the total length 
of the edges in a bridge component plus twice the 
length of the bridges: 
i{G) = 28, X(G) = 20 + 2 χ 8 = 36. 
By (e) we have: 
w
G
 = —w
c
 4- —wGl 4- —WGÎ 4- —w°3 
wo 36 wo T 36 Wo\ Ύ 36 Woi τ 36 Wo3 · 
Look at G2 separately. Let G = G2\o2S. By (c) 
and (e) we have: 
w02 - w s — 20Ws + 20Wt + 2 0 W v · 
Now look at G3. By (c) and (e): 
< 3 = < = <4P} + f vf + \wf. 
We divided G into simple subsets and we can 
put the weights at the bridge components and 
end points. For instance: 
w(u) = 22 χ A = Л 
w \ u ) — 36 * 20 180· 
A number inside a bridge component stands for 
the total weight on it, uniformally distributed. 
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12.5 Proof of Theorem 12.2 
To prove the theorem we need two lemmas. One states that strategy w does not put 
much weight close to o. 
Lemma 12.4 : Let G be weakly Eulerian with A(G) > 0. Let D be a connected f-set of 
G, containing o. Then w(D) < -^-J-. (1) 
A(G) 
Proof: If G is a chain with о on one end, it is evident. If G is an Eulerian graph, then 
W{D) = euri ^ Ä(G) · We prove the lemma by induction to the number of edges, say 
n. If η = 1, then G is a cycle or a chain with о on one end (we still assume that о is 
a node), so (1) holds true. Suppose (1) holds for all weakly Eulerian graphs with less 
than η edges (n e IN*). Let G have η edges. 
If о is a dead end and ρ is the nearest crossing, we know w^ = w^ (G = G\op). If 
w(D) = 0, (1) holds evidently, so we can assume that w(D) > 0 and thus D Π G φ φ. 
Then we know from the induction hypothesis: 
° > рК >- A(G) - 2ί{σρ) - X{G) 
Next we suppose that о lies on a bridge component С φ G. As before, G with С deleted 
is a set in ÏÏI with, say, A; connected parts (k > 1); the branches G\,.. .Gk of C. Each 
branch has only one point, say o,, in common with C. Therefore, 
A(G) = A(C) + £A(G,). 
Let Г, = G, Π D and T
c
 = D Π С. We have: 
= ^ ( ^
 + Σ ^ < · № ) (by ( e ) ) 
A(C)A(TC) v A(G,)A(r.) 
- A(G)A(C) + Σ A(G)A(G.) ( b y m d u c t l ° n ) 
= ^ 1 • 
A(G)· 
The second lemma gives information about conditional payoffs. Therefore we need 
another strategy for the hider, derived from w. Let D be an /-set of G with w(D) > 0. 
Then iu\D is by definition the restriction of w to D, i.e. all weight outside D is left out. 
We have a new strategy for the hider when we normalize w\D by dividing by w(D). 
F (s,
 w
,L· j is the payoff to the hider expected by an outsider, who knows that the 
searcher plays s and the hider plays w and moreover knows that the hider hides in D. 
Lemma 12.5 : Let G be weakly Eulerian, о £ G. Let s € Xs, (so s is a pure strategy). 
Let D bean f-set of G with w(D) > 0. Then: 
F(s,^¡§))>í1w(D)X(G). (2) 
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Proof: If G = {о} or G is a chain with о on one end, it is trivial. If G is a bridge 
component, then w(D) = ^Ш and ~Жг is the uniform distribution on D. The time 
needed to examine D is at least £(D). Because of the uniform distribution, the expected 
time to find the hider, is at least \i{D). So F (s, ^ ) > \i{D) = íw{D)X(G). 
The rest of the lemma is proved by induction to the number of edges too. If G has only 
one edge, G is a chain with о on one end or a cycle. Suppose (2) holds for all weakly 
Eulerian graphs with less then η edges (n € IN*). Let G have η edges. 
If о is a dead end and ρ is the nearest crossing, we take again G = G\öp. Let s' be the 
restriction of s in the game (G,p) in the following sense: 
Let ii = min {t; s(t) = ρ} and Í2 = max {i; s(t) = ρ}. Then s' : [0, Í2 — h] —> G is 
defined by: 
Í s(t + ti) if s(í + í x ) e G 
\ ρ else 
Then s' is a pure searcher strategy of the game (G,p). Let D' = D C\G. By the 
construction of w, w(op) = 0 and therefore w(D) = w(D'). 
Fc ( MR.) = Fc (s M£L) 
r
o \"'W(D)) ro \*> W(D')) 
= *?('.№)+*. 
> -w{D')X{G) + e(op) (by induction) 
> ^w{D) (A(G) + 2i{op)) (since w(D) = w(D') < 1) 
= \w(D)X(G). 
Let о lie on a bridge component, say Go (unequal to G). Let G\,... G* be the branches 
of Go. Let o, be the point that G, and Go have in common (1 < г < к). The path s can 
be divided into parts, such that each part lies completely in Go or in one branch, i.e. 
there are j e IN*, to < .. • < t3 Ç. H, such that t0 = 0, t3 = Ta and s([t,_i,it]) Ç G*(,) 
for some А:(г) < к. Notice that s([t,_i,i,]) is an /-set. We assume that two successive 
parts are not in the same branch, so k(i) φ к(і — 1) for all г < j . Note that it is allowed 
that i,_i = t„ i.e. it is possible that a part is only one point. Because this point is an 
element of Go, it has no positive weight on it (with respect to w). 
Let Я, = D Π (s([0,t,]) - s([0,f,_i])) (1 < г < j). Then Л, is the part of D that is 
examined for the first time between t,_i and t,. 
Let s, be a pure strategy of the searcher in the subgame (G/t(,), s(i,-i)), with the property 
that s,(t) = s(t,_i + t) for all t < t, — t,_i. Then s, is a kind of restriction of s in the 
subgame (Gfc(,),s(t,-i)). 
Since ffi/pj is the probability to find the hider in Л,, if it is known that he is in D, the 
formula for expected utility gives: 
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r
 \S' W(D)) - L·
 w
(Dj ІЛ(*.-і) \S" W(R,)) + r '-lJ · W 
We can use the induction step to give a lower bound of FG'<·' fs„ щд\) · Denote fwj^1 ) 
by w'. Gki,) is a graph with less edges than G, so we have: 
^
в д (*..ж)=^ а д (*.да ой«» 
> -u)'(Ä,)A(Gt(,)) (by induction) 
= 5W<*>SA<G*>) (by (e)) 
= |
№
(Д.)А(С). (4) 
We give a lower bound of (t, — i,_i). To simplify the notation we denote s([t,-i, t,]) by 
A. We look at two cases: A is a part of the bridge component Go or A is a part of some 
branch Gk {k > 1). 
Case 1: It is obvious that t, — i,_i > i(A), because the searcher has maximal speed 1. 
Because of the uniform distribution on Go we have: 
t(A) = wG°(A)\(GQ) = ^ i ^ p A ( G o ) 
= w(A)X{G) > w(R,)X{G). (because ADR,) 
Case 2: If A lies in a branch, it holds that s(i,_i) = s(tt). Therefore t, — i,_i > X(A). 
Because of Lemma 12.4 we have: 
X(A) > wG"M(A)X(Gkit)) = w{A)X(G) > w{Rt)X(G). (because of (e) and ADR,) 
In both cases i, — i,_i > w(R,)X(G). Hence, 
tl>X(G)(Í:w(Rm)). (5) 
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) we get: 
F (-, %$) = Σ ^ № , (*, gfe) + ^ ) (by (3)) 
> Σ ^ ( ^ № M ( G ) + A(G) Σ «»(Л-.)) (by (4) and (5)) 
A ( G ) , . , D 1 , D V >2 
2ω(£>) 
-Ц£>) 
(w(Ri) + ... + w{Rj))2
HG) . . . ,
п
,
я 
2w{D) 
= ^(D)A(G). 
This proves the lemma. D 
Applying Lemma 12.5 to D = G we get F (β,ω) > jA(G). 
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Because this inequation holds for any pure strategy of the searcher, it holds for any 
mixed strategy too. Therefore, v(G, o) > ¿A(G). We know that v(G,o) < §A(G). 
Hence, Theorem 12.2 has been proved. D 
We would like to end this section with an open question, of which we expect the answer 
to be affirmative: 
Conjecture 12.6: Let (G,o) be a search network with v(G,o) — |A(G). Then G is 
weakly Eulerian. 
We think a proof can be given along the following lines. 
Assume that о is a node. There exists a quasi Eulerian path s that never 'returns' 
halfway at an edge. This path visits all edges at most twice. 
Let D be an edge that the path s visits twice, but is not a bridge (hence, for the time 
being we assume that such an edge exists). 
We can assume that the first time the searcher visits D is immeadately followed by the 
second time. 
If ρ € G is a point in the interior of edge D, then 
F(í(s + s),p)<í\(G). 
We introduce another strategy s' of the searcher in: the searcher follows the path s, but 
he ignores edge D. This is possible, because if the searcher plays s, and he investigates 
edge D, he immedeately walks back along this edge. Only after the searcher has exam-
ined all other edges, he examines D. Similarly, the strategy s' is defined (notice that 
§'¿7). 
For all pure strategies ρ of the hider that are not in the interior of edge D we have: 
F(ì(S ' + S-'),p)<ÌA(G). 
Hence, for ε positive but sufficiently small, we have for all pure hider strategies p: 
F ( i ^ (
s + s-) + | ( s ' + r ) ) < i A ( G ) . 
Hence, v(G,o) < |A(G). It turns out that the assumption that edge D exists is in 
contradiction with the fact that v(G,o) = |A(G). 
If only bridges are visited twice, then G must be weakly Eulerian. 
12.6 Appendix: The payoff of a pair of mixed strategies 
In section 12.2 the payoff function F is given for mixed strategies: 
F{ßiv) = f F{s,q) d(ß(s),v(q)) 
in which μ (и) is a mixed strategy of the searcher (hider). We show that this function 
is well defined. 
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Before we can talk about Borei subsets, we need a topology on the set of pure searcher 
strategies. Formally, an element of Xs is a pair (Ta, s) with T, e R+ and s : [0, Ts] —> G 
is a surjective map with dG(s(ti), «(¿2)) < |*i —Í2I for all ti, ¿2 € [0, T,]. Often the strategy 
is simply denoted by s. 
We choose the topology induced by the following metric ds on Xs (let s and s' be pure 
seacher strategies): 
ds{s,s') = \T„ -T3,\ +max{dG(s(t),s'(i)) 11 € [0,max(Ts,7V)]}, 
in which s(t) = s(Ts) for all t > Ts by convention. 
Furthermore, we have to show that F is a measurable function. This is the case if 
{(s, q) I F(s,q) < a} is closed (and therefore measurable) for all α e 1R+. 
Claim: Let s, si, s2 . . . be a sequence of pure searcher strategies with lim ds(sn, s) = 0. 
Let 9,91, Ç2 · · - be a sequence of pure hider strategies with lim d(qn, q) = 0. Let α e Ж+. 
Suppose that F(s„, q„) < α for all η > 1. Then F(s, q) < a. in other words, the function 
F is lower semi continuous. 
Proof: Let s[, s'2,... and q'uq'2, • • • be subsequences of the original sequences such that 
lim F(s' ,q') exists. This is possible since 0 < F(s
n
,q
n
) < a for all η > 1. Let 
η—юо 
t
n
 = F{s'
n
,q'
n
) for all η > 1 and let t' = Jim F{s'
n
,q'
n
). Since i„ = min{i | s'
n
{t) = q'J, 
we have that s'
n
(t
n
) = q'
n
. Let ε > 0 and let N g IN be a natural number such that for 
all η > Ν: d
s
{s'
n
, s) < | ε , dG(q'n,q) < \ε and \tn - t'\ < \ε. Then, for all η > Ν: 
dc(s(t'),q) < dG(s(t'),s'n(t')) + dG(s'n(t'),s'n(tn)) + dG(s'n(tn),q) 
< d
s
{s,s'
n
) + \t'-t
n
\ + dG(q'n,q) 
< ¡ε + ¡ε + ì e =ε. 
We can conclude that s(t') equals q. Hence, F(s, q) = min{i | s(t) = q} < t' < a. D 
Once we have established this we can apply Fubini's Theorem: 
ƒ F(s,q) аШ, (я)) = / ( / F(s,q) d(u(q)) d(ß(s)) 
=LH{LF{s,q)d{ß{s))d{v{q))-
This gives: 
Let μ e Δ{Χ
Β
). IfFfa, q)<a for all q e XH, then F(ß, ν) < α for all и e A(XH)-
Moreover, 
Let и e Δ(Χ
Η
). IfF(s, и) > α for alise X
s
, then F{ß, и) > α for all μ e A(XS). 
Finally, the payoff F ^ , ν) is bounded if there is a constant С such that for all pure 
searcher strategies s with μ(β) > 0 it holds that T„ < C. 
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Index of notations 
Notations that are defined in the text are provided with a page number. 
D end of a proof 
φ empty set 
Ç ... is a strict part of . . . 
g . . . is not a part of . . . 
•< 52 
die. 24 
Λ, V minimum and maximum operator respectively 
•fl. χ indicator function of X 
\X\ number of elements of X 
Iх collection of subsets of X 
BAN cone of balanced TÍZ-games with player set TV 16 
Bt(x) {S eM\exc{S,x)>t} ('Kohlberg's collections') 16 
c(x) carrier of x, i.e. {і\х1ф 0} 16 
Cr set of connected subgraphs of Γ 52 
s with player set TV 80 
31 
11 
124 
16 
85 
11 
66 
/-set 132 
Γ undirected graph 17 
IV, 52 
Q
c
 class of non-cooperative games with convex and compact strategy 
spaces and continuous utility functions, each one concave in the 
coordinate of the player whose utility it expresses 121 
°0 
d(B) 
core(v) 
Δ(Χ) 
es (S С Χ) 
ep(v) 
exc(S, χ) 
вХСщах 
ext(X) 
cone of zero-normalized convex g; 
core of game υ 
set of probability measures on X 
indicator vector of S 
max{ea:c(5,a;) | φ Ç S Ç TV} 
set of extreme points of X 
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Of class of mixed extensions of finite non-cooperative games 121 
iff . . . if and only if ... 
I(v) imputation set 11 
ƒ*(«) preimputation set 11 
in(v) 18 
fC(v) kernel of game υ 12 
Κ." (υ) prekernel of г; 12 
Л 30 
Л
в
 30 
X(D) 133 
Í{D) 132 
C(v) least core of υ 12 
С* (υ) preleast core of и 12 
M set of proper subsets of Ν: 2Ν\{φ, Ν} 15 
Mat
mxn
(X) class of matrices with m rows, η columns and entries in X 102 
MC 61 
M(v) bargaining set of game υ 12 
IN {0,1,2,3,...} 
η number of players 
N {1,2, . . . , n) or ( 1 2 . . . n); player set 
nc(x) the non-carrier of x, i.e. {i € Ν \ v(i) = x¡} 16 
NTUN set of non-transferable utility games with player set N 10 
JVu(i)),mi(w) nucleolus 12 
Nu*(v),nu*(v) prenucleolus 13 
Nu(U, S) general nucleolus 24 
out(v) 18 
Ί*2 (V) collection of subsets of V with one or two elements 17 
Ρ M class of Ti/-games with a population monotonie allocation scheme 89 
PMN class of TtZ-games with player set N with a pmas 89 
1R+ set of non-negative reals 
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IFÎ4-+ set of positive reals 
Ж set of functions from X to R 
Rr(v) 51 
st](x) 12 
stJ(x) 52 
SAN set of superadditive Tt/-games with player set N 15 
S F class of simple flow networks 60 
S N class of monotonie simple games with player set N 17 
SQ class of zero-monotonic simple games with player set N 44 
θ coordinate ordering map 13 
TUN the set of transferable utility games with player set N 10 
•wp unanimity game 17 
u
w
 monotonie simple game 17 
v* dual of ν 80 
v
s
 subgame of υ to player set S 16 
v~
s
 subgame of υ to player set N\S 16 
W„ set of minimal winning coalitions 17 
wT 80 
X1 set of vectors orthogonal to all elements of X 50 
*{S) E ,
e 5 z , Π 
x
s
 restriction of ι to IR 
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effective, 77 
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Fubini's Theorem, 141 
game in strategic form, 9 
games 
additive, 15 
assignment, 41 
big boss, 52, 70 
clan, 52 
concave, 15 
convex, 15, 70 
cooperative, 8 
cost, 43 
fair division, 79, 92 
flow, 60 
Г-component additive tree, 42, 51, 
70 
information market, 52 
matching, 41 
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restricted, 48 
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simple flow, 59 
standard tree, 43 
strategic, 9, 121 
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grand coalition, 9 
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weakly Eulerian, 134 
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imputation set, 11, 24, 48, 62 
indicator 
function, 101 
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individual rationality, 11 
inflow, 18 
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integer, 65, 72, 100 
invariant, 15 
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Kohlberg's collections, 16 
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lexicographical ordering, 24, 64 
logically independent, 63 
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lower semi continuous, 141 
matching, 41 
max flow min cut, 19 
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Nash equilibrium, 10, 121 
ЛГ-dummy, 69 
network, 17 
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simple flow, 60 
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restricted, 123 
non-transferable utility, 9, 10 
nucleolus, 12 
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determining the, 37 
general, 24 
restricted, 37 
objection, 12 
counter, 12 
one person efficiency, 62 
option, 104 
outcome, 7, 10 
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parcel, 92 
Pareto optimal, 102 
ε-, 117 
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(quasi) Eulerian, 133 
closed, 133 
coalition, 64 
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payoff function, 10 
player, 7 
pmas, 89 
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strong, 95 
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pre-play communication round, 7 
preimputation set, 11, 62 
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price vector, 102 
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proper, 15 
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retraction, 129 
root, 43, 52 
row 
elementary, 27 
index of a, 27 
saturated, 43 
segment, 132 
separating, 69 
Shapley value, 13 
sink, 18, 82, 108 
slack, 26 
solution, 9, 11, 61 
MC-, 61 
one point, 11 
source, 18, 82, 108 
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strategy 
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tuple, 10 
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subgame , 16 
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subset, 12 
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surplus, 12, 67 
τ-value, 61 
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tree, 18, 52 
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flow, 64 
vector, 16 
utility 
density, 79 
function, 10, 79, 124 
matrix, 102 
maximization, 122 
utility-price ratio, 103 
value, 18 
vertex, 17 
veto 
control, 59, 92 
game, 17 
¿-veto, 17 
player, 17, 45 
zero-monotonic, 15 
zero-normalization, 15 
zero-normalized, 15, 48 
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Samenvatting 
Dit proefschift beschouwt verscheidene onderwerpen in de speltheorie. Deze tak van de 
wiskunde houdt zich bezig met het modelleren en analyseren van conflictsituaties. Een 
conflictsituatie kan een klassiek spel zijn, maar ook een economie met vele individuen, 
ieder met zijn eigen capaciteiten, kennis, gedrag en voorkeuren. Iedere 'speler' kiest één 
van de acties waartoe hij in staat is. Deze keuzes bepalen een uitkomst. In speltheo-
retische modellen worden alleen de meest essentiële aspecten van de situatie beschreven, 
bijvoorbeeld voor elke betrokkene alle mogelijke acties en ieders waardering voor elk van 
de mogelijke uitkomsten. 
Naast het modelleren is het geven van oplossingsconcepten een fundamenteel aspect van 
de speltheorie. Een oplossingsconcept voegt aan elk element van een klasse van spelen één 
of meerdere uitkomsten toe. Bekende oplossingsconcepten in de coöperatieve speltheorie 
zijn: de nucleolus, de kernel, de bargaining set en de Shapley-waarde. In de niet-
coöperatieve speltheorie is het meest fundamentele oplossingsconcept de verzameling 
van Nash-evenwichten. Oplossingsconcepten kunnen als leidraad dienen voor de spelers. 
Soms kunnen ze zelfs de uiteindelijke uitkomst voorspellen. In dit proefschrift wordt 
voornamelijk aandacht besteed aan: 
- het daadwerkelijk berekenen van (elementen van) oplossingsconcepten, 
- het geven van verbanden tussen verschillende concepten, 
- het aangeven van eigenschappen die een concept uniek bepalen. 
De hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 9 betreffen coöperatieve spelen met overdraagbaar nut, 
de zogenaamde ΓίΖ-spelen. Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een methode om voor elk TU-spëi dat een 
nucleolus heeft, deze te bepalen. Het algoritme kan opgevat worden als een uitgebreide 
vorm van de simplex-methode. Als op voorhand een (kleine) collectie van coalities kan 
worden aangegeven die de nucleolus bepaalt, kan het algoritme eenvoudig aangepast en 
versneld worden. Hoofdstuk 5 is gebaseerd op dit idee. Er wordt aangetoond dat voor elk 
n-persoons spel er een collectie van ten hoogstens In—2 coalities bestaat die de nucleolus 
bepaalt. In het algemeen echter is het vinden van zo een collectie even moeilijk als het 
vinden van de nucleolus zelf. Voor verschillende klassen van Ti/-spelen worden collecties 
van coalities gegeven die de nucleolus bepalen. Voor de klasse van nul-monotone simpele 
spelen wordt een aanpassing van het algemene algoritme gegeven. Ook worden in dit 
hoofdstuk spelen bekeken waarbij niet alle coalities een waarde hebben. 
Hoofdstuk 6 is geheel gewijd aan Г-component additive tree games. De belangrijkste 
resultaten van het hoofdstuk zijn dat de bargaining set gelijk is aan de core en dat de 
nucleolus gelijk is aan de kernel. 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt gekeken naar simpele netwerken en de spelen die gegenereerd 
worden door deze netwerken. We introduceren de 'minimum snede-oplossing' en geven 
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een axiomatizering ervan. Verder worden relaties gegeven tussen de core van een simpel 
flow spel en andere klassieke concepten. 
Hoofdstuk 8 behandelt fair division spelen: TU-spelen die gegenereerd worden door 
bijvoorbeeld een erfenis of een ruil-economie met land als ruilobject (naast geld). Met 
behulp van de 'maximale stroom-minimale snede' stelling van Ford en Fulkerson (1956) 
kan worden bepaald of een TCZ-spel tot de klasse van fair division spelen behoort. 
Als het model enigszins wordt aangepast, het land wordt niet meer beheerd door indi-
viduen maar door 'comités met veto controle', dan verkrijgen we de klasse van spelen met 
'population monotonie allocation schemes'. Deze klasse is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 
9. Een population monotonie allocation scheme, kortweg pmas, geeft niet alleen voor de 
grote coalitie een efficiënte allocatie, maar ook voor alle deelcoalities. De monotonie zit 
in het feit dat hoe groter een coalitie is (met betrekking tot inclusie), des te meer elke 
speler erin ontvangt. We geven enkele eenvoudige bewijzen voor bekende resultaten over 
deze spelen. Verder beschouwen we de vraag of er een (relatief) snelle methode is om te 
bepalen of een TtZ-spel een pmas heeft. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met de (open) vraag of 
een spel uit deze klasse met alleen geheeltallige waarden ook een pmas heeft met louter 
geheeltallige waarden. 
Hoofdstuk 10 gaat niet over TL/-spelen, maar bevindt zich wel in de coöperatieve sfeer. 
Er wordt een algoritme gegeven dat een verdeling van bijvoorbeeld een erfenis geeft, 
zodanig dat: 
- iedereen denkt dat hij het grootse deel krijgt 
- er geen andere verdeling is waarbij niemand erop achteruit gaat en minstens één persoon 
er echt op vooruit gaat. 
De laatste twee hoofdstukken bevatten niet-coöperatieve onderwerpen. In hoofdstuk 11 
wordt het Nash-evenwichtsconcept geaxiomatizeerd voor twee klassen van strategische 
spelen. Ten eerste voor de klasse van eindige spelen waarbij de spelers gemengde strate-
gieën mogen spelen (η-matrix games) en ten tweede voor de klasse van spelen waarbij 
de strategie-ruimten convex en compact zijn en de nutsfuncties continu en concaaf in 
de coördinaat van de betreffende speler. De gebruikte axioma's zijn: niet leegheid, 
nutsmaximalizatie (bij één persoons spelen) en consistentie. 
Tenslotte heeft hoofdstuk 12 een bepaald type search spel als onderwerp. De strategie 
ruimte is (de realizatie van) een ongerichte graph. Voor spelen waarbij de graph zwak-
Eulers is, bepalen we een Nash-evenwicht. De waarde van zo een (nulsom) spel blijkt 
gelijk te zijn aan de helft van de lengte van een kortste gesloten tour die alle punten 
tenminste één keer bezoekt. 
159 
Curriculum vitae 
Ik ben geboren in Uburu, Nigeria op 15 juli 1967. Van mijn derde tot mijn achttiende jaar 
woonde ik in Eindhoven. Van 1979 tot 1985 heb ik daar het VWO gevolgd (atheneum 
B) op het Van der Putt lyceum. Daarna ben ik verhuisd naar Nijmegen om wiskunde 
te gaan studeren aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. Mijn doctoraal examen heb 
ik behaald in 1991. Bij het schrijven van mijn scriptie, getiteld 'Bijna orthogonale rijen 
en operatoren', werd ik begeleid door Prof. Dr. A.C.M, van Rooij. Het betrof een 
onderwerp in de Functionaalanalyse. Aansluitend werd ik Assistent in Opleiding bij de 
vakgroep wiskunde van de KUN in het gebied Speltheorie, nu onder begeleiding van 
Prof. Dr. S.H. Tijs en Dr. J.A.M. Potters, met dit proefschrift als resultaat. 


